@RadioFreeTom#NickGvosdev here. Since I teach History of the Cold War for @HarvardExt, let me add my two cents. In class one, we look at the impact of 1917 and the attempt to reach a consensus during World War II. In class, we date start of Cold War to 1946, based on 1) Iran situation ... 1/
@RadioFreeTom@HarvardExt 2) Stalin's 1946 speech; 3) stopping of travel between the Korean zones; 4) breakdown of Allied coordination on Germany ... continues through 1947 and 1948 based on how elections in Eastern Europe shake out, and the rejection of the Marshall Plan. Symbolically by March 1948, 2/
@RadioFreeTom@HarvardExt when USSR walks out of the Allied Control Council for Germany and declares it no longer capable of functioning, we can say the WWII Grand Alliance is definitely over. Push to create a single Western Germany and NATO in 1949 confirms that. 3/
@RadioFreeTom@HarvardExt Cold War ending? We take as the juridical "end" the Charter of Paris on a New Europe, November 1990, which ratifies what happened in 1989 and 1990. END
@RadioFreeTom@HarvardExt Of course, some argue Dec 1991, or after 9/11 when Condi Rice says it is definitely over, or some who say it never ended, just took on a new form. One thing we address in the class is whether the Cold War is defined by capitalist/communist split, or whether this is part of the 5/
@RadioFreeTom@HarvardExt longer-term rivalry between continental/Eurasian and maritime/Atlantic powers, in which case the Cold War is part of a four-century long historical process. REALLY ENDING HERE
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@RadioFreeTom@ianbremmer@carnegiecouncil@Ipsos@wef Policymakers may find it difficult to reconcile findings where majorities say "expanding trade is a good thing" and that "there should be more trade barriers." 3/
Important piece from @profmusgrave ... suggests that the climate change narrative we identified at the @carnegiecouncil may not have as much motivating power in domestic politics ... 1/
@profmusgrave@carnegiecouncil We've seen this in the discussion in recent days with @reziemba, @CarolynKissane and @v_madalina about how short-term doorstep considerations, especially pocketbook concerns about energy prices, can trump longer-term climate policy. 2/
@Reuters@Cmkahn@Ipsos "For example, a majority of the 18-to-65-year-olds who took the Ipsos survey - 68% - agreed that the war “was going to end badly, no matter when the U.S. left,” and 61% wanted the United States to complete its withdrawal of troops on schedule." 2/
@Reuters@Cmkahn@Ipsos "Yet a smaller majority - 51% - also agreed that “it would have been worth it for the United States to leave troops in Afghanistan another year,” and 50% wanted to send troops back into the country to fight the Taliban." 3/
Continuing the conversation started at @RadioFreeTom and with the contributions by @JonNeeter and @bren1008, we are fundamentally grappling with the question of narratives: why do we do what we do in the world? 1/
@RadioFreeTom@JonNeeter@bren1008@carnegiecouncil The Afghan disaster is putting into stark relief that we may be moving away from some of the post-9/11 assumptions and statements: 1) that in order to prevent "global terrorism" from finding homes, the United States needs to strengthen all states around the world. 3/
That the Taliban feel the need to state they will guarantee women's rights (albeit "under the limits of Islam") in 2021--a statement they never felt compelled to make in 1996--suggests that they are aware that the situation today is different. 1/
Statements don't mean much unless backed by deeds, and if actions contradict the statements, then we know how much they are worth. Also of interest is an apparent recognition of the concept of sovereignty--that other states and countries live under their own laws. ... 2/
A major issue with the 1990s Taliban was their eagerness and willingness to export their revolution to neighboring states. Again, statements have to be backed up by action. 3/
As we watch developments in Afghanistan and as the blame game continues in U.S. domestic politics, this might be a good time to revisit @DerekSReveron's important paradigm for understanding national security policy: the die-kill-pay (ignore) paradigm. 1/
@DerekSReveron Revisiting @LauraWalkerKC's observation here: this is the crux of the matter. The Afghan mission was one where the public has signaled they no longer want Americans to kill or be killed, so it raises the question now: what tools to prevent ... 2/
@DerekSReveron@LauraWalkerKC other bad outcomes. For instance, this--the "first female mayor" "waiting for the Taliban to come ... kill me." What options are available? 3/