Thread by @ABarbashin

Vladislav Inozemtsev here argues you can't defeat Putin, you can only outlive him. Why?
Thread 1/14
ridl.io/en/outliving-p…

Putin’s system is in some ways not a state in the traditional sense of the word. It lacks clear ideology; it has rather blurred and undefined boundaries; and, most importantly, it does not distinguish between the private and public spheres, treating both quite arbitrarily 2/14

It is hostile to legal culture as such, constantly changing the rules and passing vague laws that could victimise any of its subjects at any given time. The nature of this bizarre regime is set by the main goal of its beneficiaries: personal enrichment. 3/14

Russia is ruled by those who are elected or appointed by a legally defined procedure. The commercial state has formal attributes of a state. In reality it is a business structure imitating a state; it is this imitation that determines its strengths and weaknesses. 4/14

While possessing the formal attributes of a state, Russia’s ‘Putin and Co.’ enterprise is endowed with enormous powers that no corporation or mafia structure has. It can legally create armed forces, threaten its neighbours, be a party to international agreements, etc. 5/14

It intimidates the rest of the world, or parts of it, with its aggressive and unpredictable behaviour; but it has neither a clear programme for external expansion nor an expectation of its possible gains. 6/14

Putin’s Russia has special powers primarily because it has tools at its disposal unavailable to the leaders of most civilised states: de facto private armies; limitless financial resources spent on bribery and corruption; the ability to grant citizenship to its supporters 7/14

The weakness of the ‘commercial state’ is its extreme internal inefficiency. Its beneficiaries, who maintain the illusion of acting as ‘regular’ statespersons, cannot openly act as owners of the country they have de facto privatised. 8/14

Extra problem comes with maintaining bureaucracy which is getting more costly and trend is irreversible. A ‘normal’ state would respond by fighting corruption. The more dangerous the civil service becomes, the higher the ‘risk premium’ enjoyed by those willing to join 9/14

Commercial state cannot be disrupted from the inside or from the outside. It shapes its domestic policy and makes sure there is enough money and resources to fight the opposition; it creates incentives for driving dissenters out of the country 10/14

It is sufficiently adventurous and aggressive in its foreign policy to elicit forceful confrontation from Western countries. It is much more likely that at some stage an agreement on the ‘red lines’ will come and the commercial state will get a free hand within these lines 11/14

Commercial state is untenable in the longer run: it can absorb any amount of resources with no positive impact on society; by definition, it does not care about modernisation or development 12/14

Fate of this Commercial State will be decided not in the trenches of the Donbass, in the offices of Washington and Brussels, or even in the streets of Russian megalopolises. It will be set by the successes of decarbonisation and by possibilities of new finance 13/14

Comment: can't say I agree with all of it but the main point stands - Putin's state can't evolve in the decarbonized world - there will be in fact new Russian after Putin. Priority now is to make it until that time with minimal damage. 14/14