Key passages of testimony in Senate Judiciary report — showing the scheme to threaten acting Attorney General to pitch in with effort to overturn the election or be replaced.
3. Senate Judiciary Committee investigation also uncovers New Year's Eve meeting in Oval Office.
Trump directly threatens acting AG Rosen and Donoghue: threatens to fire and replace them with Clark for failing to help overturn the election.
Note: Mark Meadows involved.
4. Bombshell in Dec. 27 call with Trump and Rosen-Donoghue ("just say that the election was corrupt + leave the rest to me") was Trump's threat to fire and replace them with Clark.
Was unclear if Meadows was on that call.
Now clear Meadows was in similar New Year's Eve meeting.
5. As @nycsouthpaw notes, the minority report's "best" defense against these central allegations is that Trump did not follow through on firing Rosen and the Clark plan.👇
Why didn't he?
Because senior DOJ and WH counsel said they'd resign en masse.
6. And before backing down, looks like Trump did first take an affirmative step — an overt action — in furtherance of the scheme (to use the language of criminal conspiracy):
Trump offered Clark to install him as acting attorney general and Clark accepted.
7/7. Finally, @gtconway3d was on top of this from the start.
Here's his tweet drawing a direction connection between (a) how the Department of Justice's own letters describe the allegations under investigation by the Committee and (b) 18 USC 610.
2. The internal memo breaks down for policy clients the ways in which the current Trump-Biden policy raises profound legal problems both in terms of US international legal obligations and domestic law.
3. The Koh memo also outlines for administration officials several options to avoid or minimize these legal problems, including fundamentally changing the policy course.
As @ICRC explains, the presumption of civilian status is a part of binding laws of war. Isn’t it true that @DeptofDefense has highly anomalous view that considers this rule NOT part of binding laws of war? Does the US government as a whole agree with DoD’s position?
3. Who were the most senior DoD officials who authorized or signed off on the strike?
Before taking the strike, what did DoD estimate would be total number of civilian casualties killed?
What did DoD consider would have been acceptable level of civilian casualties?
2. On the list of things that needed to be said is the use of the “legally available" standard in Executive Branch lawyering to get to yes on contentious policies.
An issue that @charlie_savage spotlighted in his book Power Wars.
One of most important accounts to follow on #Afganistan👇
If Mr. @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a government-in-exile, it significantly changes equation on recognition of Taliban, on United Nations credentials for Taliban, on interpretation of US sanctions and their humanitarian impact.
2. To spell some of this out, if @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a competitor government, it provides countries with great flexibility in withholding recognition from the Taliban.
3. If @AmrullahSaleh2 forms a competitor government, it provides UN Member States with great flexibility in denying Taliban a seat at the #UnitedNations.
"I witnessed first-hand the Taliban’s obstinance to breaking ties with al-Qaeda ... The most the U.S. negotiators could extract from the Taliban was a flimsy pledge."
"I witnessed first-hand the Taliban’s obstinance to breaking ties with al-Qaeda during countless hours of negotiations in Doha, Qatar. The most the U.S. negotiators could extract from the Taliban was a flimsy pledge" justsecurity.org/77823/take-tim…
3. Her larger point here is about the decision whether (if ever) to recognize the Taliban government, the need for #HumanRights conditions, and to see actual compliance with human rights and #counterterrorism demands.