But senior sources say UKG is still not resolved on compromise or conflict - & see risks & opportunities in both 1/
Without such a significant offer, UK ministers believe Johnson would have triggered Article 16, probably by end-November, to suspend all or (more likely) part of protocol. But UKG now has no choice but to seriously engage in talks - not just go through the motions 2/
Johnson’s allies think movement on ECJ will be needed to tip balance in favour of peace vs war, but this is something EU will find VERY difficult to do. How can Bxl offer ECJ concessions on SM/goods to 3rd country while insisting on court's writ with member states (ie Poland)? 3/
Still, at some point, aides around @BorisJohnson recognise PM will reach a “fork in the road” & have to decide whether to settle for a deal or invoke Article 16. Those AGAINST compromise are arguing several things 4/
First, that it will make Johnson look weak after talking tough (even if he claims victory as he certainly will). Second, that compromise cd destabilise politics in Northern Ireland: as @duponline has threatened to collapse power-sharing executive unless Protocol is replaced 5/
Third, that compromise would create internal Tory party problems by rallying hardline backbench Brexiteers against @10DowningStreet. Fourth, that it would also undermine Johnson’s hopes of keeping Brexit alive as an issue until next election 6/
It's true some ministers think “banging on about Europe” cd give voters impression Johnson didn't get “Brexit done” & cite @YouGov poll showing 61% of Brits saying Govt is handling Brexit badly. But fact is many of PM's aides believe Brussels-bashing plays well in red wall 7/
Those URGING compromise worry about @POTUS@JoeBiden & UKG ambition & ability to replicate AUKUS with other countries if there's a rift with US. Implications for “Global Britain” etc. They think @BorisJohnson would have to consider geopolitical context when making his decision 8/
A trade war with EU - even if not immediate - would also aggravate domestic dislocations/supply chain problems in UK. The “official line” is to describe these issues as global but of course that would be more diff if further problems were clearly linked to new Brexit standoff 9/
Lastly, a prolonged trade dispute with EU would worsen UKG strained relationship with business, which is peeved about rises in corporate tax & NI contributions & Johnson’s suggestion it should increase wages for UK workers & end its “addiction” to cheap EU labour 10/
As it's poss to see, the debate in UKG has little/nothing do with NI. Will BJ opt for conflict or compromise? Who knows. Especially as I doubt Johnson & Frost know either. As with all things Brexit & this Govt, it's going to be a v close call - what some wd call a coin toss 11/
The @EU_Commission is going to continue withholding Recovery Fund €bn from Pol & Hu & I suspect WILL activate new Rule of Law mechanism against them. Not because @vonderleyen is worried about @Europarl_EN taking her to court. But because it's in COM's own interests to do so 1/
The most imp reason is the creation of Recovery Fund & governance arrangements underpinning it. These have fundamentally altered @EU_Commission incentives. There's a recognition A LOT is riding on its successful implementation 2/
For eg: 1) whether something similar could be done in the future if EU was faced with another external shock. Or 2) whether EU fiscal rules can be substantially amended to give member states more time to repair their public finances & create budget space for green investments 3/
The EU's proposals for addressing the problems in NI are substantive & far reaching. They will effectively do away with all paperwork for goods destined for NI - instead of a border in Irish Sea, think of a “green” (NI-bound) & “red” (Single Market) lane 1/
It has taken a lot of time & leadership from @MarosSefcovic & @vonderleyen to get Commission services & member states into line. Although EU capitals haven't seen the final package & all the details, they've been socialised with what's coming 2/
The Commission's ambition has been driven by 1) a desire to institute practical fixes to improve experience of citizens & businesses in NI, but also, importantly, 2) tactics 3/
What to make of the blizzard of French presidential polls in recent days? The racist far-right pundit Eric Zemmour (no apologies for the word racist) is at 15% in first round in one poll, just behind Marine Le Pen but miles behind President Macron 1/
In another poll, @EmmanuelMacron is seen soundly defeating all challengers in the two candidate second round on 24 April. He beats Zemmour 65-35, Le Pen 60-40 and the leading (for now) centre-right contender, Xavier Bertrand, 55-45 3/
Almost unnoticed, phaps bc it’s done with an English rather than a Hungarian accent, our populist, nationalist PM is setting out to weaken institutions that define a liberal democracy: he’s moving, Orbán style, to make it harder for his Govt to lose power theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
There is a pattern here, if we’re only willing to see it. A populist government hobbling those bodies that exist to keep it in check, trampling on democratic conventions and long-held rights, all to tighten its own grip on power.
We need to recognise it, even when it wears a smile and tousled hair, and speaks in the soothing cadences of Eton College
Germany now faces weeks - if not months - of political uncertainty which creates all sorts of policy risk for Europe. A real danger in the months ahead is a lengthy period without a new voice of any kind in Berlin, just as France plunges into an uncertain election of its own 1/
Because EU faces three extremely big, complex policy questions in the third & fourth quarter this year - over Rule of Law issues with Pol & Hungary; the EU's fiscal orientation in 2023 & how to manage UK escalation over NI Protocol - which are crying out for a political steer 2/
But with a lame-duck Govt now in Berlin, soon to be followed by same in Paris, no major EU policy decisions are likely under either. This risk is the problems fester, escalate & subsequently become harder to resolve 3/
Covid has been good for the EU.
It is now both more cohesive and resilient as a result of the pandemic, compared to before it. But are EU policymakers on the verge of committing another historic fiscal mistake? Thread 1/
Two reasons explain EU’s greater resilience post-Covid
1) The creation of Recovery Fund (RF), which has enabled significant EU-wide borrowing, subsequently transferred to member states as grants. This is facilitating their economic recovery, without increasing their debts 2/
2) Populism has had a bad crisis. This is partly because of RF. Take Italy's case: It's hard to argue against €180bn (10.5% of GDP). Hence the nationalist far-right League led by @matteosalvinimi has largely shut up & entered into reform-oriented coalition led by Mario Draghi 3/