The highest popularity of pro-Soviet attitudes in the history of Levada-Center surveys in Russia has no relation at all to the popularity of left identity.
In August, 49% supported "the Soviet system as it was before the 90s", 18% - "the current system", 19% - "Western-style democracy".
Besides, 62% supported the economic system based on state plan and distribution, while only 24% supported the system based on private property and market relations.
However, in September, only 18% responded positively to whether they can be called supporters of left, socialist views. There is a clear age correlation but even the majority of the Communist voters do not identify themselves as such (only 40%).
For comparison, significantly more (32%) called themselves supporters of market economic reforms.
On the one hand, it's a problem of disconnection of the left identity from its organic base. On the other hand, if the rise of pro-Soviet attitudes reflects the protest against Putin's regime, it has only a weak left dimension.
Need to argue against a possible interpretation of these data. The fact that pro-Soviet people do not feel themselves on the left does not yet mean that they feel themselves on the right.
Soviet was a concrete experience of modernization that has not been outpassed by anything that followed. This is a very material basis of the pro-Soviet feelings that are reproduced through generations even by the schoolkids born in the 2000s.
"Left, socialist" is just an abstract ideological thing for most of the post-Soviet people. The data reflect the weakness of all ideologies in post-Soviet societies, rather than the weakness of just left ideology. I've just written about this here laender-analysen.de/ukraine-analys…
The political lesson to be taken from these data is that one needs to bridge "pro-Soviet" and "left" in Russia rather than to cherish an elitist "anti-Soviet" left identity.
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Yeah, #Azov is like deliberately making fun of those propaganda "experts" who want us to believe "Azov is a regular unit of the National Guard" and "even if #Protasevich served in Azov, so what?"
Is "Kim", the Belarusian volunteer in #Azov, expressed far-right views in the interview for Radio Svoboda? Not touching whether he and #Protasevich are the same person, there are pros and cons. But, yes, his views are far-right.
He responds to a very generic question about his and other Belarusians' in "Pahonia" squad political views. First thing, he says we are all nationalists. Then he prefers limited democracy. Then about gays, then about migration, then about democracy without "some absurdities".
I think a proper stance on #Protasevich should accept the following: 1) Whataboutism is wrong. 2) He must be released, even though he is a propagandist, his Telegram Nexta provoked hate and violence, and he apparently spent some time with the far-right Ukrainian regiment Azov.
3) Ban on flights and sanctions beyond personal hurt primarily Belarusian (and Ukrainian) people, not Lukashenka.
Although it's really difficult to feel personal sympathies to #Protasevich, not only because he served in Azov but also for the provocative role his Telegram Nexta played in Belarusian protests, I don't think his far-right links have any significance in this case.
Really fun to see a wave of similar comments questioning the confirmation of Protasevich's link to Azov by one of the oldest reputable Ukrainian newspapers. zn.ua/international/…
The Times:
"In 2014 Protasevich is reported to have travelled to eastern Ukraine, where he joined the Azov Battalion, a far-right group that fought Russian-backed separatists." thetimes.co.uk/article/hijack…
Some thoughts on the resumed talk that if #Ukraine implements the Minsk accords fully including the political provisions, it may throw the country into a civil war. /Thread
There are some very tentative hopes that Germany and France may start pushing a little bit harder within that "cluster" approach to the Minsk accords to make Ukraine finally implement at least some of the political provisions that they all signed in 2015. /1
This happens after six years of ignoring Ukraine's practical sabotage of the Minsk accords and only after Russia's recent "saber-rattling". I am not even sure that there is anything more than rumors and wishful thinking behind those hopes. /2