We will come to the next chapter soon enough but here's a recap to catch you up. 2014-19 was an exploratory period where I developed my investment style; tried to launch a fund, 2x, and didn't get it going; and had overall success punctuated by extreme volatility at times...
I grossed 220% over six yrs (vs SPX ~100%), whilst running ~30% average net exposure (ie beta-adjusted neutral), but punctuated by bouts of extreme volatility and underperformance.
Indeed most all the outperformance was generated in the early years when credit analysis 'worked'
To recap:
2014: +119% vs SPX +12%
2015: +39% vs SPX -1%
2016: +1% vs SPX +10%
2017: +21% vs SPX +19%
2018: -25% vs SPX -6%
2019: +15% vs SPX +29%
Cumulative performance: +220% (21.5% CAGR) vs SPX +100% (12.2% CAGR)
Basically by early 2020 I had semi-decided that shorting - at least the way I was practising it - had become fiendishly difficult as to be almost impossible. Certainly, impossible for me to do in a sane, effective, money-generating manner...yes it took a long time to get here!
Meaning as I entered 2020 I made a conscious effort to reduce the short book materially; reduce overall gross; and reduce sizing of individual shorts as well.
Long-time followers no doubt have noticed I spend far, far less time on individual shorts now...
...because the 'return on brain pain' simply is too tough in most cases. In fact I seem to do better (on shorts specifically) the less I talk about them (it's been that kind of environment).
I thus transitioned the book from a high gross, low net strategy to a low(ish) gross...
medium net strategy (call it 70-80% invested, 50-60% net long vs 150-200% gross, 30% net long previously).
Obviously, this was about to really hurt in early 2020...but I made the decision in good faith based on my past learnings.
The other main change (from early 2020) was i decided to dedicate more effort to my blog, ultimately putting up a paywall during the early COVID onset. Given the failure to attract (enough) outside capital, this became (and remains) my 'base salary.'
On a personal level, 2019 saw the arrival of my first child (yay 💕💕) and a decision to move back to Asia (Tokyo) after 4 years in the UK. This ultimately only happened late in 2020 (thanks, COVID), meaning most of the initial COVID response happened whilst still in the UK...
Stay tuned for next time, when we break down Raper Capital's 2020 roller-coaster and what I learnt along the way 👊👊
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Here's an interesting example for the commodity shitco degenerates in my feed: Stanmore Resources, $SMR.AX.
Note this is extremely illiquid, as a result I have a tiny position, I think its more of a speculation than an 'all in' type call. But it is certainly intriguing...
As always here at Raper Capital there is an event angle. $SMR.AX is 74% owned by a Singapore holdco, Golden Energy $AUE.SI, also v cheap but a different beast.
Note that Golden bid for the whole co at $1 last April...
Stock was in the low 80s at the time - despite coal prices being in the toilet (post COVID) and a few operational issues.
Unclear why they couldn't mop up the entire thing, I guess there were a few holdouts, they went from 31% to 75% but couldn't get it done.
Time for another chapter in the Raper Capital origin story. Part 6: 2019.
This was a most eventful year and the most difficult since I began my full-time money management adventure. I got carried out of numerous shorts at huge losses and my entire approach was questioned...
First, the headline numbers. +15% on the yr vs the SPX +29%. In general I'll always take an absolute performance like that, but this felt like a total loss if you look at how I was doing through 1-3Q:
As you can see, I was on track for a smashing year (mid-30s%+) before 4Q happened and brought everything crashing down...
Looking at the top detractors ($NIO short calls, short $TSLA, etc) its pretty clear what happened...
If I had to summarize the state of play in a GIF it would be
Honestly the FY numbers were OK to fine. Overall EBITDA (pre-leases) was flat YoY despite large COVID issues (lockdowns affecting work; labor shortages, etc). Adjusting from leases, 'true' EBITDA was $16mm (and worth noting the trajectory much stronger in 2H):
Let's break it down by segments. Core homebuilding saw a big increase in starts - +14% yoy - a bit higher than I expected, but lower earnings as margins got hit by shortages and inefficiencies. Actually I think the Balance sheet tells part of the tale too...
The short answer is not much has changed. Still (by far) my largest position w the best combo of absolute valuation; execution; and potential event/takeout catalyst.
I think tho some people are realizing the housing/renovation/remodel boom May well continue a good deal longer…
Which is basically the message if you listen to most all the building products/home interior 2Q calls.
Maybe one/some woke up to the fact that this is one of the best quality building products names globally but still absurdly cheap (<5x EV/ebitda, unlevered).
Recall in 2018 I was still working at a fund in 🇬🇧 so was running long only and VERY concentrated (just a handful of core names). Still, 2018 was pretty painful, -25% vs the SPX -6%, most all the pain due to the huge Q4 drawdown in $AER:
Actually worth looking at the quarterly progression of returns. If you remember 2018 you'll recall 4Q was an absolute bloodbath (the 'taper tantrum') with many stocks falling out of bed for no apparent reason. $AER was no exception.
Some of these cyclical valuations are getting downright absurd. Today's example: Kloeckner $KCO.DE
This is not a particularly great biz (mild understatement) but let the numbers speak for themselves. 1.6bn EV (pre-2Q nos), currently doing 200-250mm EBITDA per QUARTER 🤪🤪
EV post-2Q will be ~1.5bn (they'll generate a bunch of cash), and prob 1.3-1.4bn post 3Q. Post 3Q - almost in the bank - they'll basically be <1x net levered (vs 4-5x a yr ago).
Like many other biz in this space, one good yr has completely fixed the B/S...
Again what's interesting here is what the mkt seems to imply will happen. This biz is run-rating 800mm+ EBITDA - so is on <2x EV/EBITDA currently - and there's no sign the environment is rolling over...
But who cares if it does? The biz did 200mm EBITDA pre-COVID in a good year