The fixed income market is selling off and people are all over the place trying to interpret the move.
Let me help you out - what’s moving and why?
A quality thread for the nice FinTwit people
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Move in nominal yields can be decomposed into inflation expectations and real yields
10y US inflation swaps topped in May and have plateaued ever since - no move over the last days
All the action is in real yields (see pic) which were on the way up already before the Fed.
Higher real yields are generally healthy for markets if they reflect sustainably higher economic growth down the road.
But 2022 US GDP consensus estimates have recently been revised down (see pic), and the same goes for earnings growth forecasts.
So, why higher real yields?
In this case, it’s about the risk premium demanded by investors to own bonds rather than roll-over short term deposits.
The future path of short-term interest rates is more uncertain (post Fed meeting), hence more premium required.
See also implied volatility in the pic below
The Eurodollar market is also on the move, reflecting more probabilities the Fed will hike rates in 2022 and beyond.
Such a policy shift requires more risk premium (in the form of higher real yields) at the short-end.
Dec22 Eurodollar contract below
What about the long-end though?
The curve has been flattening aggressively and for good reasons.
If you require more risk premium at the front-end to account for a more hawkish Fed…well, it works the opposite way at the long-end.
Hence a flatter curve. Let me explain better.
A more hawkish Fed now - in the face of a fading growth impulse - means there is LESS uncertainty about the long term path for interest rates: stable or down
That’s because tightening today is generally seen as bad for long-term growth = lower yields, flatter 5s30s (pic)
So, the move is mostly in the front-end (higher real yields and implied vol to compensate for more uncertainty) while the curve flattens out.
Higher real yields due to risk premium rather than better growth prospects = something to watch out for in global macro multi-asset.
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Evergrande panic? I can almost hear you asking for it...here is your Chinese thread!
From a panoramic macro perspective, chances that a widespread financial market panic unfolds are relatively low - it will mostly depend on the Chinese authorities reaction.
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The chart below shows the % of Chinese households wealth in real estate - 74%, quite high.
For comparison, US households own <30% of their wealth in real estate.
This tells us:
- The Chinese economy is not very financialized
- Real estate matters for the CH household
How much?
74% of wealth concentrated in real estate is quite a lot, yes.
But 74% of what?
The chart below shows Chinese HH net assets (value of assets - liabilities).
In 2019, Chinese household net assets were RMB 500 trn = approx. 70k USD net wealth per each Chinese adult.
People obsess about outright yield levels, but curve shapes are at least equally important.
The US yield curve has been flattening relentlessly since May this year - chart below shows the yield differential between 5y and 30y US bonds.
This is paramount important.
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Yield differentials between short and long-end of the curve inform you about investors’ expectations on interest rates years down the line.
A steep yield curve means investors demand compensation (term premium) to own long bonds vs rolling ownership of short bonds each time
Premium for what risk?
It can be inflation, (real) duration or credit risk.
In this case, the curve has become flatter so investors demand less premium to own long end bonds - the distribution of probabilities of future interest rates has become easier to predict.
Very unpopular take, but backed by facts.
And I care much more about facts than opinions.
House prices are NOT expensive, when measured as one should reasonably do: in real terms, assuming a 10% down-payment and the remaining 90% financed with a fixed-rate mortgage.
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The median US house price has gone up 2.4x times since 1990.
In real terms, we are looking at a whopping 70% price increase over the last 10 years.
But houses are not paid for 100% in cash.
The median home buyer finances 88% of the house price with a fixed-rate mortgage.
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What's really relevant is how much these mortgage installments weigh on your net monthly income.
The red line in the chart measures just that, with the index = 100 in 1990 for comparison.
So how can (mortgage payments / real wages) be pretty low if house prices are high?
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The gold standard (black box) prevented govt to inject large qty of resources in the private sector (big deficits w/o plans to tax back) and banks to create tons of money (strong lending)
Constraining credit creation conflicts with the very human nature - ''I want all, and now''
After '71 (orange box), credit expansion is a completely elastic process - we can freely expand/contract the amount of money in the system.
Obviously, we choose to expand credit very often.
But sometimes deficit hawks prevail and we ''put deficits under control'' (black arrows)
Keep in mind the pace of change matters - decelerating credit creation is enough to slow down YoY GDP and earnings growth.
When you go into net surplus, you are actively draining resources from the private sector.