F raises concerns about how s 11 of Covid-19 Public Health Response Act 2020 operates as a Henry VIII provision (ie, secondary legislation overriding primary legislation).
Side note: Sure, s 11 must be a Henry VIII clause; s 13(1) gives it priority over primary legislation. However, s 13(2) expressly provides that the Bill of Rights Act still trumps any Covid-19 orders; in other words, the orders must be bill of rights consistent.
F: Claim is about whether this vax order can legally be made under C19 Public Health Response Act, not directly about Bill of Rights (although the latter does feed in).
Seems to be more in the style of the principle of legality claim -- power should be read narrowly, nudged by bill of rights and principle against Henry VIII-type effect.
Churchman: cautions F about ‘casting net too widely’; judicial review proceedings are narrow: focus on lawfulness, process, compliance with Bill of Rights.
F: Vax order was prepared by Min for C19 response but was signed off by Associate Min of Health. Difficult to know what minister was "satisfied" about legal requirements.
Side note: This is a thorny issue. Section 7 of Constitution Act allows another minister to exercise powers. But how does that square with legal mandate to consider such matters?
For the trainspotters, s 9(1)(ba) requires the minister to be satisfied that order is bill of rights compliant. But this doesn't really add anything to the usual principle that secondary legislation must be rights consistent (s 13(2) of this Act; Drew v AG generally).
F: Vax order goes beyond what is necessary, esp in light of high vax rates in community. Order is too wide; didn't assess which workers were (un)safe etc.
F argues about inadequate process.
Churchman: Are you attacking mode of operation of Parl when this order made? Undemocratic operation (not sitting as per usual) means order itself unlawful? But nothing in pleadings setting out such a challenge?
F concludes. Orders are very wide. Unconstitutional. Gravity of orders means s 9 considerations could not be met; minister could not be satisfied about mandated matters. Effect of vax orders on rights significant; should not have been promulgated as secondary legn.
Side note: I note that no right seems to have been identified but I presume it's s 11 of the Bill of Rights (right to refuse to undergo medical treatment).
Churchman: Is the argument about about process or substantive effect?
F: Process, but order has substantive effect.
Side note: This exchange underplays a huge conundrum on bill of rights jurisprudence -- when the supervisory concern in procedural or substantive (ala Miss Behavin', I think?).
The courts have fallen on substantive appraisal, ie whether the action is compliant or not, not merely whether the govt properly considered rights in the course of deliberation.
Side note: I think that underplays the effect of s 13(1); clearly, C19 orders prevail and thus "impliedly repeal" inconsistent primary legislation -- at least as long as they are in force? But the label might be by-the-bye.
P: No particular implicated right identified in applicant's submission.
Churchman: But accept - as developed in oral argument - that the argument is that freedom of choice implicit in s 11 of the Bill of Rights is burdened by employment consequences that might flow.
P: Court should be wary of reading anything into fact that ministers may have taken a different view from officials on some (unknown) matters. That's life.
Really important exchange about the applicable standard of review. Forgive the lack of verbatim reportage but it was so intoxicating I had to lean into it and think deeply about it...
To paraphrase. Merits are usually off limits on judicial review. However, Bill of Rights consistency is a question of law and thus a matter the courts can assess. Section also imposes preconditions to exercise of power, ie matters the minister must be satisfied about.
Some debate about the standard applicable to the latter. Crown says "satisfied" means "reasonably satisfied". Churchman ponders the extent to which court can second guess the decision, if doesn't think factual case made out.
More generally, Crown points to Pro-life Alliance: "considerable latitude" must be given to ministers and their assessment. Crown argues no basis for lowering threshold for substantive or irrationality review.
P: in answer to question, accepts, “on balance” in this case, the vax order coercively affects freedom of choice implicit in s 11 such that burden shifts to Crown to demonstrate that the limit is demonstrably justified. #bordervax
And that concession demands a flashing light or three too... 🚨🚨🚨
P: Jettisons first 3 Hansen steps and focuses on 4th – ie, proportionality – as that’s what it all turns on. (Or, rather, "step (b)(iii)" under the original *dreadful* numbering in Hansen.)
