A short thread on my piece (behind paywall) here:
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.11…
I look at groups of seats either lost or gained by Labour in 10 or 15 vs those lost or gained in 17 or 19 to set up a comparison pre Brexit and Corbyn and post-Brexit and Corbyn.
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.11…
I look at groups of seats either lost or gained by Labour in 10 or 15 vs those lost or gained in 17 or 19 to set up a comparison pre Brexit and Corbyn and post-Brexit and Corbyn.
First, evidence on EU referendum vote. Seats lost in 2010 or 2015 are as 'leave' voting as those lost in 17 or 19 
Seats lost 10/15 are very similar to seats lost 17/19 in terms of socio-economic characteristics. (And potentially worryingly for Labour those held on to are more similar to losses than gains)
Differences according to age profile are smaller (not least because across constituencies age profiles vary less than class/education profiles).
As a result, I argue that the 'realignment' of the Labour vote has been more gradual, happening since at least the 2010 election and though both Brexit and Corbyn's leadership did nothing to reverse it they are also not the only causes.
So if you question is Brexit or Corbyn for what happened in 2019, your answer will probably be wrong
'Each of these are better seen as accelerants rather than the sparks that lit the bonfire.'
'Each of these are better seen as accelerants rather than the sparks that lit the bonfire.'
