Thread by @AMFChina

My article "The Chinese Communist Party’s hybrid interference and Germany's increasingly contentious China debate (2018-21)" has been published open access in the Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies @JournalEACS. 🇩🇪🇨🇳 1/32 doi.org/10.25365/jeacs…

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) ambition to neutralise independent academia at home and abroad is the conundrum at the heart of this article. Strictly enforced political censorship has led to "educated acquiescence" (Elizabeth J. Perry, 2020) among scholars in China. 2/32

Based on a review of the literature on sharp power, hybrid interference, the United Front system, and the party-state's globalising censorship regime I argue that the Chinese Communist Party's rule by fear has induced self-censorship among many western academics, too. 3/32

Dapiran has described self-censorship as "a response to an environment of fear, to implicit threats of negative consequences for acts of speech and expression that cross vague, undefined red lines. The creation of that environment of fear is the act of censorship." 4/32

Faced with the CCP’s psychological influence, western China scholars—in Germany and other parts of the world— are mostly left to their own devices. This can lead to an overly fearful or passive attitude. Typical concerns relate to the following four dimensions: 5/32

【 1 】the fear of upsetting Chinese partner organisations or Chinese funders (and thus potentially being seen as a troublemaker by their home institution) 6/32

【 2 】the fear of putting colleagues, family, or friends in China at risk by conducting politically sensitive research 7/32

【 3 】the fear of losing access to China as a result of public comments which are critical of the Chinese Communist Party 8/32

【 4 】the fear among China scholars about risks that the delivery of university courses which are critical of the CCP “could create for mainland PRC and Hong Kong-based students and themselves” (Hoffman, 2021) 9/32

While the second concern can be a legitimate reason to engage in individual self-censorship, an overly fearful attitude also means that under such conditions China scholars are afraid to “live in truth” (Václav Havel). 10/32

Another outcome of CCP censorship is enforced silence. Any discourse which is critical of the CCP or its policies is consequently seen as a dangerous act. This can also explain cynicism among some western China experts, which in my view camouflages deep-seated insecurities. 11/32

The study of contemporary China is fraught with peril. An increasingly totalitarian Xi regime is intimidating independent-minded scholars at home and abroad. But Mark Twain also reminds us that "courage is the resistance to fear, mastery of fear—not absence of fear." 12/32

In the empirical part I put the spotlight on an increasingly contentious debate among China experts in Germany (2018-21). I analyse public expert discourses on China which take place despite political censorship. 13/32

This expert debate on China takes place across websites, journals, interviews, public talks, and public statements of learned societies, as well as through oral and written testimonies of China scholars to parliamentary committees. 14/32

In 2018 Thorsten Benner @thorstenbenner had foreseen that Germany’s China debate would become increasingly contentious. He assumed that there would be a proliferation of voices downplaying the systemic challenge posed by the CCP. 15/32

The public debate among China experts in Germany throughout 2020-21 has proven Benner right. At least six public discourses can now be identified which obscure rather than illuminate how the German state and society should respond to the CCP’s hybrid interference. 16/32

The question here is not whether these expert discourses accurately represent the state of the art of contemporary Chinese Studies in Germany. But since they are likely to shape the German public’s knowledge and understanding of China they deserve greater scrutiny. 17/32

【 Discourse 1 】Playing down valid empirical evidence of victimisation / oppression in order to appease the Chinese authorities 18/32

【 Discourse 2 】Trivialising the significance of anti-democratic CCP edicts and/or antiliberal CCP policies 19/32

【 Discourse 3 】 Recommending “silent diplomacy” whilst keeping tight-lipped about obstacles to dialogue 20/32

【 Discourse 4 】Prescribing academic cooperation with China without addressing the issue of access 21/32

【 Discourse 5 】Extolling the virtues of neutrality in Asian Studies and discouraging positionality 22/32

【 Discourse 6 】Acknowledging political censorship without offering practical and applicable solutions 23/32

Seen in their entirety the six discourses reveal a great reluctance among China scholars to address the question of how best to respond to the hard authoritarian turn under Xi Jinping. This ostrich effect points to a deeper malaise in German academia. 24/32

To counter the six harmonising discourses—all of which run the danger of reducing democratic resilience in Germany—there is a need for a value-based public debate about what kind of China-related knowledge and understanding is required. 25/32

It is high time for a paradigm change in contemporary Chinese Studies in Germany. Academics should question rule-stabilising, culturally relativistic and culturally essentialist as well as anti-praxeological traditions which inform misguided expert discourses on China. 26/32

From now on Chinese Studies should be considered a post-normal studies, since the field deals with issues which “[involves] risk” and is marked by an environment “where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). 27/32

In the future western China experts should make their pre-scientific value judgments explicit, acknowledge political risks in their research, and jointly work on policy-oriented solutions aimed at refuting CCP censorship and minimising self-censorship. 28/32

The following ten recommendations for a better China discourse by David Missal @DavidJRMissal and I can go a long way towards addressing many of the shortcomings identified in this @JournalEACS article. 29/32

https://twitter.com/AMFChina/status/1450718445302128640?s=20

If German academia is either unwilling or unable to address the issue of censorship and self-censorship head on as part of academic self-governance the Federal Ministry of Education and Research @BMBF_Bund should step in. @starkwatzinger @th_sattelberger @JBrandenburgFDP 30/32

Foreign Minister @ABaerbock and the @AuswaertigesAmt should double down in their efforts to warn about the Chinese Communist Party's threats to Germany's CAMP sectors. @AnnaLuehrmann @KatjaKeul @tobiaslindner 31/32

Last but not least think tanks like @LiberaleModerne @GPPi @dgapev @merics_eu etc and media organisations should continue to shed light on the issue of CCP hybrid interference in Germany. @Girschick @MKalkhof @asienreporter @hfeldwisch /End