Thread by @ThreshedThought

Time for another little round up on Afghanistan, and why I don't think much is going to change .....

The Taliban government is basically stuck.

Everyone is calling on them to become more inclusive, everyone wants them to disassociate themselves from terrorism, and everyone wants them to get the girls back to school.

Dealing with these in turn - inclusivity is simply not an option for the Taliban - this is for several reasons

Firstly, jobs for the boys. They been fighting an insurgency for 20 years, and they have lots of people to give jobs to; people who have been loyal; people who have fought. The idea of giving a job to a non-Talib is a non-starter - it would cause the movement to fracture.

Secondly - this is made worse by the transition that they are going through - they are changing from a polycentric insurgency structure (highly decentralised and necessary to survive 20 years of Coalition operations) to a more hierarchical and centralised structure more ...

... befitting of a government. They are having to get people to work for other people, when they have been their own boss essentially. Even MORE reason to make sure they have enough jobs to go around.

And lastly - ISKP.

Now, everyone seems to talk about ISKP and the Taliban like they are separate organisations.

Let me tell you: they're not.

The Venn diagram of the Taliban, the Haqqanis, the TTP, ISKP, and the role of the ISI overlaps hugely.

There is a lot of fluidity of personnel and motive between them all.

Much better to consider the Taliban and ISKP as occupying different positions along a the political spectrum (like exists in every country, the only difference here being that politics is armed).

And the Taliban leadership are terrified that if they tack to the centre on e.g. inclusivity, or talking to/working with outsiders they will lose fighters and even commanders to ISKP.

Like I said - similar to most countries, except that everyone is armed.

The next reason why the Taliban is stuck is that they are in the middle of a massive factional dispute.

On one side you have the Haqqani network: of longer duration, more cohesive, and supported by Pakistan (in fact they are so close to Pakistan they mediated the recent talks and ceasefire between the TTP and the Pakistani gov).

Most senior guy: Siraj Haqqani, Min of Interior

On the other side you have what I would call the Southern Taliban powerbrokers - less cohesive, and much closer to Iran than Pakistan.

Most senior guy: Barardar, Deputy PM

This most recently kicked off (I mean it waxed and waned during the insurgency too) immediately as Kabul fell. Whilst the evac was still going on, both factions rushed up to Kabul and started occupying ministries. No-one was expecting Kabul to fall so they both rushed in ....

And initially it appeared that the Southerns had the upper hand - after Zakir, a key southerner from Helmand, had occupied the ministry of defence with his militia (always a good start!).

But the visit of the DG ISI on the 4th Sep put paid to this - and the Talib gov announced on the 7th Sep showed that the Haqqanis (supported by Pak, remember) had taken senior positions, the Southerns had been excluded (Zakir, Sardar Irbrahim), and Baradar had been demoted

(Later on Zakir and Sardar Ibrahim were given deputy positions in Defence and Interior respectively)

This has gone on and on - Baradar immediately disappeared down to Uruzgan in a strop, but there have been arguments about positions, BBC reports of fights in the presidential palace, and now (2 months later) reports that Baradar is moving more men up to Kabul to bolster his posn.

It is not going away and the mediation of Yacoub (Omar's son) and Hassan (the PM, and a religious scholar and so not aligned to a faction) have failed to quell the dispute - it is a major source of instability.

And so this factional dispute is another reason why the Taliban leadership don't have much room to manoeuvre.

As to the other 'requests' of the regional countries and international community - cutting links to terrorism, and education for girls .....

It's pretty hard for the Talibs to cut links to terrorism - Siraj - the Minister of Interior, and the guy responsible for counter terrorism in the county is actually on international terrorism watchlists.

The poachers have supposedly become the gamekeepers.

But on girls' education, it does appear that there is some movement.

Initially all girls' schools were closed, but then fairly quickly primary schools were opened.

And recently it appears that secondary schools for girls have opened in Herat, Bamian, and even Helmand.

(I'm sure there are other places where they are closed or open, but I thought interesting that even in Helmand they were open).

And so it appears that some in the Taliban leadership have won their internal arguments and started opening girls schools - no doubt hoping that this will curry favour with other countries, so that they can perhaps gain recognition, and importantly humanitarian funding

I'm sure everyone is aware of the dire humanitarian state of the country right now - half of the country will starve this winter if something is not done.

(As a little aside, everyone is fleeing the country: 300K left by the Nimruz people smuggling hub in October alone and with most of these heading to Europe it appears that there will be another migrant crisis in Europe in spring/summer 2022)

So what does 2022 hold for Afghanistan?

I'm afraid, not much.

The Taliban government can't get more inclusive without splintering.

And this makes it hard to get recognition and for foreigners to help with the humanitarian crisis.

These issues, coupled with the factional dispute, mean that power will likely drain back to the provinces - I mean, no decisions are being/will be taken in Kabul!

And this increases the risk of civil war - which all the surrounding states are terrified of, because they know they will get sucked in.

I would put the risk of civil war in Afghanistan in 2022 at 50%.

Depressing, but hard to see how these interlocking problems can be solved.