US Attorney General Amos Akerman traveled to SC to investigate.
Klansmen had committed thousands of acts of criminal violence over the last year, he reported. Most white residents were in active cooperation with Klan, or at least offered it their "sympathy and countenance."
The presence of federal troops had led to "some abatement" in Klan terrorism, Akerman wrote.
"But the organizations and discipline are industriously kept up." If the US government did not uproot the Klan, "no freedman will enjoy essential liberty."
100s of arrests followed, carried out by US troops & marshals. Some Klansmen surrendered. Others fled to Texas, Canada, and elsewhere.
US officials now faced a challenge that will sound familiar in 2021:
What to do with a volume of cases that would overwhelm federal courts?
US grand juries returned over 1300 Klan indictments in S. Carolina.
By Jan. 1873, federal courts tried 35 cases and accepted guilty pleas in 71 others. Almost 1200 still waited.
Prosecutors could try only "cases...of the worst class, in which one or more murders are charged."
Oh, and this part may sound familiar too:
Politicians and press sympathetic to the Klan expressed outrage over the treatment of convicted terrorists - and little concern for the Klan's victims.
Ultimately, most of the remaining indictments against Klansmen were dropped.
So we're left with a question that—again!—resonates after Jan. 6:
Was this use of federal law enforcement against "insurgents engaged in...unlawful combinations and conspiracies" a failure or success?
Securing only a few dozen convictions certainly looks like a failure.
But the arrest and detention of 100s of Klansmen—and flight of many others—temporarily suppressed terrorism in South Carolina, and the 1872 election passed off in relative peace. A success.
That success depended on suspending the writ of habeas corpus.
But when Grant's authority to do so expired in mid-1872, Congress refused to renew it.
The result was to weaken his power to respond to renewed terrorism—in La. in 1873, in Ala. in 1874. The list when went on.
The ultimate failure, in other words, was not so much of the courts as of the political branches.
Which is the lesson for today:
Don't try to treat an insurrection—what Grant called a "rebellion"—as simply a law enforcement problem, and leave the courts to sort it out. /fin
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I support pro-democracy measures, Joe Manchin might say—protecting voting rights, #DCStatehood, filibuster reform, &c—because:
1. they're just;
2. they're now made "partisan" by an assault on democracy by the leaders of the other party;
3. that assault hurts my constituents.
What's this got to do with Civil War & Reconstruction?
Before the war, some white Northerners forged an alliance with African Americans, opposing slavery and supporting equal rights on principle—think, abolitionists and Radical Republicans, swayed by argument #1. But ...
1. No, the current crop of voter suppression laws don’t threaten the kind of wholesale disfranchisement that Black Americans suffered at peak Jim Crow.
But they’re enough to swing key states, and success likely begets more attempts.
"It's not a local issue anymore" - and in fact, it never was.
With a Congressional hearing scheduled Monday on #DCStatehood, let's trace the roots of opposition to democracy for DC—roots in the racist, late 19th century backlash against Reconstruction.
"We favor self-government, national suffrage and representation in the Congress of the United States for residents of the District of Columbia."
1960 Republican party platform:
"Republicans will continue to work for Congressional representation and self-government for the District of Columbia and also support the constitutional amendment granting suffrage in national elections."
1964 Republican party platform on the District of Columbia: