Over the past twelve months @DavidJRMissal and I have jointly explored the issue of academic freedom and China. During our studies of the national context of Germany we noticed shortcomings both in terms of the academic and the public expert discourse about China /1
Our article "Mitigating threats to academic freedom in Germany: the role of the state, universities, learned societies and China" will soon be published in @InRights. In parallel we have developed ten suggestions aimed at improving the academic and public discourse about China /2
#1 Address the challenge of censorship and self-censorship.
China specialists should openly discuss the dangers of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) globalising political censorship regime and critically assess the challenge of individual and institutional self-censorship /3
Learned societies have a special responsibility to help develop sector-wide standards and protocols aimed at protecting academic freedom. They can lay the groundwork for reform by commissioning systematic studies about self-censorship at universities /4
Universities could consider adopting recommendations by Human Rights Watch from 2019 on how to mitigate risks to academic freedom in part or in full /5 hrw.org/news/2019/03/2…
#2 Research both 'official China' and 'unofficial China'.
China specialists need to be conscious that while the CCP under General Secretary Xi Jinping seeks a Gleichschaltung of Chinese academia, civil society and media under a unified narrative... /6
... this remains a totalitarian ambition, not yet a fait accompli. Western China scholars should continue to research both what could be termed 'official China' (represented by the party-state) ... /7
... and 'unofficial China' (which includes independent-minded academics, doctors, entrepreneurs, citizen journalists, public interest lawyers and young students who no longer accept the CCP’s rule by fear) as well as the interactions between both /8
Despite an easier access to ‘official China’ for Western academia the viewpoints of representatives of 'unofficial China' should be represented equally in research on contemporary China /9
#3 Avoid stereotyping ‘China’ and ‘the West’.
China scholars should be mindful of the downsides of pitting 'China' vs 'the West'. While such shorthands are common in the public discourse on China, such binary opposites do not capture the reality of a diverse ‘China’ /10
This stereotyping often mirrors the CCP’s narrative of a people united behind the party not able or willing to live in a democratic system. It suppresses the desire of people to live under a democratic system in both ‘China’ and ‘the West’ /11
#4 Beware of the downsides of overspecialisation.
Greater attempts should be made to strike a better balance between a generalist and specialist approaches to the study of China. When researching a local phenomenon in China the wider picture should not be disregarded /12
e.g. when researching smart cities in China it should be noted that whilst CCTV cameras can help solve local problems such as traffic congestion, they simultaneously augment the central party-state's ability to exercise social and political control through grid management /13
Greater efforts should be made to analyse China simultaneously from holistic and reductionist perspectives /14
#5 Close the theory-to-practice gap.
In order to narrow the theory to practice gap greater efforts should be made to incorporate the views of practitioners. There is a tendency to see contemporary China exclusively through the lens of political or academic discourses /15
This comes at the expense of observing and analysing communities of practice. Capturing the perspective of practitioners will require greater willingness to experiment with knowledge co-production /16
#6 Celebrate viewpoint diversity.
Whereas in the past public commentary on current Chinese affairs was mostly limited to a select few experts with extensive China expertise, in the 21st century the number of China pundits has exponentially increased /17
This means that experts with vastly different academic training and practical China experiences are joining the public discourse about China. This development is also due to missing diversity in viewpoints within the ‘traditional’ community of university-based China scholars /18
Viewpoint diversity should be welcomed, no matter whether taking place within or outside the world of academia /19
#7 Live in truth.
To quote Einstein, experts "must not conceal any part of what one has recognised to be true" in the public discourse about China. 'Being economical with the truth' distorts the public discourse about China /20
For example, pundits should not consider public opinion polls conducted in authoritarian China as credible evidence for Chinese citizen support towards the CCP’s regime /21
Due to political censorship and self-censorship even seemingly scientific surveys should be taken with a big grain of salt. At best they reveal the efficacy of CCP propaganda /22
#8 Prevent conflicts of interests.
