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The Dissolution & Calling of Parliament Bill returns to the Commons next week
In our blog, Unit Director Meg Russell, @Prof_Phillipson & @PetraSchleiter analyse its key flaws & propose a solution that keeps parliament at the heart of decision-making
@UKandEU
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The Dissolution & Calling of Parliament Bill returns to the Commons next week
In our blog, Unit Director Meg Russell, @Prof_Phillipson & @PetraSchleiter analyse its key flaws & propose a solution that keeps parliament at the heart of decision-making
@UKandEU
https://twitter.com/ConUnit_UCL/status/1435467936454557696
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The bill seeks to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act & revive the prerogative power of dissolution – allowing the PM to ask the monarch for dissolution without parliamentary approval.
But @PACac, @HLConstitution & @JointCtteeFTPA have all identified problems with the bill
The bill seeks to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act & revive the prerogative power of dissolution – allowing the PM to ask the monarch for dissolution without parliamentary approval.
But @PACac, @HLConstitution & @JointCtteeFTPA have all identified problems with the bill
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First, the bill seeks to exclude the courts, through its ‘ouster clause’. But its approach risks legal uncertainty – it’s unclear whether a statute can revive a prerogative power. Such legal uncertainty can only be resolved in court: ironically, risking drawing the courts in
First, the bill seeks to exclude the courts, through its ‘ouster clause’. But its approach risks legal uncertainty – it’s unclear whether a statute can revive a prerogative power. Such legal uncertainty can only be resolved in court: ironically, risking drawing the courts in
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And ouster clauses are often ineffective: courts may ‘read them down’, to uphold the fundamental rule of law principle that there should be legal limits to executive action. For that reason, @PACac has called the ouster ‘constitutionally unwise’.
And ouster clauses are often ineffective: courts may ‘read them down’, to uphold the fundamental rule of law principle that there should be legal limits to executive action. For that reason, @PACac has called the ouster ‘constitutionally unwise’.
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Second, the bill risks politicising the monarchy. It leaves the monarch as the only constitutional check on a rogue PM. But asking the monarch to fulfil this role – and potentially to refuse a dissolution – risks dragging the monarchy into political controversy.
Second, the bill risks politicising the monarchy. It leaves the monarch as the only constitutional check on a rogue PM. But asking the monarch to fulfil this role – and potentially to refuse a dissolution – risks dragging the monarchy into political controversy.
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@JointCtteeFTPA called the govt’s draft dissolution criteria – showing when a monarch might refuse a request – ‘inadequate’. The govt hasn’t produced fuller criteria, but even these would need interpretation. And some argue that the Queen can no longer refuse dissolution.
@JointCtteeFTPA called the govt’s draft dissolution criteria – showing when a monarch might refuse a request – ‘inadequate’. The govt hasn’t produced fuller criteria, but even these would need interpretation. And some argue that the Queen can no longer refuse dissolution.
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Clearly the PM should not have unlimited election-calling power: a constitutional check is necessary
The solution is simple: retain Commons control over election-calling. The FTPA’s 2/3 majority requirement is unenforceable. But a simple majority vote is a different matter
Clearly the PM should not have unlimited election-calling power: a constitutional check is necessary
The solution is simple: retain Commons control over election-calling. The FTPA’s 2/3 majority requirement is unenforceable. But a simple majority vote is a different matter
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A Commons majority vote on the principle & date of an election would protect against a rogue PM but not hinder one with Commons support. As a ‘proceeding in parliament’ it would keep out the courts, making the ouster unnecessary. And it would not risk politicising the monarchy
A Commons majority vote on the principle & date of an election would protect against a rogue PM but not hinder one with Commons support. As a ‘proceeding in parliament’ it would keep out the courts, making the ouster unnecessary. And it would not risk politicising the monarchy
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For more on the FTPA, see our previous blog, analysing its role in the 2017-19 parliament. One common rationale for its repeal has been that it caused the 2019 Brexit deadlock, but – as Meg Russell explains – it’s far from certain that this is true.
bit.ly/3n9bALv
For more on the FTPA, see our previous blog, analysing its role in the 2017-19 parliament. One common rationale for its repeal has been that it caused the 2019 Brexit deadlock, but – as Meg Russell explains – it’s far from certain that this is true.
bit.ly/3n9bALv
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