The highest popularity of pro-Soviet attitudes in the history of Levada-Center surveys in Russia has no relation at all to the popularity of left identity. 
In August, 49% supported "the Soviet system as it was before the 90s", 18% - "the current system", 19% - "Western-style democracy".
Besides, 62% supported the economic system based on state plan and distribution, while only 24% supported the system based on private property and market relations.
However, in September, only 18% responded positively to whether they can be called supporters of left, socialist views. There is a clear age correlation but even the majority of the Communist voters do not identify themselves as such (only 40%).
For comparison, significantly more (32%) called themselves supporters of market economic reforms.
On the one hand, it's a problem of disconnection of the left identity from its organic base. On the other hand, if the rise of pro-Soviet attitudes reflects the protest against Putin's regime, it has only a weak left dimension.
Need to argue against a possible interpretation of these data. The fact that pro-Soviet people do not feel themselves on the left does not yet mean that they feel themselves on the right.
Soviet was a concrete experience of modernization that has not been outpassed by anything that followed. This is a very material basis of the pro-Soviet feelings that are reproduced through generations even by the schoolkids born in the 2000s.
"Left, socialist" is just an abstract ideological thing for most of the post-Soviet people. The data reflect the weakness of all ideologies in post-Soviet societies, rather than the weakness of just left ideology. I've just written about this here
laender-analysen.de/ukraine-analys…
laender-analysen.de/ukraine-analys…
The political lesson to be taken from these data is that one needs to bridge "pro-Soviet" and "left" in Russia rather than to cherish an elitist "anti-Soviet" left identity.
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