A number of elements in this are refreshing to hear acknowledged by the @DF_COS - I am sure there’s a lot more topics he wished to cover. Whilst the military are aware of the threats, our politicians are slightly aware our civil service is in utter denial. thetimes.co.uk/article/1e2998…
The Dept of Defence needs actual experts. The Dept of Taoiseach and the NSAC too. The NCSC needs strategists not just code warriors.
Key gov depts such as comms, agriculture and Health should have designated Defence Liaison SMEs too who can work towards…
Integrating and enhancing the national security strategy whenever it sees the light of day.
We need a whole of gov approach to national security.
I hope we see more of this type of honest assessment from the @DF_COS, it’s needed because we need to create a cultural awareness and discourse in Irish society on national security and defence matters. Journalists like @JohnMooneyIRL have done excellent work to date
So too have private individuals and enterprises who are working to enhance the security of the country they love.
When @RivadaNetworks submitted to the National Security strategy we stressed the importance of building this culture within gov and society and working towards understanding what we valued and wished to protect, before we offered our opinion on anything else.
We offered some suggestions. But we expressed concern that the NSS was being developed before the foundations had been set. Let’s hope we were listened to. Our submission was based on the experience of those who have worked in this space and have seen the pitfalls we can avoid.
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The Irish gov has released its Electronic Communications Security Measures (ECSMs), effectively a reaction to risks in #5G technologies and networks. Here's a summary of what it does say ....
Ireland’s Risk Assessment concluded that nation-state actors pose the greatest risk to networks. It looks like technologies that are not granted exceptions must be ripped and replaced by 2027. Is this a ban on high-risk vendors, if the bar is very high??
There are serious risks affecting #5G networks, in particular risks arising from poorly written or malicious code, supply chain risks, particularly those arising from high risk suppliers and the risk of third country or State interference.
Since 2016 the French security services, the SGDSN, raised significant concerns over the growing dominance of CCP connected vehicles systems, especially those that will be paired to #5G networks with Chinese hardware. Now their fears are coming to pass: techwireasia.com/2020/05/huawei…
Background: Since 2014 #Huawei has been engaging several European car manufactures to explore rolling out Huawei GPS technology for both autonomous vehicles, connected vehicles and GPS assisted navigation.
In 2016 French car manufacturer Groupe PSA signed a deal with Huawei called "Push to Pass" strategy for 2016 - 2021. #Huawei technology would allow car manufacturers will be able to track, in real-time, the location of a vehicle, and retain the data. A major #DataProtection issue
To understand why so many are highlighting the Chinese cameras in Leinster House, one must first recognise that China does not do business or espionage like the West. There's no separation between industry sectors the CCP deems strategically important.
The #IOT, #5G, #AI and #SmartCities sectors are integral to China. These sectors have billions of dollars pumped into them from Chinese government central and regional funds and are controlled centrally by the CCP, with the CCP placing key personnel into these companies.
One other area of interest to the Chinese government is #BigData - and boy do they have the opportunity to gather as much of this as possible thanks to the West. This data is used to forecast and predict actions, reactions of markets, industry and people - most importantly people
A Thread: Key points of the UK #HCSEC#Huawei Oversight report and the implications:
1. HCSEC has been running for 8 years - 5 years testing
Examining Huawei and their operations, coding and security for a long time. In that time Huawei has basically slow-balled the process.
2. New additional risks with Huawei identified
These compound the previous risks of binary equivalence, and sloppy coding. Not to mention delays in translating firmware upgrades etc into English which slows the process down
2a. The report identified extensive non-adherence to basics ecure coding practices, including Huawei’s own internal standard, mandated since 2013