Thread by @FLojdquist

1. A thread to summarize elements in the current crisis for European caused by Russia, the worst since the cold war. Last week’s meetings (bilat US-Russia, NATO-Russia Council & OSCE) have not lead to any de-escalation from Russia, neither militarily nor in political posturing

2. We are now on hold as Moscow evaluates its options and waits for written answers from Washington and NATO before the end of this week. These answers will not satisfy Russia’s maximalist ultimatums as laid out in December.

3. We are in a dynamic situation, where Russia’s next steps will be at least partly informed by Western responses and strategic signaling (although decisions may already have been taken).

4. A number of elements and Russian demands, none of them new in themselves, are now coming together in a focal point, but not yet culmination point. For Russia’s goals (intentions, capabilities and opportunities) see @SCEEUS_UI Commentary.

ui.se/forskning/cent…

5. The overarching conflict between Russia & the existing European security order (based on int'l law & fundamental OSCE principles), that Russia both violates & wants to replace, is a structural crisis which will last for a long time = systemic challenge for European security

6. The current status quo clearly not acceptable to the Kremlin and the want to move the tectonic plates of the European and Transatlantic security system more permanently to Russia’s perceived advantage.

7. What will be decided in the coming weeks is whether and in what form Russia will escalate militarily and with hybrid means against Ukraine, that’s the short-term crisis we are facing.

8. We are dealing with parallel & partly separate issues from a Russian point of view: control over Ukraine, ruining the European security order and readjusting the military-strategic balance in Europe (which means in relationship to the US).

9. The latter concerns both role of NATO and strategic and conventional military balance. Russian talk about “military-technical means” means the latter (deployment of military hardware as Lavrov has clarified).

10. This is about strategic balance or “stability”, missile defense, a new INF-deal and conventional arms control and limitations (including possibilities to deploy and exercise).

11. Possible Russian actions could be deploying land-based version of Kalibr to Kaliningrad or Belarus, repositioning nuclear weapons & posturing with hypersonic missiles. Aegis ashore in Poland and Romania is an issue that’s needs to be addressed from a Russian point of view.

12. This military-technical means area also a way of positioning Russia ahead of possible talks on arms control and strategic stability. There could be parallels to early 80's and NATO:s double-track decision. Question is if Scholtz is a new Helmut Schmidt.

13. Russia has used military violence as means of achieving political aims since 2008. This is a problem that the West has not been able to address successfully (changing Russia’s cost-benefit analysis) as we now are faced w another military (and other) escalation against Ukraine

14. On these issues Moscow has the initiative and formulates the agenda. West is in a reactive mode partly caught wrong-footed. Much now depends on Western actions and signaling vis-à-vis Moscow.

15. Washington and EU have talked about “massive consequences” & "unprecedented measures", but little is known about possible content of such actions. Current discussion seems to focus more on what’s NOT on the table (the same table that Moscow has put a gun on).

16. Germany and France are now faced with stark choices and carry a responsibility for Transatlantic and EU unity. As does Washington. American Alleingang and striking deals with Moscow that inevitably will affect Europe, without Europeans, would be damaging.

17. The ability & willingness of US & Europe to raise to the challenge adequately will define US and EU credibility as geopolitical actors able provide security. This is a defining moment for EU’s and US’s position in Europe & globally. Unity is key. Moscow will divide et impera

18. Kremlin seems willing to go to great lengths to achieve a more permanent shift in the security balance with the West & to pay a considerable price for this. Political aims will on balance trump economic costs.

19. High energy prices (and European dependence on Russian gas) speaks to Russia’s advantage. But the current crisis has also affected Russian stock exchange negatively.

20. Russia has already achieved some goals. West’s apetite to hold Russia accountable for violations of its international commitments on democracy, human rights & RoL has diminished, thus partly tacitly accepting Russia’s insistence on “non-interference in internal matters”.

21. This jeopardizes the #OSCE comprehensive concept of security, which connects the dots between internal repression and external aggression. Democracy, human rights and RoL are relevant also for security between states.

22. The US also declared that it is prepared to discuss mil transparency, arms control & risk reduction. This is a tricky field, where the devil is in the detail, and which could affect the defensibility of a number of European countries, incl. Sweden and Finland.

23. An additional benefit for Moscow is that the current crisis accelerates Belarusian integration with Russia.

24. Russia would seem to have wind in its sails. Whatever the outcome of the current crisis, Moscow will most likely have forwarded its long-term positions. The West is on the defensive.

25. But there is also the possibility that Moscow overplays its hand and ends up with an even more recalcitrant Ukraine, increased defensibility of its neighbouring countries, a strenghtened NATO and paying a high political and economic price.

26. Kremlin might be willing to accept a new cold war situation, isolated from the West but with “clear rules of engagement”, tacit acceptance of its spheres of influence and self-limitations on Western military posture.

27. A situation where Russia is “respected” and treated as an equal to the US and NATO and not as a strategic periphery.

It is hard to see a scenario where European security will no be weakened and the European security order further undermined.