1. Over the last 25 years the Unionist vote in Northern Ireland has gradually declined from 51% to now circa 44%.
Regardless whether N Ireland stays in UK for the next decade it's now no longer, in any sense, a "unionist province".
While religion is certainly not a "100% determinator of N irish political identity" it's still a useful gauge of demographic trends:
2. The only demographic with more Protestants than Catholics are the over 50s.
The average working age person in Northern Ireland is a Catholic.
3. In 1983, almost 90% of Northern Ireland's MPs were unionist.
The last election (2019) marked the 1st time unionists no longer formed a majority of N Irish seats at Westminister.
4. The last Northern Irish Assembly election (2017) marked the 1st time unionists gained less than 50% of N Irish seats (election is by strict proportional representation).
Whats clear now is that regardless of N Ireland's constitutional status it is now a province with more Catholics than Protestants, more nationalists than unionists.
The Gerrymandered state is over.
Its over.
What comes next...
The existence of N Ireland in UK will thus increasingly be dependent on the consent of those "who do not consider their identity as unionist".
Given this the only possible way for UK govt to maintain a hold on N Ireland is to aim its policies at N Irish swing "other" voters.
This swing ("Other") vote in N Ireland is non sectarian, pro European & socially liberal with an ambiguous position on constitutional arrangements.
If UK govt serious on maintaining N Ireland within UK its only hope is making continued UK membership compatible with the above.
Since 2016 UK govts have done the opposite by doubling down on:
Hard Unionism
Anti europeanism
Coalition with the DUP
This can only mean 1 of 2 things:
UK Govt has:
1. Given up on keeping N Ireland & uses it merely now for short term political gains
2. No idea about N Ireland
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Many people assume elections are won or lost by how many of the other party you "convert" to voting for yours. This is largely a myth.
UK elections are won by winning more swing seats by: 1. Encouraging opposition voters not to vote 2. Encouraging more of your supporters to vote
In UK marginal constituencies (seats with a majority of less than 3%) many seats can change hands simply by one party's voters staying at home more than normal & a few more of another's voters voting more.
In other words govts can change without many people changing their vote.
The way FPTP operates in UK this makes swing voters in swing seats super crucial.
Swing voters are obviously easier to switch to & from voting.
So in theory the next UK election only needs 85 000 Tory voters in certain seats to decide not to vote to wipe out the govt's majority.
A point that’s often forgotten by remainers is the key role 🏴 plays in the next Labour govt.
The assumption (probably correct) that SNP wins nearly all 🏴 seats if Tories lose…actually makes 🏴 role in next Labour govt even more crucial…not less.
Here’s why…
The key point is Labour are a 🇬🇧union party. Out of conviction & self interest.
They won’t want to “lose” Scotland. No party wants that on their watch.
So the question is what can Labour offer the most anti Brexit part of the UK that will convince them to not go independent..?
Any coalition that is in anyway dependent on 🏴 seats and particularly on cooperation with the SNP can offer only 1 thing that might avoid 🏴 independence ->
A huge softening of Brexit.
It’s the only thing Labour have got it can give - and its of course what Labour members want.
It’s become clear from reports in the last few days that Australia has been deceiving 🇫🇷 for as long as the last 18 months.
Countries can play hard ball on commercials interests - everyone does it, incl. the 🇫🇷.
But such an action by allies on defence pacts is something else.
The upshot of this is the 🇫🇷 will conclude that in foreign policy terms Biden is continuity Trump. But the 🇫🇷 have always been less dewey-eyed about the US anyway.
🇫🇷 will strengthen focus on EU & assume that 🇦🇺 isn’t a serious dependable ally.
What does this mean for 🇬🇧?
The AUKUS stuff will please the anti-EUers but less reported on is how little 🇬🇧 benefits from this. 🇺🇸 will get lion share of any new contract while 🇬🇧, reliant on 🇫🇷 good will for so many things: immigration control, trade flows etc will simply think Britain an reliable sh*t.
Gavin Williamson has informed staff at the Dept for Education that he’s leaving the department.
As part of his demotion he was offered Northern Ireland by Boris Johnson.
The most sensitive job in the most sensitive part of UK at its most sensitive time in its last 2 decades.
I should add this has not been officially confirmed yet - depends if Williamson wants to accept it.
In parliamentary lore “going to Northern Ireland” is not something that usually precedes a stellar rise to the high offices of state. It usually signals the end of a career.
Now hearing that Gavin Williamson turned down Northern Ireland job, which makes Johnson’s reshuffle a bit more complicated.
This could drag on about…perhaps even into tomorrow..
One of the worst debates is the climate change one.
It’s fought on risk/cost but regardless of how bad it turns out much of the cost of going carbon neutral is not really a cost drag but substituting out of resources that make people ill, deform environment & fund awful regimes.
In other words the idea that tackling climate change is a very high cost that’s either worth it or not (depending on your view) is not the whole story.
The benefits of a greener run world are huge even if current climate change projections turn out to be a bit alarmist.
Much of the fraught oil debate resembles people worried about what cutting down on smoking will do to the tobacco industry.
Both tobacco & oil are “deadweight industries” that add little in technological advances & money spent on them could be more productively spent elsewhere.