German China scholars have to find an answer to China's increasing censorship on German academia, @DavidJRMissal and I write in @ForeignPolicy. If scholars don't act, the state has to step in and help protect academic freedom /1 foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/28/ger…
The most recent example of Chinese censorship is a cancelled book tour at Confucius Institutes affiliated with German universities. Last week, at the behest of a Chinese general consul, 2 journalists were disinvited from giving talks at CIs about their biography of Xi Jinping /2
Similar attacks on academia are becoming increasingly frequent. In response to western sanctions, the CCP retaliated by imposing counter-sanctions against, inter alia, western scholars and think tanks /3
1336 scholars signed a solidarity statement. Among the signatories were eighty China experts at German universities. Many prominent German China scholars did not sign the solidarity statement, maybe because they don’t want to risk Beijing’s support for their research projects /4
The response from Berlin was inadequate: German Foreign Minister Maas summoned the Chinese ambassador, but there was no public reaction to the CCP's attack on European China experts from Chancellor Merkel. By staying silent, she doubled down on her CCP-friendly China policy /5
Three months after the incident, the German Ministry of Education and Research announced a new initiative aimed at strengthening independent China research. But it is not cracking down on continued CCP interference in German academia /6
One reason is Germany’s federal system, where only the 16 states have oversight over universities. Another is that universities are largely exempt from freedom of information laws, and are all too eager to veil Chinese money boosting their budgets /7
Individual researchers often have even more to lose should they be barred from entry to China, access to Chinese primary sources, and cooperation with their research partners. The CCP still has much leverage to influence academia, and its efforts continue to be successful /8
The German state seems unable to mitigate international risks to academic freedom: Neither the relevant government ministries nor the German political parties have developed a comprehensive China strategy for academia (with exception of the Greens and the Free Democrats) /9
Other key players have been just as ineffective. The German Rector's Conference has done little more than publish more than 100 “Leading questions about university cooperation with China" /10
Similarly, the German Academic Exchange Service defends cooperation with Beijing, and continues to downplay the risks. It is highly doubtful that waiting for those who run and benefit from continued cooperation to put a stop to foreign interference will be enough /11
Individual researchers and their academic associations will need to shoulder greater responsibilities: They could warn their universities about risks in cooperating with China and help scholars and institutions to develop policies dealing with censorship and self-censorship /12
Such intellectual leadership has been in short supply. E.g., in June 2021, the German Association for Asian Studies in a public statement bemoaned interference and self-censorship in German academia. But it failed to develop any proposals how to deal with such problems /13
The new German government might bring change: 2 of the 3 parties in the likely coalition are unusually critical of China. One key step would be the long-overdue establishment of a national security council to coordinate security issues, including defending academic freedom /14
There is also a strong need to train university administrators in political risk assessment, in hopes that they, too, will come to see the benefit of transparency and academic independence even at the cost of Chinese funding /15
Academic associations could help by making the case for disclosure of third-party funding. Transparency would empower professors and staff to critique unhealthy financial dependencies. Less reliance on funding from China could also help reduce self-censorship among scholars /16
If universities don't self-correct, tougher measures will be needed. In such a case the German government should consider legislative measures: /17
It could introduce a German version of the US Foreign Agents Registration Act and cut federal funding for universities which take Chinese money or fail in risk management. State governments should introduce effective transparency laws /18
German academics also need to critically reflect on their position toward the Chinese state. One start might be our 10 recommendations for a better China discourse /19
Staying silent on the CCP’s abuses at home and abroad is no longer a neutral position or count as disinterested research. We need a professional and public discourse about the best strategies to mitigate the CCP’s threats to academic freedom in Germany now /End
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Over the past twelve months @DavidJRMissal and I have jointly explored the issue of academic freedom and China. During our studies of the national context of Germany we noticed shortcomings both in terms of the academic and the public expert discourse about China /1
Our article "Mitigating threats to academic freedom in Germany: the role of the state, universities, learned societies and China" will soon be published in @InRights. In parallel we have developed ten suggestions aimed at improving the academic and public discourse about China /2
#1 Address the challenge of censorship and self-censorship.
China specialists should openly discuss the dangers of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) globalising political censorship regime and critically assess the challenge of individual and institutional self-censorship /3
Lately I have been thinking a lot about the need to engage in Machtkritik. This German term can be translated as ‘critique of power’. The latter requires us to address the issue of democratic political legitimacy (or lack thereof), eg of the Chinese party-state /1
I have noticed that when we talk about the CCP’s lack of democratic political legitimacy there is a tendency among many European elites to shy away from conflict & to praise the virtues of tolerance and to highlight the merits of suspending judgment in intercultural encounters /2
From such a vantage point any public critique of power is seen as contributing to polarisation. But who is polarising in the historical reality? The hard authoritarian turn of the Xi regime is real and affecting Chinese citizens as well as non-Chinese citizens around the world /3
With their cynical approach to the People's Republic of China 🇨🇳 the four chancellors Schmidt (1974-82), Kohl (1982-98), Schröder (1998-2005) and Merkel (2005-21) have done Germany 🇩🇪 a disservice. There is much to be learned from their leadership failures. A short thread 🧵 /1
Chancellor Helmut Kohl is best known for his role in Germany's re-unification. Yet he also helped normalising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. In 1995 he was the "first Western leader to visit a Chinese military base" /2 nytimes.com/1995/11/09/wor…
Kohl's visit to the People's Liberation Army 196 Infantry Division outside Tianjin was highly symbolic. It was a clear signal to the Chinese Communist Party that the atrocities of 1989 were no longer an obstacle to western business engagement with China /3 scmp.com/article/138269…
Fischer's analogy to Cold War 1.0 is a red herring. The threat which the Chinese Communist Party poses to peace within and outside 🇨🇳 can not be directly compared to the former USSR. It is a different kettle of fish. What I find worrisome is how Fischer misrepresents the CCP /2
Fischer describes 🇨🇳 as "a market economy under Leninist auspices". This "hybrid character" supposedly explains China's "success story" and its ability to overtake the 🇺🇸 technologically and economically by 2030. The many costs of China's political system do not feature at all /3
The Board of the German Association for Asian Studies (DGA) has published a new statement about the state of Asian studies in Germany. Their explicit commitment to #academicfreedom is welcome. But many problems with the DGA's approach remain /1
In the opening paragraph the DGA statement bemoans the supposed "return of dangerous stereotypical categorization patterns and woodcut-like world order models" without initially offering important context or country-specific examples /2
In the second paragraph, however, it becomes fairly clear that they are primarily concerned about the "power and system rivalry between the USA and the PR China" as well as "democratic backsliding / democratic regression in parts of Southeast Asia" /3
Have you ever wondered how the Chinese Communist Party's censorship regime works at home and abroad? What follows is a short thread 🧵 /1
The CCP's sharp power works with the help of the *simultaneous* use of carrots and sticks. In my book "The Struggle for Democracy in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong" I called the carrots rule by bribery and the sticks rule by fear /2
A key instrument is the psychological warfare technique of ‘decomposition’ (Zersetzung) against domestic and international opponents of the regime /3