China itself is one big Evergrande.
One big debt crisis.
For years massively over-levered shadow banks masqueraded as propcos, got drunk on credit, flirted w/ default & called for bailout like a late-night uber.
Contagion has begun
👇
1/ How Evergrande is Actually a (Shadow) Bank
On the surface Evergrande is a propco. It has insatiable demand for capital cuz it needs to buy land. That's what propcos do.
But then Evergrande started stuffing its commercial paper into WMPs & selling it off to its own employees.
Let's be more explicit.
In June 2019, Evergrande plowed 13.2B¥ into Shengjing Bank, acquiring 36% stake in a literal lender.
Shengjing was on the brink of default. Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio was 8.52%, barely above regulatory req.
Now why would a propco bail out a bank? 🤔
2/ China's Other Fantastical Bank Bailouts
Evergrande's story is big. But it's barely new news.
In May 2019 China’s central bank announced its 1st bank takeover in 20 years: Baoshang.
Creditors were to take a hit, assets would be sold and an example set for governance.
And then there was Bank of Jinzhou.
In March 2020, the PBoC poured another 12B¥ into Jinzhou as Tier 1 capital adequacy fell to 5.14%. Two quasi state-controlled investors were said to have seized 44.34% in the troubled lender.
In July 2020, a state-backed provincial highway operator stepped in as the largest shareholder, but was dealing with its own balance sheet issues. Months later the company announced a 167.3B¥ refinancing to deal with debts on 37 government toll roads.
It kinda feels like trick-or-treating. Like Chinese financial institutions just gotta stick out their hand and the big brother rushes in with backstop.
4/ Where does all that bailout money come from?
In America we say "money printer go brr."
In China we say "money printer go BRRRRRRRRRR."
Xi's QE has been making a farce out of JPow since 2008. 👇
Is it sustainable?
5/ What about the whole real estate sector?
TLDR: this could snowball fast.
China's top 200 property companies currently hold >$5.5 TRILLION in assets at 8x leverage.
If Evergrande catalyzes even a 15% decline in prices across the board, much of the industry becomes insolvent.
Graph (left) shows the asset/liabilities ratio for 10 other propcos besides Evergrande. Note: they're all less than 1, which means shareholder's equity is negative- including Greenland, Sunac, Vanke, Country Garden...
Chart (right) shows the top 15 worst propcos in the world.
6/ What is the CCP gonna do now?
China is incentivized to let Evergrande collapse while minimizing shakeup in the rest of its property market.
So far the CCP made its goals pretty clear: pro stability & deleveraging; anti speculation.
According to macro expert @ABCampbell, "for a credit issue to get systematic, it has to go through the banking system, in particular the biggest and least stable"
Here they are. China's worst banks.
(its "Waterfall of Pain")
Let's wait & see.
Most of the data and images from this thread come from @rosetechnology_.
Check them out for more primary source data & visuals as the China debt crisis continues to unfold.
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From Fortune 500 to 1.95 Trillion in debt: How did China's #2 real estate giant get to this point?
How much cash does it *actually* have?
Will there be a bailout?
Who's gonna get f*cked?
Here goes. Story time.
👇
1/ First, how bad is the current situation?
There's not much info on Evergrande's finances on the Western web (aka Google) so I had to dig through the Chinese web (aka Baidu).
This poster shows China's top 3 most indebted real estate co's in 2020:
#1 is Evergrande (@ 1.95T ¥!)
2/ According to the company's 2020 annual report, 674B ¥ (35%) is interest-bearing debt, which means it incurs new interest liability of 180+M ¥ every day!
Comparatively, it only has 158B in cash to repay all its short term debt + interest which means...
1. Hot date 🔥 (or several) 2. Hot portco 🦄 (or several)
Turns out:
There's a famous game theory algorithm that maximizes ur chances of finding both.
It's called ...
👇
1/ What is the Secretary Problem?
Imagine ur in HR.
U wanna hire the best secretary from N applicants. So u interview them 1 by 1 until u decide to accept one. Rejected candidates can't be resurrected.
What strategy maximizes ur chances of choosing the BEST?
[code @ end of 🧵]
Now replace "ur in HR" with
"ur a normal guy" (or girl).
Replace "secretary" with
"hot date" &/or "hot portfolio company🦄."
The strategy that maximizes for the BEST secretary also maximizes for the BEST gf/bf also maximizes for the BEST investment. 🤯
In 1983, McDonalds struggled to launch the McNugget. Chicken volatility was too high.
"How can we set fixed prices w/out risking billions?"
Hedge funder Ray Dalio cracked the code.
Here's how his economic machine solved McDonald's 🐥problem.👇
1/ What is the Economic Machine?
Before talking about 🐥s, let's take a quick intro ride through Dalio's core macroeconomic insight:
While seemingly complex, the economy is mechanically & predictably driven by human nature.
i.e. Everything from debt cycles to GDP is a machine.
3 Forces drive Dalio’s economic machine:
#1 Productivity growth
#2 Long Term Debt Cycle
#3 Short Term Debt Cycle
The diagram above shows these 3 forces together in action.
#1 is shown by the monotonically increasing curve.
#2 wiggles sinusoidally along #1.
#3 wiggles along #2.
"3 reasons."
Start here. It shows (a) ur organized (b) u've done ur homework.
Example:
#1: "Ur the best at [restructuring/techM&A/derivatives]!"
#2: "I read about X deal & I wanna help on the next one!"
#3: "My buddy X from LevFin says culture is great."
Why was that a good answer?
#1 strokes ur interviewer's ego; s/he will like u more & whatever u say next will sound 2x better
#2 shows ur excited! (i'm convinced half the reason banks hire undergrad interns is for their energy)
#3 - shows ur an insider/ already 'one of the guys'