Let's talk about the non-existent 2021 valuation, that could have been invoked by @USSpensions as a solution to the crisis that the scheme and pre-92 HE sector is heading towards. (This is an overdue thread.) 1/
It is widely appreciated by the scheme's members that the 2020 valuation date of 31 March 2020 is right in the middle of a COVID-related dip in the markets (first-wave, locked-down, market chaos), and is one important factor in the huge £14-15bn deficit. 2/
At the valuation date, the scheme's assets had plummeted from around £73bn at the end of December 2019 to £66.5bn. By 31 March 2021 the assets had recovered to £80.6bn, and market conditions were widley seen as more 'normal'. (Most recent figure? £88bn) 3/
Now, you might be thinking that a +£14bn swing in asset values on a scheme with a £14-15bn deficit might mean we've broken even. Alas, no, not in the murky world of pension valuations, and especially not at #USS. 4/
The issue is the valuation of the liabilities, which is based on a complex calculation with many moving parts. @USSpensions' assessment of the March 2021 position is that the deficit has indeed receded significantly, but is still around £5-7bn due to much higher liabilities. 5/
Is this sizeable residual deficit as at March 2021 a fair assessment? That question mainly comes down to the appropriateness (or otherwise) of the so-called 'discount rate', which can be thought of as a prudent estimate of the future investment returns for the scheme. 6/
That word 'prudent' is super-important! On an unbiased estimate of the future investment returns (i.e. one that's equally likely to be too low as too high), the scheme doesn't have a deficit, even as at 31 March 2020, and certainly not a year later. 7/
But pensions regulation requires a prudent assessment, and for good reason: adding in a safety buffer allows for things to turn out worse than expected without knocking things off track. The problems occur when prudence is ramped up too far. 8/
So, how prudent is the discount rate used in the 2021 valuation? The answer is significantly more prudent than the one used in every valuation over the past decade *bar* 2020, where it was ramped up even more. 9/
One way to see this is by looking at where the discount rate sits on the distribution of projected investment returns from #USS's model. In 2014, #USS used the 65th centile. In 2017 and 2018, the 67th. In 2020, it was somewhere around 80-90th centile. 2021? Around the 75th. 10/
Another useful comparison is in a (scrappy) table I threw together, comparing the discount rates for successive valuations in three ways: nominal terms (i.e. % returns), relative to the CPI, and relative to the return on long-dated government bonds (aka 'gilts'). 10/
It is clear from this table that the discount rate assumption is bumping around at its lowest ever level in the 2021 calculations that #USS have released. And I don't think it's possible to over-estimate how much of an effect small tweaks to the discount rate can make! 11/
In other words, the 2021 position (an improved deficit of £5-7bn) is based on the most pessimistic view of long-term investment returns that #USS has used at any point in the last decade of valuations! 12/
So forgive me if I struggle to believe #USS's claims (repeated by @UniversitiesUK) that the 2021 valuation doesn't present an improved position for the scheme. It should, and it would under reasonable valuation assumptions. 13/
This thread's too long, and I haven't mentioned future service costs, which are key to the claims that @USSpensions & @UniversitiesUK are making in ruling out a solution based on a 2021 valuation. Those costs have gone through the roof due to the same ramping up of prudence. 14/
I will try to write this stuff up properly at some point, as it's too central to the brewing dispute to allow #USS to make such claims unchallenged. The document that contains USS's argument and figures is below. Please do scrutinise! 15/15 uss.co.uk/-/media/projec…
PS Why have employers (with a couple of exceptions) not been crying out for a 2021 valuation? Because they were focussed almost exclusively on avoiding the contribution increase from 21.1% to 23.7% due in October; the only way to do that was with a 2020 valuation and benefit cuts
PPS I've just seen that @nm_davies beat me to it on this subject! It's almost as if spending most of the week in in furiating JNC meetings leads you to miss out on Twitter... medium.com/ussbriefs/the-…

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More from @Sam_Marsh101

1 Sep
Want a whistle-stop summary of how we ended up hurtling towards industrial action over #USS? Here's a brief summary. 1/
1. The valuation date

