In my letter to @thetimes I call on British universities to adopt the Draft Model Code of Conduct (DMCC) developed by @AFI_WG. This would show that 🇬🇧 Higher Education institutions are serious about enhancing transparency and accountability in their cooperation with 🇨🇳 China /1
The biggest danger facing British higher education institutions now is complacency. When it comes to critically re-evaluating universities’ ties with 🇨🇳 China, students, academics, service professionals and vice-chancellors all have skin in the game. The time to act is now /2
British universities agreeing to adopt @AFI_WG’s Draft Model Code of Conduct (DMCC) would be a game changer. Taking such a step would stand universities in good stead with the government, and adopting the code could help to prevent heavy-handed state regulation in the future /3
The Academic Freedom and Internationalisation Working Group @AFI_WG brings together academics from UK Higher Education institutions, who are supported by relevant civil society representatives and the All-Party Parliamentary Human Rights Group /4
German China scholars have to find an answer to China's increasing censorship on German academia, @DavidJRMissal and I write in @ForeignPolicy. If scholars don't act, the state has to step in and help protect academic freedom /1 foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/28/ger…
The most recent example of Chinese censorship is a cancelled book tour at Confucius Institutes affiliated with German universities. Last week, at the behest of a Chinese general consul, 2 journalists were disinvited from giving talks at CIs about their biography of Xi Jinping /2
Similar attacks on academia are becoming increasingly frequent. In response to western sanctions, the CCP retaliated by imposing counter-sanctions against, inter alia, western scholars and think tanks /3
Over the past twelve months @DavidJRMissal and I have jointly explored the issue of academic freedom and China. During our studies of the national context of Germany we noticed shortcomings both in terms of the academic and the public expert discourse about China /1
Our article "Mitigating threats to academic freedom in Germany: the role of the state, universities, learned societies and China" will soon be published in @InRights. In parallel we have developed ten suggestions aimed at improving the academic and public discourse about China /2
#1 Address the challenge of censorship and self-censorship.
China specialists should openly discuss the dangers of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) globalising political censorship regime and critically assess the challenge of individual and institutional self-censorship /3
Lately I have been thinking a lot about the need to engage in Machtkritik. This German term can be translated as ‘critique of power’. The latter requires us to address the issue of democratic political legitimacy (or lack thereof), eg of the Chinese party-state /1
I have noticed that when we talk about the CCP’s lack of democratic political legitimacy there is a tendency among many European elites to shy away from conflict & to praise the virtues of tolerance and to highlight the merits of suspending judgment in intercultural encounters /2
From such a vantage point any public critique of power is seen as contributing to polarisation. But who is polarising in the historical reality? The hard authoritarian turn of the Xi regime is real and affecting Chinese citizens as well as non-Chinese citizens around the world /3
With their cynical approach to the People's Republic of China 🇨🇳 the four chancellors Schmidt (1974-82), Kohl (1982-98), Schröder (1998-2005) and Merkel (2005-21) have done Germany 🇩🇪 a disservice. There is much to be learned from their leadership failures. A short thread 🧵 /1
Chancellor Helmut Kohl is best known for his role in Germany's re-unification. Yet he also helped normalising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. In 1995 he was the "first Western leader to visit a Chinese military base" /2 nytimes.com/1995/11/09/wor…
Kohl's visit to the People's Liberation Army 196 Infantry Division outside Tianjin was highly symbolic. It was a clear signal to the Chinese Communist Party that the atrocities of 1989 were no longer an obstacle to western business engagement with China /3 scmp.com/article/138269…
Fischer's analogy to Cold War 1.0 is a red herring. The threat which the Chinese Communist Party poses to peace within and outside 🇨🇳 can not be directly compared to the former USSR. It is a different kettle of fish. What I find worrisome is how Fischer misrepresents the CCP /2
Fischer describes 🇨🇳 as "a market economy under Leninist auspices". This "hybrid character" supposedly explains China's "success story" and its ability to overtake the 🇺🇸 technologically and economically by 2030. The many costs of China's political system do not feature at all /3
The Board of the German Association for Asian Studies (DGA) has published a new statement about the state of Asian studies in Germany. Their explicit commitment to #academicfreedom is welcome. But many problems with the DGA's approach remain /1
In the opening paragraph the DGA statement bemoans the supposed "return of dangerous stereotypical categorization patterns and woodcut-like world order models" without initially offering important context or country-specific examples /2
In the second paragraph, however, it becomes fairly clear that they are primarily concerned about the "power and system rivalry between the USA and the PR China" as well as "democratic backsliding / democratic regression in parts of Southeast Asia" /3