Short version of the prize: We used to dig into the data, say "correlation ain't causation," quickly forget we said that, and make a bunch of causal-ish statements based on data that really couldn't support such claims.
Then David, Josh and Guido said: Hang on.
Their response wasn't the usual destructive "we can't make causal claims" stuff, but rather entirely constructive: Here's a toolkit and set of approaches to help you make credible causal claims.
And so the next generation of empirical economists focused on analyzing credible "natural experiments."
Economists often can't run true experiments. But nature has a way of running a sort-of experiment. And those can help you make causal claims.
Josh's paper on the draft is an example. One way to figure out the effects of military service on outcomes would be to run an experiment, randomly giving some people the "treatment" of serving.
But it's impossible and unethical to run that experiment...
So Josh said: Isn't getting a low Vietnam draft number a bit like that experiment -- of randomly being assigned to military service. And aren't folks with high draft numbers a bit like the treatment group.
So he developed tools to analyze the results of this "natural experiment"
And those tools have revolutionized the work that applied microeconomists have done, on everything from crime to family to labor markets to development. It's been a revolution in our lifetimes, and it's been a privilege to have a ring-side seat.
The credibility revolution has had less impact in macro, and that's because it's difficult to think of experiments that also account for the spillover effects from one person or one market to the other. Those "general equilibrium" effects are absolutely central to macro.
And that's why today's Nobel, while well deserved, will be a bit controversial. To some economists, the credibility revolution led economists to abandon economic theory (even as it has emphasized more careful statistical theorizing).
Another version of this critique is that the focus on credibility has led some economists to look under the lamppost, focusing on the questions we have the "natural experiments" to answer well, rather than the questions that most need to be answered.
The right answer, of course, is that the best tools to use depend on the question you're asking, and David, Josh and Guido have added really important tools to the economic toolkit. We can do credible causal analysis now, and that need not crowd out theory, or general equlibrium.
An aside: I don't think I've ever seen the Nobel committee describe particular fractions of a prize for each laureate. Maybe they think they can credibly estimate the contributions of each (dad joke).
No quibble with it; just an observation.
And today, it's hard not to notice that Alan Krueger is no longer with us. Alan would surely have shared this prize. He was so interesting, so exciting, and he made this economic revolution so much fun. He may have been the most creative of all of these guys. Rest in peace, Alan.
Orley Ashenfelter, who by some measures kicked off the credibility revolution, was surely a bit unlucky to not be included here. The Princeton IR section had a huge influence here: Orley started the revolution, and hired David and Alan, and trained Josh.
The truly notable thing about today's Econ Nobel is that it's a prize for work that has been felt across so many fields. The credibility revolution they kicked off has transformed empirical work in political science, sociology, criminology, demography, public health, the law, etc
This year's prize reaffirms a trend we've seen for years: If you want to win the Prize, you've got to win the next generation of graduate students. Teach them tools that they can use to push back the frontier. Each of these guys has trained a veritable army of graduate students.
Unrelated true story: The last time I saw Guido Imbens was at Legoland.
There were a lot of people who underestimated Guido Imbens for a long time. The work he was doing was always great; he just got caught in the crosshairs of a sometimes acrimonious methodological war.
At first I thought this was a cute theory; now I can't get it out of my head. There's clearly a prize for modern labor economics (that's the Card [and Krueger] prize). And there's a second prize for causal inference methods (that's Angrist & Imbens).
Non-farm payrolls in September rose by only +194k, after +366k last month.
The recovery has stalled.
We're missing about 8 million jobs, and at this rate, we're not bringing them back any time soon.
Slightly brighter news in the revisions: Last month's gains were revised from +235k to +366k. The previous month's gains were revised up by an additional +38k. So the prior two months were in total +169k better than we thought.
But this month is about 300k worse than we hoped.
The unemployment rate fell from 5.2% to 4.8%, but celebrations on this score would be premature, as it partly reflects the labor force shrinking by about -183k.
Household survey is slightly sunnier than the payrolls survey, showing employment growth of +526k.
Stunning new estimates suggest that the 400 wealthiest American families paid an average Federal tax rate of only 8.2%. whitehouse.gov/cea/blog/2021/…
Here’s why: 1. The rich rely on investment income, which is taxed at lower rates than labor income. 2. They pay no income tax on a big chunk of their investment income. (This is the “stepped up basis” loophole.)
This new estimate does something quite important: It analyzes a measure of income that includes unrealized capital gains. The rich earn a lot of this income, but because it’s difficult to calculate, few estimates of tax rates include it.
The vax mandate solves a collective action problem:
Businesses want to vax their staff to provide a safe workplace. But they’re each worried that if they move first, they’ll lose staff to their rivals (who probably also want vaxxed staff). Mandating the vax solves this problem.
Point is in many industries all of the major players want fully vaccinated staff, but none wants to bear the political heat of announcing this first. Result: None of them require it even if all of ‘em want to.
The mandate solves the problem of waiting for a first mover to emerge
The vax mandate only applies to large employers, and so may be a competitive advantage for large companies, because customers know they’ll be safe there. Small businesses who do have vaccinated staff need a way to signal that they’re just as safe.
Viewing Biden's vaccine mandate as simply economic policy, it's surely the cheapest and most powerful economic stimulus ever enacted.
Lemme explain: Covid is a tax -- a tax on all in-person interactions, paid not with dollars but with lives. Vaccinations are a tax cut, and your shot cuts both your your covid tax, and your neighbors taxes, too. More jabs = a bigger tax cut, which will boost the service sector.
The reason that cutting the covid tax is such a cheap stimulus, is that this is one of the few tax cuts that doesn't actually reduce government revenue. Indeed, it probably boosts revenue: People are more likely to work when they feel safe, which boosts the government coffers.
This @DataColada finding of outright data fabrication in a high profile study is really a holy shit moment, and I hope that all social scientists pay attention, and not just psych. datacolada.org/98
Also, the original blog post is just a lovely example of forensic analysis. Well worth reading just to learn from such a clear and fair statistical prosecution.
BOOM! Payrolls growth of +943k in July, and unemployment down from 5.9% to 5.4%, and that's what a robust jobs report looks like.
Pretty helpful revisions add another +119k to May/June.
Volatility is a thing, so better to focus on the three month average of jobs gains running at +801k per month, which is pretty great, but also pretty necessary given the depth of the hole we're in.
Household survey shows employment grew +1,043k in July, roughly confirming the payrolls numbers.
Unemployment fell a lot because more people got jobs. Participation actually rose a tick (though it has further to go).