According to luminaries of global economic governance, fiscal policy will not be the same in the aftermath of the pandemic.
Even Carmen Reinhardt has turned austerity-skeptic.
Some, like @MESandbu of the FT, think that there is now a 'New Washington Consensus':
"fiscal probity is no longer about reining in public spending but about getting value for money – and spending more where the value can be found" ft.com/content/3d8d22…
But is this time really different, and is austerity a thing of the past?
We looked at the IMF's public spending projections, and compared them to the average of the 2010-19 period.
Two headline findings:
Rich countries will gradually phase out covid-related spending increases: by 2023, they will be still spending more than the 2010s
Middle income countries are expected to rapidly scale back *below* 2010s avg
Poor countries will soon revert to their very low spending levels
83 countries will still face aggressive austerity in the near term: by 2023, their public spending in 2023 will be at least 1 percentage point less than the 2010s avg.
This heavily limits ability to pursue a 'just recovery' (let alone a green and inclusive transition)
Overall, austerity will expose 2.3bn to budget cuts.
What does this mean for countries in crisis, and for the future of global public health?
Check out the — somewhat optimistic — take by the FT's Martin Sandbu on a "new Washington Consensus" that likes states, social protection and fighting inequality.
Also check out a recent overview about why revisionist history about the legacy of the Washington Consensus is problematic, conceptually and methodologically.
Let's start with the basics: what was the Washington Consensus?
For supporters, it was shorthand for the list of reforms that were necessary to overcome debt problems and unlock the development potential of low- and middle-income countries.
For opponents, the term was used to describe the scourge of radical market-oriented reforms that trapped countries in conditions of dependency and underdevelopment.
Global economic institutions currently find themselves on the firing line, whether from anti-liberal states or from populists/nationalists in liberal democracies.
But this is not the first time they have attracted intense criticism and challenges to their legitimacy.
To understand these processes, we examined world leaders' speeches on the podium of the UN General Assembly.
We spotted references to liberal economic institutions, and created a coding scheme drawing on Albert Hirschman’s 'exit, voice and loyalty' typology.
Developing countries will face enormous economic fallout from Covid-19. Already there are massive capital outflows.
This constrains governments from spending on health systems at a time when capacity urgently needs to expand and depresses economic activity.
2/17
The G20 expects IMF and World Bank to playing central role in supporting these countries, and both announced a set of tools to deal with the pandemic's impact.
But is this the best way to achieve lasting global health security?
Pre-1980s, when countries were faced with external economic shocks, they commonly chose to pursue “a unilateral suspension of payments followed by a lengthy moratorium and an eventual settlement on debtor-friendly terms.”
Sounds alien, right?
2/8
That is because from the 1980s onwards the US and the IMF started implementing large-scale financial interventions in countries going through debt crises.
These interventions were underpinned by the principle that repayment was sacrosanct.
International organizations are broadcasting their commitment to aiding #SDG attainment. But might their actual policy advice hurt progress towards these goals? We look at the case of the #IMF.
2/9
IMF structural adjustment programs—mandating austerity, deregulation, liberalization, & privatization—have been the workhorse of neoliberal globalization. For the history of such policies, see here: