As @ICRC explains, the presumption of civilian status is a part of binding laws of war. Isn’t it true that @DeptofDefense has highly anomalous view that considers this rule NOT part of binding laws of war? Does the US government as a whole agree with DoD’s position?
3. Who were the most senior DoD officials who authorized or signed off on the strike?
Before taking the strike, what did DoD estimate would be total number of civilian casualties killed?
What did DoD consider would have been acceptable level of civilian casualties?
4. Has DoD used its standard rule that places the burden on those who allege civilian casualties and requires proof by preponderance of evidence (more than 50% likelihood) that civilians were killed before DoD will even consider the reports credible for purpose of investigation?
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2. On the list of things that needed to be said is the use of the “legally available" standard in Executive Branch lawyering to get to yes on contentious policies.
An issue that @charlie_savage spotlighted in his book Power Wars.
One of most important accounts to follow on #Afganistan👇
If Mr. @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a government-in-exile, it significantly changes equation on recognition of Taliban, on United Nations credentials for Taliban, on interpretation of US sanctions and their humanitarian impact.
2. To spell some of this out, if @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a competitor government, it provides countries with great flexibility in withholding recognition from the Taliban.
3. If @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a competitor government, it provides UN Member States with great flexibility in denying Taliban a seat at the #UnitedNations.
"I witnessed first-hand the Taliban’s obstinance to breaking ties with al-Qaeda ... The most the U.S. negotiators could extract from the Taliban was a flimsy pledge."
"I witnessed first-hand the Taliban’s obstinance to breaking ties with al-Qaeda during countless hours of negotiations in Doha, Qatar. The most the U.S. negotiators could extract from the Taliban was a flimsy pledge" justsecurity.org/77823/take-tim…
3. Her larger point here is about the decision whether (if ever) to recognize the Taliban government, the need for #HumanRights conditions, and to see actual compliance with human rights and #counterterrorism demands.
2. “Key American decisions were made long before July, when the consensus among intelligence agencies was that the Afghan government could hang on for as long as two years, which would have left ample time for an orderly exit.”
That’s called an intelligence failure.
3. “As late as a week before Kabul’s fall, the overall intelligence analysis was that a Taliban takeover was not yet inevitable.”
Important statement by over two dozen United Nations experts that meets the moment.
"It is unacceptable for States to stand on the sidelines when a [UN] listed terrorist organization overruns the territory of #Afghanistan and engages in acts that may amount to war crimes..."
2. "International law requires that those engaged in acts of terrorism be dealt with fully with the considerable capacity of the law and practice that has developed since the Taliban were first designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations Security Council."
3. Their statement also calls for UN member states "to apply to the fullest extent and consistent with international law, the international sanctions on designated terrorist organizations, including the obligations of all States to suppress and prevent terrorist acts."
Mounting evidence of Donald Trump's criminal intent under federal and Georgia state law.
U.S. Attorney in Georgia testifies: Trump was going to fire him for refusing to back up Trump's false claims (including on call with Raffensperger) of voter fraud.
2. "Mr Pak had refused to support similar election fraud claims because of the lack of evidence, according to two people familiar with his investigation. 'You have your never-Trumper US attorney there,' Mr Trump told Mr Raffensperger during their phone call."