@USSpensions ploughed ahead with a valuation using market data from the peak of market turmoil in the first wave of COVID (31 March 2020), wiping billions off the value of the scheme's assets.
2. Extreme prudence and misguided risk-management

Not content with a COVID-affected valuation date, #USS reworked their discredited Test 1 and ramped up prudence much further than in previous valuations. medium.com/ussbriefs/how-…
Read 14 tweets
11 Sep 20
"Tired of your old Test 1? Always found the linakage too rigidly mechanical? Then welcome to the new, improved Metric A!" Or so the marketing spiel seems to go. But look below the surface and you'll find all the same logical flaws and a near identical ramping up of costs. 1/
I will try and keep this as accessible as possible, because #USS can't be allowed to bluff their way through this stuff. First, a recap. What was wrong with Test 1? 2/
There were a number of criticisms of Test 1, but the main one was that it unnecessarily drove up deficits and contribution rates based on a very flimsy premise (a "large and demonstrable mistake" in @MikeOtsuka's words). 2/ medium.com/@mikeotsuka/us…
Read 12 tweets
9 Apr 20
Okay, time for that #USS update! This thread is going to take in as much of what's going on as possible. And that is *a lot*. I will try to be as concise as I can, but this could be a long one. Happy Easter break. 1/
Firstly, the #USS board has confirmed it is proceeding with the 2020 valuation using market data as at 31 March. It is hard to see how a meaningful assessment of the scheme's long-term health can be made as that date, but that's what we're going to have to try and do. 2/
There are some arguments in favour of proceeding: @TPRgovuk will issue guidance for schemes with a March 2020 valuation date which may allow more flexibility than normal, and "post-valuation experience" over the next 15 months can (and we're told will) be taken into account. 3/
Read 24 tweets
10 Mar 20
I wrote a quick reaction to the 2020 methodology "discussion document" that #USS released yesterday, but I didn't go into detail on the claims I made. Allow me to do some of that in a thread now. 1/

medium.com/ussbriefs/the-…
There are three main problems I identified in #USS's document:

1. The dual-discount rate they illustrate is a very close match for their old methodology;
2. Test 1 has been replaced by Test 1 v2.0;
3. We are still hitting a brick wall when it comes to evidence.

2/
Let's start with the easy one: the dual discount rate that #USS is considering is (at best) equivalent to the 2018 valuation in terms of the calculation of liabilities. This is evident in Table 7.2 of the document (compare the deficits and TP discount rates in rows 1 and 2). 3/
Read 28 tweets
19 Dec 19
The release of the Joint Expert Panel's second report and the clear resolve shown by @UCU members mean we are now in a strong position to make major changes to how #USS is managed. A future free from the intense acrimony of recent years is possible. We need to make it happen. 1/
In September, I wrote that it was essential we take a stand over #USS in order to shift the balance of power in the discussions. The resounding mandate and first wave of strike action have totally changed the dynamics of recent meetings. 2/ medium.com/ussbriefs/why-…
Our employers' representatives at @UniversitiesUK had, since May, tried to convince members and employers that #USS's 'Option 3' was the best possible outcome within the law, and in line with the recommendations from the JEP's first report. 3/
Read 12 tweets
28 Nov 19
People have been asking me for more details on the 9 day delay I tweeted about yesterday. I'm very happy to oblige, as it illustrates very clearly what we've been up against, and why it's hard to see constructive progress being made on #USS while Bill Galvin is in post. 1/
This summer, a subgroup of the #USS JNC was set up to look at modelling of the fund to get a better understand of the risks the scheme is carrying. We've been asking for such information for years, but have struggled to get meaningful data and modelling out of #USS. 2/
After years of showing very little interest, @UniversitiesUK finally joined our calls for such a group to happen. (Credit goes to @Cambridge_Uni CFO Cambridge Anthony Odgers, who joined the UUK team in the spring and is the sole member of the group from UUK.) 3/
Read 15 tweets

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