A rather nasty move by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. He ordered the publication of his exchange of letters with his German and French counterparts @HeikoMaas and @JY_LeDrian. mid.ru/documents/1018….
Letters concern the prospect of having a Normandy meeting on the conflict in Ukraine. Lavrov refused to participate after Germany and France refused to endorse his proposed final document, which Ukraine would have to sign, and which contains questionable propositions.
For example, Ukraine would have to cancel some of its laws (on the national language, education, and rights of minorities). Ukraine would also be required to deal directly with the de facto authorities in Donbas and Luhansk (which is a long-standing Russian goal).
Maas and Le Drian reject these preconditions as irrelevant, and demand unimpeded access for the OSCE mission. (Their proposed draft, in English, is also a part of Lavrov's release).
Lavrov claims that his reason for releasing confidential correspondence is because the Russian position has been "perverted", so he is seeking to appeal to the public. But of course, the release of these documents only shows just how unreasonable Russia's position actually is.
More interestingly, going for bust and publishing confidential correspondence (a very unusual move) suggests that Russia is shutting off dialogue. Who will want to talk to Lavrov on these issues or seek compromise if he violates good faith in this way? An odd move.
Anyway, looks kind of worrying (not that anything else Russia has been doing in relation to Ukraine in recent weeks looks any less worrying).
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A very interesting interview with Bertrand Russell (recorded in 1961 at his house in North Wales), where he talks about his life, and sets out his views on issues ranging from sex life to education to nuclear war. .
Many of the things he says appear unduly pessimistic in retrospect. For example, he predicts that there would not be one person left alive by the end of the century. He repeatedly calls for Britain's withdrawal from NATO, which he sees as just an extension of US imperialism.
Other points seem right on the money (knowing what we know of the Cold War today). For example, he sees ideology as playing a decidedly secondary role to the struggle for power and claims things would have been much the same if the Russian tsars were still around.
An interesting op-ed by Joseph Nye, where he argues that the parallel between the Cold War and the current state of US-China rivalry is misplaced. The analogy is "lazy and dangerous", says the title. nytimes.com/2021/11/02/opi…. Here's why Nye is wrong 👇🏿...
According to Nye, the key difference was that during the Cold War the Soviet Union was a direct ideological and military threat to the United States, so containment was a feasible objective. Let's unpack this.
At no point during the Cold War was the Soviet Union a direct ideological threat to the United States. To argue that it was a direct ideological threat would be to imply that the Communists could come power in the U.S. or, broadly speaking, in the West, through the ballot.
A fascinating article on Trump & NATO, and in particular @jensstoltenberg's key role in dissuading Trump from attempting a US withdrawal from the alliance.
The key argument is that Stoltenberg patiently massaged Trump's ego through flattery, reached out to other actors in the US to contain Trump, and manipulated meeting agenda to make it appear like NATO was responding to Trump's concern about insufficient defence spending & China.
But the part I found most interesting was where Schuette talks about how Stoltenberg worked to undermine a possible rapprochement with Russia because it threatened NATO's very raison d'être.
I keep wondering about the term "empire" and how we apply it to the Soviet Union but not, for example, to today's Russia and China, which are both instead called "multiethnic states". Is there an actual reason why we do this apart from convention?
My sense is that there is no conceptual difference between, say, the Soviet incorporation of the Baltics in 1940, and China's incorporation of Tibet in the 1950s.
Nor is there a great conceptual difference between, say, Moscow's relationship with Dagestan and Tuva today and Moscow's relationship with Moldavia and Turkmenistan in the 1960s or the 1970s.
This is a rather strange article. You'd think that, at one level, Russian policy-makers should be quite pleased with it because Kupchan here endorses a strategy (that the Biden administration has in any case been following) of easing off on Russia to focus on China. But...
But the evidence is unconvincing, many of the historical examples furnished get the facts wrong, and the whole premise of the article - that Washington can somehow convince Russia of what its national interests should be - infantilises Russia to a degree.
Kupchan argues that the relationship between China & Russia is asymmetrical; thus, Russia should presumably see that it is not in its interest to align with Beijing. Yet he also claims that the relationship allows Russia to push above its weight on the international stage.
A pretty interesting article about Lavrov's recent adventures in Central Asia. kommersant.ru/doc/4907714?fb…. Highlights: 1) Lavrov criticises the US for quitting Afghanistan. 🤯 2) However, he doesn't want the US to have any bases / training centres in Central Asia.
3) But Putin apparently proposed that the US make use of Russian bases to track the situation in Afghanistan. 🤯 4) US refusal is construed to mean that the real purpose of US interest in Central Asia is to contain Russia, China and Iran.
5) Meanwhile, Lavrov spoke up against the US plan of allowing tens of thousands of pro-government Afghan refugees to settle in Central Asia, which, he indicated, could radicalise these countries.