In the margins of my undergrad thesis explaining Soviet intentions regarding interventions/non-interventions in Eastern Europe (56, 68, 81), my advisor, Alex Dallin, wrote in the margins 2 dozens times, "how do you know"? Wisdom from a great Soviet scholar is relevant today. 1/
BTW, I also wrote about US responses. Regarding Hungary 1956, we overpromised and undelivered. 2/
Regarding Czechoslovakia 1968, we did next to nothing; Johnson was focused on Asia (Vietnam) and polarized domestic politics. 3/
Regarding Poland 1981, Reagan had a comprehensive strategy of support for democratic forces and credible threats to Kremlin. Good lessons for today. Didnt stop martial law though. 4/
Thankfully, our Secretary of State @SecBlinken knows this last case well. He published a book on the sanctions debate regarding the Siberian pipeline (eery parallels to NS2 debate now) rhttps://www.amazon.com/Books-Antony-J-Blinken/s?rh=n%3A283155%2Cp_27%3AAntony+J.+Blinken 5/
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In 2010, "Russia" attended the NATO summit in Lisbon and called the friendly meeting "historic in terms of its spirit and atmosphere.." 1/ THREAD
At the NATO summit in 2010, "Russia" presented a grand proposal for missile defense cooperation, not exactly something you normally do with enemies. 2/
In 2011, "Russia" abstained on UN Security Resolutions 1970 & 1973, authorizing the use of force against Libya by NATO countries. Russia could have vetoed these resolutions and stopped NATO countries, but did not. It was a major cooperative moment between Russia-US-NATO. 3/
"Biden should state publicly his desire to reinvigorate diplomacy to end the war in eastern Ukraine..." 1 THREAD
, including naming a senior envoy to represent the United States in these negotiations and insisting that the United States formally join Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France to reinvigorate the now moribund Normandy talks tasked with ending the war in eastern Ukraine. 2/
Such an announcement would dispel the absurd Russian claim that Washington and Kyiv are scheming to restore Ukrainian sovereignty over Donbas by military force ... 3/
"Biden should state publicly his desire to reinvigorate diplomacy to end the war in eastern Ukraine... 1/ THREAD.
"including naming a senior envoy to represent the United States in these negotiations and insisting that the United States formally join Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France to reinvigorate the now moribund Normandy talks tasked with ending the war in eastern Ukraine." 2/
"Such an announcement would dispel the absurd Russian claim that Washington and Kyiv are scheming to restore Ukrainian sovereignty over Donbas by military force..." 3/
In my 5 years in the US government (2009-2014), NATO expansion to Ukraine was a non-issue in U.S.-Russia relations & U.S.-Ukraine relations. 1/ THREAD
In 2010, Medvedev even attended the NATO summit in Lisbon. He said, "The meeting… was historic in terms of its spirit and atmosphere." (I was there; he was thrilled to be at the meeting.) 2/
While attending Obama, Biden, Clinton, Lavrov, Donilon, etc. meetings with Putin/Medvedev/Lavrov, and listening in on nearly every phone call between Obama and Russians for 5 years, I cannot recall a serious contentious exchange about NATO expansion. 3/
The job of an intelligence officer is to make probabilistic assessments about the intentions of foreign actors. The job of a US foreign policymaker or diplomat is to try to shape those intentions in ways that serve US interests. 1/THREAD.
If the IC assesses that the probability of Putin invading Ukraine is 10%, then the job of Biden, Blinken, Sullivan et al is to reduce that percentage to 5% or 1%. 2/
Those spending so much time arguing about probabilities should spend more time discussing creative ways to influence these probabilities, no matter if you think it's 70% or 10% probability of invasion. 3/
After 30 years of either liberal internationalism or all-out war, American strategists have forgotten the tools of "coercive diplomacy" for dealing with great power adversaries. Everyone should go back and read Alex George. Some recommendations: 1/ THREAD.
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (with David K. Hall & William Simmons). Boston: Little Brown, 1971. (Expanded Second Edition, 1994, with William E. Simmon.) 2/
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (with Richard Smoke). New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. 3/