JUST OUT! My team @CNA_org just completed a quick-look project – led by Alex Powell – looking at lessons from historical examples of #maritime#sabotage for #StrategicCompetition. I’ll summarize some key findings & implications in this THREAD. 1/n
@CNA_org The impetus for this study was discussions w/various #SOF entities as well as the call for work in this area by the Joint Special Operations University in its 2021 “Special Operations Research Topics” guide: jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content… 3/n
@CNA_org JSOU called for a study on “strategic sabotage,” but we recognized (a) a number of war college theses have already examined this aspect & (b) those efforts focused on land-based sabotage. So, we focused our study on sabotage in or emanating from the *maritime domain.* 4/n
@CNA_org Of note, #DOD doesn’t currently have a formal definition for “sabotage,” having removed that term from its official dictionary in 2016. So, we created one that we believe captures the salient aspects of a variety of different definitions.
(Cc @ElenaWicker) 5/n
@CNA_org@ElenaWicker We identified 21 open source examples of maritime sabotage & coded them according to 25 variables. The latter were chosen for descriptive reasons & to test specific hypotheses that we formulated about sabotage operations. 6/n
@CNA_org@ElenaWicker As this chart shows, about half the examples of #sabotage we found occurred during #WWII, but the other half spanned the decades since then. 7/n
@CNA_org@ElenaWicker We found that 18 of the 21 examples occurred in the context of large-scale combat ops, while only 3 occurred in other parts of the range of military operations (ROMO). 8/n
@CNA_org@ElenaWicker We also found that 18 of the 21 examples were successful in accomplishing their desired aims. 11 of these were successful #sabotage events; 7 of them were successful sabotage campaigns. 9/n
@CNA_org@ElenaWicker In terms of the forces involved, 13 of the 21 examples involved #SOF or SOF-like entities; the other 8 were conducted by conventional forces. 10/n
@CNA_org@ElenaWicker We tested a number of specific hypotheses in our study. Of these, interesting results included the idea that #sabotage ops incurring third-party collateral damage tend to result in significant negative political consequences. 11/n
@CNA_org@ElenaWicker We also found that the element of surprise may be less important for successful #sabotage operations than one might assume, & that complex sabotage ops are less likely to succeed than simple ones. 12/n
@CNA_org@ElenaWicker Some implications of this quick-look effort:
- #DOD should re-establish a definition for #sabotage & explore if it warrants a distinct theory or operational concept
- #DOD should examine sabotage from single event & campaign perspectives IOT understand pros/cons of each 13/n
@CNA_org@ElenaWicker - #DOD should think more deeply about #sabotage outside of large-scale combat ops (eg, is it an appropriate tool for competition? If so, under what conditions & w/what risks?)
- #DOD should examine in more depth the idea of multi- & cross-domain sabotage 14/n
@CNA_org@ElenaWicker Conclusion: This wasn’t meant to be a comprehensive study & we offer more Qs than As in it. BUT, to our knowledge it remains the first/only study of maritime #sabotage specifically & so will hopefully serve as a springboard for future work: CALLIN' ALL Y'ALL!
15/15
As with its last report, this latest report on the #Taliban’s relationship with #alQaeda in #Afghanistan is 180 degrees out from the current US assessment. 1/n cbsnews.com/news/afghanist…
“According to the report presented to the UNSC [#alQaeda] has established ‘up to 8 new training camps in #Afghanistan, including four in Ghazni, Laghman, Parwan & Uruzgan Provinces, w\a new base to stockpile weaponry in the Panjshir Valley….’ 2/n
“…The terrorist organization also operates 5 madrasas - religious schools where it trains and indoctrinates children to become fighters - in the east & northeast of #Afghanistan, the reports said…” 3/n
I was recently passed a pre-publication copy of Feridun Sinirlioğlu's independent assessment of the situation in #Afghanistan, conducted for the @UN
I'll put some thoughts about it in this THREAD. 1/n
@UN (Since the report isn't out yet, I can't link to it, but you can find various news articles about it via Google, such as this one by @VOANews: ) 2/nvoanews.com/a/un-mandated-…
@UN @VOANews Overall, the assessment is clearly written & admirably forthright, especially given that its audiences are wide-ranging, from the #Taliban to those who hate the Taliban.
Its primary conclusion: "the status quo of int'l engagement is not working." 3/n
Today, the #Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an evaluation report of its contribution to the Resolute Support mission in #Afghanistan that *pulls no punches.*
I'll string together its primary findings in this THREAD. 1/n
Before the findings, a quick comment: the Dutch MFA produced this report b/c "Dutch contributions to missions under Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution are subject to an obligation to evaluate the deployment after it's been completed"
Today, the @JoeBiden admin released its National Security Strategy. I’ll summarize its major points & put some thoughts on #terrorism & #Afghanistan specifically in this THREAD. 1/n
@JoeBiden The strategy exists in 5 parts: (1) overview of the problem; (2) sources of US strength (solutions); (3) global priorities; (4) strategy by region; (5) conclusion.
Oddly, part 1 starts on page 6. Nitpicky, I know, but still weird--who counts the cover as page 1? 3/n
Today the @StateDept held a presser and there were questions about today's announcement of the "#Afghanistan Fund." I'll string those together in this THREAD. 1/n
Thread. In the immediate aftermath of #Afghanistan’s collapse, I attended a virtual event featuring Petraeus & Crocker on what went wrong. Their comments are best summarized as “things were bad until we got there, then they improved until we left & others effed it up.” 1/n
In this article, P4 adopts a similar tone. The “we” he uses is not a “royal we” that includes himself, but a we of “others.” The parts that he describes as having been done right are the parts that he did—aligning resources, getting HQs in place, etc. 2/n
Count the number of times he uses “I” & the associated context. Overwhelmingly these refer to policies that he recommended but weren’t adopted (& were the “right” ones), not mistakes that he personally made. 3/n