#BSA38 released by @natcen today. Worth remembering that the data are from summer 2020 so still quite early on in the pandemic. Overall there doesn't seem to be radical shifts in values but given how early it is there are hints that things might change. 1/
This chart on redistribution shows a marked increase between 2019 and 2020 in % agreeing we'll need more data points to know if it is noise in the data (which does occur year to year) or part of trend 2/
This table is especially interesting as it suggests the early pandemic had an effect on the economic values of young people in particular.This would fit with ideas about events having greater impact in early adulthood and may add further to age polarisation in terms of voting 3/
These trends will need careful analysis over the coming years to grasp the impact of the pandemic on values. While I agree as @natcen say 'the pandemic has so far not proven a ‘reset’ moment that has persuaded them of the needfor radical social or political change' 4/
the data are an early indication and there do seem to be some important changes occuring. Looking forward to seeing data from 2021 to see how the prolonged experience of the pandemic changes the outlook. end/
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A bit more on the voting/non-voting values divide. First chart for those with GCSE as highest qualification.
For all but 70+ group non-voters are more authoritarian than voters. For the youngest group they are also considerable less economically 'left'.
For those with a degree or higher the pattern is more marked. Non-voters with degrees more authoritarian than voters with degrees.
Key thing is not to assume that for same age/education (and class not shown here) position voters and non-voters are alike. Not possible with these data as it is corss-sectional but also further separation between never voters and intermittent voters worth thinking about.
Looking at voters who switched from Labour to Conservative either in 2017 or 2019, compared with other Con and Lab voters. All data from BES internet panel
56% of those who switched self-identify as working class (36% of Cons and 49% of Lab) /1
A third of 'switchers' think neither party looks after their local area (compared with 21% Cons and 15% Lab)
I think this is an important factor - and need to better understand the difference people draw between someone who stands up for them/their area and regional devo /2
When asked to place themselves on a left-right scale more than half the 'switchers' choose either the mid-point of the scale or 'don't know' (34% Con and 30% Lab) /3
Some debate today about how we should think about social class. Been a topic for the last 40 years in political sociology, not going to be resolved on twitter but for Labour it doesn’t really matter... /1
...as however you think of ‘working class’ Labour are losing in that group. The key to unlocking this (as shown in the thread) is thinking about economic and social values (which have their roots in social positions) and how people engage with these as identities.
/2
First ‘class’ measured by occupation, housing and social grade
Bars show the Con lead over Lab, lines show distribution of electorate across the categories
Will get into definitions of class later - here is occupational class by values group from the @BESResearch random probability survey
The key point to take away:
Among both higher professionals and routine occupation groups more than 60% are on the 'left' BUT
For higher professional this is 35% Liberal, 17% moderate and 8% 'authoritarian'
For routine occupations this is 8% Liberal, 21% moderate and 31% authoritarian.
This is the challenge if you want to unite the 'left'
It really doesn't matter *how* you measure class you will find this divide - there are two options:
1. Make economics more salient where the common ground is 2. Find a way to at least talk to the 'moderates' on the 2nd dimension (together moderates + liberals are more than half)
We are reading so much into what 'Red Wall' and other voters think from the votes of < 1/3rd of voters who are far from a random sample of voters in a given area.
It is information to use, but it is a long way from perfect information and should be used with caution.
Also is it too much to ask that councils reported this in a standardised way?
I look at groups of seats either lost or gained by Labour in 10 or 15 vs those lost or gained in 17 or 19 to set up a comparison pre Brexit and Corbyn and post-Brexit and Corbyn.
First, evidence on EU referendum vote. Seats lost in 2010 or 2015 are as 'leave' voting as those lost in 17 or 19
Seats lost 10/15 are very similar to seats lost 17/19 in terms of socio-economic characteristics. (And potentially worryingly for Labour those held on to are more similar to losses than gains)