Some people talk about a possible full-scale or mass invasion of Ukraine, which is less likely. Others recognise that a number of small-scale operations with well-defined objectives are more likely. However, some imply that such operations will be less damaging and deadly. 1/ 🧵 
Yet, when we look at what possible smaller, well-defined (below mass invasion and occupation threshold) operations could include, we must accept that Ukraine is at risk of great social and economic damage. 2/
1. The 2012 Russian General Staff plan (itself a revision of a 2008 plan) to seize Crimea and create a "Fortress Crimea" power projection platform to dominate the Black Sea Region remains unfinished. It requires full flank protection. 3/
That means total domination of the airspace west (Odesa), north (Kherson) and east (Sea of Azov coast) of occupied Crimea and the corresponding marine space. This can be accomplished through air defence and electronic warfare systems. However, it ties in with .. 4/
2. The land bridge between Russia's Rostov region and occupied Crimea. The Kerch Strait bridge will not last for ever (maybe 75 years tops). It is vulnerable to attack or accident. The security of occupied Crimea will, at some stage in the future, depend on the land bridge. 5/
3. The North Crimean Canal (NCC) is a vital conduit for freshwater supply to occupied Crimea. It has been blocked by Ukraine since 2014 following Russia's occupation. It is essential for agricultural irrigation in Crimea; the blockage already impacts grain production. 6/
Furthermore, as drought and other effects of climate change in the Black Sea Region become more pronounced, the NCC will become ever more vital to Crimea's and Russia's agricultural economy. 7/
It has long been understood that Russia has plans to "liberate" and secure the NCC through a military operation in Kherson region north of occupied Crimea. To secure the NCC corridor and source (the Dnipro River at Tavriysk) would require seizing southern Kherson region. 8/
It makes little strategic sense to seize southern Kherson and leave the flanks exposed to Ukrainian forces. Therefore, such an operation could tie-in with a full Fortress Crimea flank protection and/or land bridge operation. 9/
The obvious advantage of bringing the Odesa direction and Sea of Azov direction under full Russian control would be the objective of cutting Ukraine off from the Black Sea and, therefore, all maritime economic activities with the world. 10/
This would put Ukraine's economy into a stranglehold from which it could not escape without enormous military effort. 11/
3. A focused Russian attack (siege) against a strategic Ukrainian city (I'm not going to speculate which) other than Kyiv would serve several purposes: first, as a 'shock' to destabilise the political situation in Ukraine. 12/
Second, as an 'example' to Ukrainians: a 'punishing' operation to demoralize, such as happened to Grozny in Chechnya in the 1990s or (through Assad) to Aleppo in Syria in 2016. This would tie-in with the aim of creating internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. 13/
IDPs would add to the existing burden on the Ukrainian state. Refugees fleeing across Ukraine's borders into Poland and other NATO/EU countries would serve to create additional pressures on Europe's body politic: the Belarus border crisis on a much larger scale. 14/
Russian elite ground forces tank and infantry divisions (Kantemir and Taman respectively) have trained for urban warfare involving tank and artillery shelling of a city, with aerial bombardments and infantry incursion with brutal house-to-house fighting. 15/
4. A covert (highly visible) Russian Armed Forces occupation of the Russian-occupied Donbas would seal the region's fate: paving the way for annexation into the Russian Federation. 16/
Furthermore, Russia may attempt to pushback the Ukrainian frontline in order to occupy all of the Donbas, including current government-controlled areas. This could tie-in with an operation to seize the land bridge. 17/
5. There are other less likely options, including a Russian operation to expand occupied eastern Moldova (Transnistria) by seizing a swathe of southwest Ukraine. But this seems improbable given current Russian force dispositions. 18/
By cutting Ukraine's access to the sea, seizing the land bridge, or controlling the southern reaches of the Dnipro River, or 'punishing' a city and creating refugees, Russia can severely impact Ukraine's economy, society and politics without a full-scale or mass invasion. End/
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