P: Consequences of risk not confined to border workers – rather, absorbed by community as a whole and borne disproportionality by certain vulnerable groups (elderly, immo compromised, etc).
Churchman: Statistically, all that can be said is vax folk are less likely to be infected and less likely to transmit etc. But not as a matter of certainty – deductive, albeit legitimate – reasoning based on likelihood.
Churchman: Argument in applicant’s written subs that, because vaccination only had interim approval, administering vaccine amounted to medical experimentation. Unsure whether still advanced but invites response.
P: Nods to possible indirect discrimination re specific groups. But assessment of whether distinction actionable discrimination the same as section 5 justified limits calculus.
Churchman: Re te Tiriti, nods to comments of Goddard in Trans-Tasman Resources that te Tiriti duties may arise even in absence of - or beyond - legislative reference.
P: Addresses whether section 6 Bill of Rights requires reading down s 11 power to make orders: Crown position is that that’s superfluous, as s 9 requires orders to be Bill of Rights consistent.
@SpeakerTrevor Thanks. It will be interesting to see how this plays out. A few top-of-mind/random thoughts, on what seem to be proposals in tandem.
@SpeakerTrevor My instinct is to think about efficacy and design in functional terms, ie do/will these institutions deliver the type and style of accountability etc expected, regardless of name and form?
@SpeakerTrevor In order to answer that, we need to identify the style of scrutiny/accountability needed in the particular context.
Apologies to my fellow trainspotters but core uni duties (our first LAWS213 classes on admin law and judicial review) trump spectating today — so I’m dipping in-and-out of the hearing
I’ll try and catch up on events at the tea break. But the NZLS has finished and now the Solictor-General, Jagose QC, is on her feet leading the govt’s case.
Judges have arrived. Farmer QC et al for Borrowdale; Solicitor-General et al for govt (good to see SG appearing herself); NZLS intervening. Gallery full — except the broken seat (my favourite at the back right).
Housekeeping about order, timing and 10min non-interruption rule. Court takes different views on when NZLS should appear. Court suggests argument could be done in 1 day — but Farmer doubts. Wisely, Farmer engages 10min rule.
The legal challenge to New Zealand’s C19 lockdown in Mar/Apr 2020 continues in Court of Appeal today, after Borrowdale challenges two grounds he lost before High Court (scope of health orders; essential businesses list). Snippets below explain background. #BorrowdaleRound2
Snippets are from a note of mine:
“Stamping out Covid-19 in New Zealand: legal pragmatism and democratic legitimacy” [2021] Public Law 241.
Whether the Health Act power to “isolate or quarantine” people allows a medical officer of health to issue a stay-at-home order for the entire country, regardless of suspicion of infection, is key issue IMV.
High Court declines to grant interim orders stopping vaccine roll out in New Zealand, in wide-ranging judicial review challenge to provisional approval of Pfizer vaccine and roll out.
However, Court observes that it is "reasonably arguably" that provisional approval is "problematic" because s 23 of the Medicines Act 1981 contemplates provisional approval only for "treatment of a limited number of patients" (~ all those 16+ prob not limited number).
That question will ultimately be decided, in the usual way, at the substantive hearing of application for judicial review. The judge's comments about whether there is a *reasonably arguable* case are not definitive, ie only for interim purposes after limited argument/evidence.
Our #laws522 postgrad class @VicUniWgtn convenes today to dive into and critique some hot public law scholarship — ideas, anatomy, argument and context. Always an exciting (and heady) day! 🤓
First up @PeterTMcKenzie, grappling with McLean’s sketch of NZ’s political (“insider, elite”) constitution - and the threat from legalism. #laws522
Next, @HannahReynecke dips into Harlow’s piece on the (redundant?) public—private divide — and challenges in bridging the spheres, esp in context of digitisation. (But what of te Tiriti?)