China's digital manhunt goes global: The final piece in our series on China's outbound propaganda and censorship shows how police use ever more sophisticated tech to find and silence those overseas. They target Chinese students and Chinese Americans alike. nytimes.com/2021/12/31/bus…
For a sense of what that looks like, here's a video of Chinese police harassing a Chinese student living in Australia. They summoned her father in China to the station, called her on his phone, and demanded she delete a Twitter account that mocked Xi Jinping.
One contractor who unmasks critics in the US for security authorities uses open-source investigation tools, databases leaked on the dark web, and other records, like voting and license registries. He has been assigned journalists and Chinese-American policy analysts.
The goal is to find China connections and leverage them to enforce self censorship. His reports label speech on a numerical system 1: criticizing leaders/planning political action 2: broader criticisms that harm China's image and ethnic separatism 3: libel, gambling etc.
Procurement documents bear out the trend. There are more appearances of police across China spending on the practice. This, from Shanghai police, uses the term “touching the ground” to refer to finding overseas critics and identifying their connections to China.
They have other means too. After the Chinese student in Australia was contacted by police, she left up her account. Yet Twitter took it down, coincidentally on China's National Day. They restored it when we asked, but didn't say why it was removed. My theory is mass reporting.
@YaxueCao told us, the logic is that of an overactive lawn mower: “They cut down the things that look spindly and tall — the most outspoken. Then...the taller pieces of grass no longer cover the lower ones. They say, ‘Oh these are problematic too, let’s mow them down again.’”
That means the digital dragnet and campaign to police speech overseas has targeted increasingly obscure critics. Many Chinese students who have no more than 100s of followers have been contacted. Many are mystified how they were connected to accounts they thought anonymous.
Some Chinese have been incredibly brave in the face of this, one woman told us: “Even though it is still dangerous, I have to move forward step by step...I can’t just keep censoring myself. I have to stop cowering.” Yet many others calculate it's not worth the risk.
This is the punitive side of a sweeping, well-resourced effort to change the tenor of global discussions on China. Increasingly Chinese propaganda campaigns are being blasted out via bots, officials, and state media on platforms like Twitter and Facebook. nytimes.com/interactive/20…
In other cases, authorities set up a reward structure to encourage foreign friends to parrot propaganda talking points. They have successfully seeded a fast-growing group of influencers with money, official and bot amplification, and access. nytimes.com/interactive/20…
As with Peng Shuai, it doesn't always work. Authoritarian propaganda rings hollow on overseas social media. Yet there is every indication China is committed and its strategies are improving. It is already changing the online debates, it will continue to. nytimes.com/interactive/20…

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More from @paulmozur

21 Dec 21
All year we’ve been tracking what Chinese influence campaigns look like on platforms like Twitter and Facebook. A new remarkable document gives us an inside look at how it works: local governments buy global internet manipulation as a subscription service. nytimes.com/interactive/20…
The bidding document from Shanghai police lays out with remarkable clarity what they want. The first order of business is fake accounts. They need a company that that can provide 100’s of accounts on Twitter, Facebook and other platforms. Sometimes they need it quick.
Then they want a special set of accounts that are camouflaged as real people and have their own following. Aware of the bot purges on sites like Twitter, they demand the contractor be able to keep the account up for long periods of time.
Read 9 tweets
14 Dec 21
In the Cold War there were useful idiots. In the internet era, we now have useful influencers. Check out our deep dive into a new crop of social media personalities that get major support from China to boost its image overseas. nytimes.com/interactive/20…
The rise of the influencers dates back to the protests in Hong Kong, when China first began to more aggressively push its narratives on global social media. It has returned to them again and again, to defuse criticism over Xinjiang and the early spread of the coronavirus.
So what did we find? State media and local governments pay influencers to take trips around China. They also offer payment for content sharing. The influencers say they are creatively independent.
Read 15 tweets
8 Dec 21
As Chinese state media worked to shift the narrative around Peng Shuai, they got help from a familiar resource: a big old bot network. We turned up 97 fake accounts amplifying and claiming to believe the creepy proof-of-life posts from state media: nytimes.com/interactive/20…
Twitter took down the ones @nytimes and @propublica identified and likely 100s more. It says it's investigating. The accounts mostly pretended to believe Peng was safe and free. Some echoed state-media attacks against foreign media and governments that had expressed concern.
They were part of a broader network of 1,700 accounts we found that pushed other propaganda points, linking #StopAsianHate to articles critical of China and hitting out at usual targets like Guo Wengui and Steve Bannon. They posted mostly during China work hours:
Read 7 tweets
5 Oct 21
China's Gilded Age is over: riding high off Covid-19 success, Xi Jinping is upending China's private sector. It's about control, to varying ends: guiding innovation, reducing the wealth gap, managing debt, sculpting culture, building self reliance: nytimes.com/2021/10/05/bus…
All of this has been long in coming, but the policies/casualties keep piling up. It's a huge story and there's been tons of great coverage, but the world seems just to be waking up to it, so here are some thoughts with links to good stories.
Why now? A Chinese professor said it's about Xi's popularity: "At this point, the public would support whatever the government does. So in terms of the reforms, it’s a very important window." The hit to capital markets shows the potential dissatisfaction:
Read 18 tweets
30 Aug 21
To recap the past year: Beijing cut IPO of Ant Financial, suspended apps of Didi, fined Alibaba. Created new data and algo rules, but exempted gov't. Shut down tutoring sector. Banned foreign textbooks. Declared war on celebrity fandom. Cut kids to 3 hours of games per week.
Also...likely some ban of foreign IPOs. There are some interesting ideas in Beijing's regulations. Some sectors badly needed controls. But what is happening should unnerve all. Silly parts of private tech fund serious innovative parts. Foreign investment has been critical.
Not to mention this is happening as large state-backed monopolies go untouched. I do wonder if 2021 won't go down as the year everyone realized China's era of reform and opening up (and likely the economic successes that came with its embrace of private business) truly ended.
Read 4 tweets
23 Jun 21
How do you deny genocide accusations today? An online influence campaign of course.

Our breakdown of the anatomy Chinese propaganda campaigns, which now flow fast and at large scale from China to the global internet. This is likely just the beginning. nytimes.com/interactive/20…
In recent months thousands of testimonials from inside Xinjiang purporting to show Uyghurs living happily were blasted across the global internet.

The videos look spontaneous. They are anything but. Each step of the way was the hand of China’s government.
Our analysis found major linguistic correlations between the testimonials, suggesting they were half-scripted. At times they are disturbingly like hostage videos. People saying they’re free in the same way over and over obviously points to the opposite likelihood.
Read 15 tweets

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