In order to enhance public trust in experts commenting on current Chinese affairs discourse participants should disclose any special interests /23
It is in their own interest for experts to create transparency about consultancy work and sources of supplementary income /24
Media outlets which interview experts or publish their op-eds should follow the good practice of @ConversationUK, which requires authors to provide a disclosure statement and answer questions about potential conflicts of interests or affiliations /25
#9 Show greater civil courage.
Junior experts should feel empowered to make their voice heard, even if their point of view run counter the conventional wisdom of senior politicians, bureaucrats, business leaders or other academics /26
Both junior and senior experts should stand up for a more open discussion /27
#10 Exercise solidarity.
Experts who incur the wrath of the CCP for their critique of the party-state's authoritarian overreach deserve public solidarity and support (e.g., they should be invited to participate in projects, events, publications etc even more) /End
Lately I have been thinking a lot about the need to engage in Machtkritik. This German term can be translated as ‘critique of power’. The latter requires us to address the issue of democratic political legitimacy (or lack thereof), eg of the Chinese party-state /1
I have noticed that when we talk about the CCP’s lack of democratic political legitimacy there is a tendency among many European elites to shy away from conflict & to praise the virtues of tolerance and to highlight the merits of suspending judgment in intercultural encounters /2
From such a vantage point any public critique of power is seen as contributing to polarisation. But who is polarising in the historical reality? The hard authoritarian turn of the Xi regime is real and affecting Chinese citizens as well as non-Chinese citizens around the world /3
With their cynical approach to the People's Republic of China 🇨🇳 the four chancellors Schmidt (1974-82), Kohl (1982-98), Schröder (1998-2005) and Merkel (2005-21) have done Germany 🇩🇪 a disservice. There is much to be learned from their leadership failures. A short thread 🧵 /1
Chancellor Helmut Kohl is best known for his role in Germany's re-unification. Yet he also helped normalising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. In 1995 he was the "first Western leader to visit a Chinese military base" /2 nytimes.com/1995/11/09/wor…
Kohl's visit to the People's Liberation Army 196 Infantry Division outside Tianjin was highly symbolic. It was a clear signal to the Chinese Communist Party that the atrocities of 1989 were no longer an obstacle to western business engagement with China /3 scmp.com/article/138269…
Fischer's analogy to Cold War 1.0 is a red herring. The threat which the Chinese Communist Party poses to peace within and outside 🇨🇳 can not be directly compared to the former USSR. It is a different kettle of fish. What I find worrisome is how Fischer misrepresents the CCP /2
Fischer describes 🇨🇳 as "a market economy under Leninist auspices". This "hybrid character" supposedly explains China's "success story" and its ability to overtake the 🇺🇸 technologically and economically by 2030. The many costs of China's political system do not feature at all /3
The Board of the German Association for Asian Studies (DGA) has published a new statement about the state of Asian studies in Germany. Their explicit commitment to #academicfreedom is welcome. But many problems with the DGA's approach remain /1
In the opening paragraph the DGA statement bemoans the supposed "return of dangerous stereotypical categorization patterns and woodcut-like world order models" without initially offering important context or country-specific examples /2
In the second paragraph, however, it becomes fairly clear that they are primarily concerned about the "power and system rivalry between the USA and the PR China" as well as "democratic backsliding / democratic regression in parts of Southeast Asia" /3
Have you ever wondered how the Chinese Communist Party's censorship regime works at home and abroad? What follows is a short thread 🧵 /1
The CCP's sharp power works with the help of the *simultaneous* use of carrots and sticks. In my book "The Struggle for Democracy in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong" I called the carrots rule by bribery and the sticks rule by fear /2
A key instrument is the psychological warfare technique of ‘decomposition’ (Zersetzung) against domestic and international opponents of the regime /3
Whereas in March 2021 European Research Institute Directors roundly denounced the CCP's sanctions against @merics_eu Berthold Kuhn suggests that 'young scientists and business experts in particular are more likely to refrain from working with Merics' /2 statement-china-sanctions.vercel.app
While I welcome robust public debates about the logic & limits of Magnitsky sanctions I am dismayed that Berthold Kuhn's discussion of the Chinese Communist Party's sanctions against @merics_eu isn't prefaced with an unequivocal defence of #AcademicFreedom and #FreedomOfSpeech /3