1. Transfer of Biological Samples from a BSL 3 Facility
A stern warning from Xavier Abad Morejón de Girón, Biosafety level 3 Laboratory Manager at CReSA – Centre de Recerca en Sanitat Animal, UAB-IRTA, 08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès), Spain
"improperly treated and therefore still infectious materials transferred out of a BSL3/4 facility could lead to potential proliferation of bio-weapons and increase the biohazard to the community"
3. Two Ways to Transfer
A biological sample can reach the outside of a BSL3
area in two ways: either without inactivation (infectious) if it must be transferred to another BSL3 facility
or
after undergoing an inactivation process to render the biological sample non-infectious
4. Transferring non-infectious samples (1)
1. Thermal procedures, inactivation by solvent or detergents, use of chaotropic agents, phenol: chloroform extraction procedures, desiccation on specially-treated papers & inactivation by fixation for anatomical pathology purposes
5. Transferring non-infectious samples (2)
2. the inactivation procedure relies on the capacity of the initial steps of current commercial nucleic acid extraction kits which many researchers & lab technicians consider to be viral or bacterial commercial inactivation kits.
6. Lysis Buffers
For example, the mixture of biological samples with lysis buffers (containing chaotropic agents at unknown concentrations) in addition to further thermal steps
In some cases BSL3 staff regards biological materials mixed with lysis buffers as non-infectious.
7. Guanidine
Manufacturers do not provide evidence of such effects in product data sheets & there is limited data in journals
it is difficult to compare inactivation capacity of lysis buffers because some claim to contain guanidine derivatives without specifying the amount
8. Guanidine (2)
There is neither proper documentation of exact compounds included nor their concentrations
Lysis buffers with guanidine have shown very disparate inactivation rates for a specific virus, making it impossible to draw general conclusions about all lysis buffers
9. If we accept that a lysis buffer is acceptable for inactivation of viruses in a BSL3/4 environment, without previous in house testing, and therefore allow those mixtures to be further handled in a BSL3 or BSL 2 lab, we increase the risk of laboratory acquired infections.
10. Conclusión
"In overview, the removal of inactivated samples from a BSL3 facility must be limited at a minimum, and avoided entirely whenever possible"
11. Heat treatment
Heat treatment of biochemical samples to inactivate Ebola virus: does it work in practice?
"We found that, in our hands, it was not possible to provide biochemical testing after heat treatment, as recommended by current guidelines"
14. Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center (SHPHCC)
if SHPHCC Lab admitted they deliberately shipped the 7 Wuhan Pneumonia human samples & transferred via CRE without shipping permit of biohazardous material, that would be a biosafety protocol violation
1. An FCS insert scenario proposed by @daoyu15 explained by @pathogenetics thus:
"Some say the FCS is not the right sequence "Man" would design, but here @daoyu15 presents the exact workflow "Man" would use to generate the FCS sequence see in COVID-19, with a design rationale"
"HCoV-OC43 cleavage site RRSRR was introduced (in an experiment by Belouzard et al, 2009). A similar experiment in China could use either RRARR or RRSRR from MHV-JHM or HCoV-OC43 via a "Lazy Loop Insertion"
"Potentially the WIV may have been attempting to swap in the MERS-CoV spike gene using targeted RNA recombination (Masters and Rottier, 2005) or perhaps experimenting with a pseudotyped MERS-CoV spike vector"
3. That is a significant claim
"the WIV appears to have been simultaneously using a HKU4r-CoV backbone for independent research"
So while doing EHA NIH funded work, at the same time they were "experimenting" with the reverse!
"Viral isolates will remain at the Wuhan Institute of Virology initially. Isolates, reagents and any other
products, will be made available to other NIH-funded researchers via applicable WIV and EHA Material Transfer Agreements and/or icensing agreements"
3. Cells (Page 203)
• Records are maintained for each of the cell lines regarding 1. the origin of the cell lines 2. when they were resuscitated 3. number of passages 4. all test results 5. any unique distinguishing growth behavior 6. any known genetic features.
2. we believe a more transparent and comprehensive system of reporting biological incidents to a neutral third party would help reduce the number of laboratory incidents
3. it could be broadened to include all kinds of incident data. In our opinion, an international version of such a reporting system would also help reduce the number and severity of laboratory incidents, both locally and worldwide