Great scoop via @AlexThomp @alexbward

Internal State Dept letter by top legal adviser Harold Koh outlining legal problems with "covid-19" expulsions of Haitians.

Koh's analysis is highly consistent with top immigration law expert analysis here:
justsecurity.org/69640/coronavi…

<thread>
2. The internal memo breaks down for policy clients the ways in which the current Trump-Biden policy raises profound legal problems both in terms of US international legal obligations and domestic law.
3. The Koh memo also outlines for administration officials several options to avoid or minimize these legal problems, including fundamentally changing the policy course.
4/4. I think some are over-reading this as a resignation letter. Looks like an internal memo on specific policy giving legal advice.

Politico: "An administration official said Koh would be staying on in a consulting role and that his departure was long-planned."

<end>

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More from @rgoodlaw

19 Sep
Two discrepancies in @SecDef Austin's vs. @CENTCOM Gen. McKenzie's statements on Friday about Kabul #DroneStrike.

- On definite nature of the intelligence failure.
- On potentially prejudicing next step of investigation.

McKenzie's statements are cause for concern.

<thread>
2. On left, Sec. Austin:

"We now KNOW that there was NO CONNECTION between Mr. Ahmadi and ISIS-Khorasan..."

On right, Gen. McKenzie:

"We now assess that it is UNLIKELY that the vehicle and those who died were associated with ISIS-K or were a direct threat to U.S. forces."

🧐 ImageImage
3. On left, Austin:

Says DoD will review Centcom investigation to consider fulness of investigation, info used in strike, need for accountability, etc.

On right, McKenzie:

Says all US operators acted “in accordance with” ROE, took “prudent steps” to avoid civilians, etc. ImageImage
Read 5 tweets
13 Sep
Monday @just_security:

We have dozens of questions for Congress, reporters, investigators to ask to get to bottom of what happened with U.S. #DroneStrike in Kabul on Aug 29.

cc: @EricSchmittNYT @mgordonwsj @helenecooper @barbarastarrcnn @missy_ryan @JenGriffinFNC @laraseligman
2. Example

As @ICRC explains, the presumption of civilian status is a part of binding laws of war. Isn’t it true that @DeptofDefense has highly anomalous view that considers this rule NOT part of binding laws of war? Does the US government as a whole agree with DoD’s position?
3. Who were the most senior DoD officials who authorized or signed off on the strike?

Before taking the strike, what did DoD estimate would be total number of civilian casualties killed?

What did DoD consider would have been acceptable level of civilian casualties?
Read 4 tweets
10 Sep
Many important insights and things that needed to be said in @BCFinucane @StephenPomper essay.

A most important read on:

War Powers
Executive Branch lawyering
Congressional oversight
National security

Should be centerpiece @ABANatSec @asilorg with @charlie_savage as discussant
2. On the list of things that needed to be said is the use of the “legally available" standard in Executive Branch lawyering to get to yes on contentious policies.

An issue that @charlie_savage spotlighted in his book Power Wars.

charliesavage.com/books/power-wa…
3. The @just_security essay then reveals new details of how that standard has supported counterterrorism warfare.

cc: @barbarastarrcnn @missy_ryan @EllieCKaufman @MarkMazzettiNYT @glubold @mgordonwsj @Meghann_MT @karendeyoung1 @GregJaffe @alexbward @joshtpm @dklaidman
Read 5 tweets
23 Aug
One of most important accounts to follow on #Afganistan👇

If Mr. @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a government-in-exile, it significantly changes equation on recognition of Taliban, on United Nations credentials for Taliban, on interpretation of US sanctions and their humanitarian impact.
2. To spell some of this out, if @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a competitor government, it provides countries with great flexibility in withholding recognition from the Taliban.

@FCDOGovUK @CanadaDOFA @eu_eeas @GermanyDipl

@HouseForeign @SFRCdems @SenateForeign
justsecurity.org/77794/expert-b…
3. If @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a competitor government, it provides UN Member States with great flexibility in denying Taliban a seat at the #UnitedNations.

@UKUN_NewYork @irishmissionun @franceonu @NorwayUN @EstoniaUN @EUatUN @MexOnu

justsecurity.org/77957/the-huma…
Read 5 tweets
19 Aug
Good observations by @AaronBlake.👇

We just published opinion piece by @LisaCurtisDC.

"I witnessed first-hand the Taliban’s obstinance to breaking ties with al-Qaeda ... The most the U.S. negotiators could extract from the Taliban was a flimsy pledge."

justsecurity.org/77823/take-tim…
2. Longer (without internal ellipses):

"I witnessed first-hand the Taliban’s obstinance to breaking ties with al-Qaeda during countless hours of negotiations in Doha, Qatar. The most the U.S. negotiators could extract from the Taliban was a flimsy pledge"
justsecurity.org/77823/take-tim…
3. Her larger point here is about the decision whether (if ever) to recognize the Taliban government, the need for #HumanRights conditions, and to see actual compliance with human rights and #counterterrorism demands.

And a critique of both Trump and Biden actions.
Read 4 tweets
18 Aug
Despite the headline, there’s a lot in here that points instead to an intelligence failure.

1. The timing of some of these warnings came very late in the game (including when it was increasingly obvious that Afghan mil could collapse)

<thread>

nytimes.com/2021/08/17/us/…
2. “Key American decisions were made long before July, when the consensus among intelligence agencies was that the Afghan government could hang on for as long as two years, which would have left ample time for an orderly exit.”

That’s called an intelligence failure.
3. “As late as a week before Kabul’s fall, the overall intelligence analysis was that a Taliban takeover was not yet inevitable.”

That’s more evidence of an intelligence failure.
Read 9 tweets

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