Our article "Mitigating threats to academic freedom in Germany: the role of the state, universities, learned societies and China" has just been published open access in the International Journal of Human Rights @InRights /1 tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
What follows is a brief summary. In our article we probe whether or not the ecosystem of organised academia in Germany defends academic freedom sufficiently, particularly in respect to attacks on it by the Chinese government /2
Despite constitutional guarantees of academic freedom, academics face multiple threats from populist politicians, dubious third-party funding, uncivil society, and misguided developments within German academia itself /3
These domestic threats are exacerbated by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) globalised censorship regime, dubious party-state funding from China, the weaponization of informal Chinese networks, and an unhealthy dependency among Western China scholars on ‘official China’ /4
Our research reveals that the German state, universities, and learned societies have so far failed to properly identify – let alone mitigate – threats to academic freedom emanating from state and non-state agents under control of the CCP /5
We argue that while German parties have largely abdicated political leadership, German universities exhibit shortcomings in terms of their ethical leadership /6
Drawing on an in-depth analysis of a controversial statement by the Board of the German Association for Asian Studies (DGA) we argue that leading China scholars also seem unwilling or unable to exercise intellectual leadership /7
The widespread abdication of leadership now risks to entrench censorship and self-censorship in academia, which in the medium- to long-term will severely undermine national and democratic security in Germany /8
It should be a concern for both the German state and civil society that so far neither politicians nor academics have come up with sensible suggestions on how to mitigate such risks /9
While we do not wish the German state to directly interfere in the self-government of German universities, it has a constitutional obligation to mitigate domestic and international threats to academic freedom /10
This will require a political debate about the merits and demerits of relying too much on third party funding in general and from the Chinese party-state in particular /11
The German state also has to create a regulatory framework for greater transparency and accountability of German universities. This will require reforming Freedom of Information laws at the federal and state level /12
German academics should furthermore critically reflect on their position towards the Chinese party-state. Attempts by academics to try to enjoy the best of both worlds need to stop. At the very minimum evident conflicts of interest should be transparent for all /13
Here we would like to emphasise that we do not prescribe a particular political position that academics should take. Nevertheless, German China scholars should be upfront with members of the public how their value orientations inform their respective takes on Chinese affairs /14
We would like to stress that a supposedly “neutral” position does not exist. China scholars may want to consider the words by Desmond Tutu, who famously said that "(if) you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor" /15
While every scholar has the freedom to choose his research topic and stance, we would welcome if more China specialists were willing to publicly acknowledge, analyse and critique the totalitarian turn in Xi’s China /16
A more reflective attitude would also go a long way in facilitating a more respectful professional and public discourse about sensible strategies how to best mitigate the threats of the Chinese Communist Party to academic freedom in Germany /17
In light of the hard authoritarian turn under General Secretary Xi Jinping the terms #DemocraticDeterrence#DemocraticSecurity#DemocraticResilience need to enter the public lexicon. If you are interested in learning more I suggest the following key readings. A short thread 🧵/1
In terms of #DemocraticDeterrence Mikael Wigell's @MWigell article "Democratic Deterrence: How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference" is essential reading. His distinction between traditional deterrence and democratic deterrence is particularly illuminating /2 tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
When it comes to #DemocraticSecurity Didi Kirsten Tatlow @dktatlow has offered ten practical steps to protect European democracy and sovereignty from influence and interference by the Chinese Communist Party. This text should be widely read /3 dgap.org/en/research/pu…
In my letter to @thetimes I call on British universities to adopt the Draft Model Code of Conduct (DMCC) developed by @AFI_WG. This would show that 🇬🇧 Higher Education institutions are serious about enhancing transparency and accountability in their cooperation with 🇨🇳 China /1
The biggest danger facing British higher education institutions now is complacency. When it comes to critically re-evaluating universities’ ties with 🇨🇳 China, students, academics, service professionals and vice-chancellors all have skin in the game. The time to act is now /2
British universities agreeing to adopt @AFI_WG’s Draft Model Code of Conduct (DMCC) would be a game changer. Taking such a step would stand universities in good stead with the government, and adopting the code could help to prevent heavy-handed state regulation in the future /3
German China scholars have to find an answer to China's increasing censorship on German academia, @DavidJRMissal and I write in @ForeignPolicy. If scholars don't act, the state has to step in and help protect academic freedom /1 foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/28/ger…
The most recent example of Chinese censorship is a cancelled book tour at Confucius Institutes affiliated with German universities. Last week, at the behest of a Chinese general consul, 2 journalists were disinvited from giving talks at CIs about their biography of Xi Jinping /2
Similar attacks on academia are becoming increasingly frequent. In response to western sanctions, the CCP retaliated by imposing counter-sanctions against, inter alia, western scholars and think tanks /3
Over the past twelve months @DavidJRMissal and I have jointly explored the issue of academic freedom and China. During our studies of the national context of Germany we noticed shortcomings both in terms of the academic and the public expert discourse about China /1
Our article "Mitigating threats to academic freedom in Germany: the role of the state, universities, learned societies and China" will soon be published in @InRights. In parallel we have developed ten suggestions aimed at improving the academic and public discourse about China /2
#1 Address the challenge of censorship and self-censorship.
China specialists should openly discuss the dangers of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) globalising political censorship regime and critically assess the challenge of individual and institutional self-censorship /3
Lately I have been thinking a lot about the need to engage in Machtkritik. This German term can be translated as ‘critique of power’. The latter requires us to address the issue of democratic political legitimacy (or lack thereof), eg of the Chinese party-state /1
I have noticed that when we talk about the CCP’s lack of democratic political legitimacy there is a tendency among many European elites to shy away from conflict & to praise the virtues of tolerance and to highlight the merits of suspending judgment in intercultural encounters /2
From such a vantage point any public critique of power is seen as contributing to polarisation. But who is polarising in the historical reality? The hard authoritarian turn of the Xi regime is real and affecting Chinese citizens as well as non-Chinese citizens around the world /3
With their cynical approach to the People's Republic of China 🇨🇳 the four chancellors Schmidt (1974-82), Kohl (1982-98), Schröder (1998-2005) and Merkel (2005-21) have done Germany 🇩🇪 a disservice. There is much to be learned from their leadership failures. A short thread 🧵 /1
Chancellor Helmut Kohl is best known for his role in Germany's re-unification. Yet he also helped normalising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. In 1995 he was the "first Western leader to visit a Chinese military base" /2 nytimes.com/1995/11/09/wor…
Kohl's visit to the People's Liberation Army 196 Infantry Division outside Tianjin was highly symbolic. It was a clear signal to the Chinese Communist Party that the atrocities of 1989 were no longer an obstacle to western business engagement with China /3 scmp.com/article/138269…