The risk of escalation has been high since Russia gave unrealistic ultimatums with a demand to resolve them immediately. The results of this week's talks were entirely predictable. The more important development this week is the military forces moving west from Russia's Far East.
Russian officials committed themselves to a "military or military-technical" response if NATO didn't make unilateral concessions. They deliberately boxed themselves in a corner with a substantial military force near Ukraine. Russian intentions/signals haven't changed much. 2/
The main development over the last month is that Russia has continued to mass combat power near Ukraine with the capability to conduct a significant escalation. That trend continues as we speak, and VDV units can now be committed near Ukraine as Kazakhstan stabilizes. 3/
Russia conducted a buildup in the spring, which failed to achieve its objectives. When you take into account the developments of the summer and fall (e.g. HMS Defender, continued arms sales, TB2 strike, etc.), the buildup in November meant Russia was more willing to escalate. 4/
My view of the situation hasn't really changed since we saw Russia's demands. There aren't any obvious offramps or solutions to Moscow's main issue: a hostile Ukraine that is increasing its conventional deterrence. The possible NATO concessions wouldn't solve the problem. 5/
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A problem with many of the articles about how Ukraine can resist a Russian invasion, often through an insurgency, assume that Russia intends on occupying terrain for long periods of time. But the 2008 War is a better example of what Russia would do. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainea…
Russia's behavior is in line with an attempt at compellence. Russia has watched the US' wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has no interest in occupying terrain where the local populace would be hostile. The purpose of an invasion likely wouldn't be to seize terrain. 2/
What if Russia's military objectives were to destroy Ukrainian military units east of the Dnieper and degrade its defense capabilities (e.g might included destroying Ukrainian Air Force, airfields, air defense)? They could inflict a lot of damage and leave after 1-2 weeks. 3/
If Russia were normally to deploy military forces to Kazakhstan, we would expect to see units from the Central Military District's 41st Combined Arms Army based in Siberia and the Urals, which is almost completely deployed near Ukraine and Belarus right now.
Russia still has plenty of units that it can deploy if necessary, but you wouldn't want to start a conflict with Ukraine right now while the situation in Kazakhstan is so uncertain. Wars are inherently unpredictable, and Russia's situation just became more complex. 2/
I think Russia was pretty well prepared for an escalation with Ukraine. Its economy is pretty strong right now with record-high currency reserves, and the likelihood of mass protests is unlikely given Russia's efforts to jail or undermine its opposition. This could change that.3/
2022 Russian arms export thread. Photos of Project 11356 frigates, the Tushil and Tamala, under construction at Russia’s Yantar Shipyard in Kaliningrad for the Indian Navy. t.me/bmpd_cast/10147
My thread on Russian arms export news for 2021. 2/
2022 Russian Armed Forces procurement thread. The Russian MoD said the Ground Forces will receive more than 400 pieces of equipment in 2022, including T-72B3M, T-80BVM, and T-90M tanks, BMP-2M with Berezhok turrets and BMP-3 IFVs, and BTR-82A APCs. function.mil.ru/news_page/coun…
The Russian MoD said the same thing about the Ground Forces procurement in 2021 (thread on its details below). 2/ tass.com/defense/1383625
Izvestia reports the Baltic Fleet's 4th Naval Attack Aviation Regiment based in Kaliningrad will be rearmed with modernized Su-30SM2 fighters this year. 3/ iz.ru/1270981/roman-…
A better explanation is that Russia realizes that Ukraine will be a long-term hostile neighbor, is determined to retake the Donbas, is arming itself for that purpose, and it is better to act now before Kyiv has greater conventional deterrence (can target Russian cities/bases)
Ukraine is a national security threat that pins down much of the Russian Ground Forces needed to defend the Donbas. Either Russia will try to force changes to Ukraine's constitution/political orientation or force NATO to stop strengthening its military to "solve" that threat. 2/
A Russian military operation would be much more costly if Ukraine has cruise and ballistic missiles that could target important Russian bases and cities, and future Russian coercion efforts would be weaker if Ukraine had those kind of capabilities. 3/
Multiple Russian Navy officials, Captains, and officials from Electropribor have been accused of embezzling 692.7 million rubles ($9.35 million) from the state defense order from 2013-2016 from funds for upgrading the weapons of Northern Fleet ships. kommersant.ru/doc/5153456
They are also accused of destroying evidence and pressuring witnesses. 2 of the defendants, a retired Navy Captain and advisor to Rosoboronexport, and the head of the Navy's Missile and Artillery Armament Development and Operation Service, are under house arrest. 2/
Investigators from the FSB's Military Counterintelligence Department said the accused communicated on their phones with a foreign app that allowed them to delete their conversations, which sounds like Signal. 3/