2. The internal memo breaks down for policy clients the ways in which the current Trump-Biden policy raises profound legal problems both in terms of US international legal obligations and domestic law.
3. The Koh memo also outlines for administration officials several options to avoid or minimize these legal problems, including fundamentally changing the policy course.
4/4. I think some are over-reading this as a resignation letter. Looks like an internal memo on specific policy giving legal advice.
Politico: "An administration official said Koh would be staying on in a consulting role and that his departure was long-planned."
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As @ICRC explains, the presumption of civilian status is a part of binding laws of war. Isn’t it true that @DeptofDefense has highly anomalous view that considers this rule NOT part of binding laws of war? Does the US government as a whole agree with DoD’s position?
3. Who were the most senior DoD officials who authorized or signed off on the strike?
Before taking the strike, what did DoD estimate would be total number of civilian casualties killed?
What did DoD consider would have been acceptable level of civilian casualties?
2. On the list of things that needed to be said is the use of the “legally available" standard in Executive Branch lawyering to get to yes on contentious policies.
An issue that @charlie_savage spotlighted in his book Power Wars.
One of most important accounts to follow on #Afganistan👇
If Mr. @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a government-in-exile, it significantly changes equation on recognition of Taliban, on United Nations credentials for Taliban, on interpretation of US sanctions and their humanitarian impact.
2. To spell some of this out, if @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a competitor government, it provides countries with great flexibility in withholding recognition from the Taliban.
3. If @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a competitor government, it provides UN Member States with great flexibility in denying Taliban a seat at the #UnitedNations.
"I witnessed first-hand the Taliban’s obstinance to breaking ties with al-Qaeda ... The most the U.S. negotiators could extract from the Taliban was a flimsy pledge."
"I witnessed first-hand the Taliban’s obstinance to breaking ties with al-Qaeda during countless hours of negotiations in Doha, Qatar. The most the U.S. negotiators could extract from the Taliban was a flimsy pledge" justsecurity.org/77823/take-tim…
3. Her larger point here is about the decision whether (if ever) to recognize the Taliban government, the need for #HumanRights conditions, and to see actual compliance with human rights and #counterterrorism demands.
2. “Key American decisions were made long before July, when the consensus among intelligence agencies was that the Afghan government could hang on for as long as two years, which would have left ample time for an orderly exit.”
That’s called an intelligence failure.
3. “As late as a week before Kabul’s fall, the overall intelligence analysis was that a Taliban takeover was not yet inevitable.”