Earlier, I commented about a reporter in @PentagonPresSec briefing asking whether @82ndABNDiv would parachute into Poland.
Since then, lots (LOTs) of paratroopers commented on in-flight rigging, how it would send a message, how it's been done on exercises etc. 1/7
From a theater commander's perspective, here are the pros and cons:
Pros: 1. Yes, you can do in-flight rigging (but it's difficult and takes excessive space). 2. Yes, it would send a message (but not a good one, given we are not trying to be excessively provocative). 2/7
3. Yes, the 82d has parachuted into Poland (and Germany, and several other countries in Europe) before (but almost all were in the summer, as part of an exercise, and with other nations). 4. Yes, I'm a tanker & therefore a "leg" (but I know a bit about airborne ops in EU). 3/7
Now, the Cons of doing this.
1. It sends a message (see #2), but the wrong one 2. Airborne doctrine - which usually involves seizing an airfield, or a key terrain feature, for purposes of link-up operations is not required in Poland. 4/7
3. Airborne operations usually result in between 5-12% injury rate of troops, depending on drop zone environment, wind conditions, threat, etc. (lessons I learned at the NTC as the COG). 4. Winter is not summer in Poland (dense fog, snow, ground conditions, see #3, above) 5/7
5. The Army Commander in Theater makes the call on recommending Airborne Ops (as a former Army Commander, I would say "No" as there is no purpose for this kind of mission, this isn't an exercise, and this isn't the right message to send din a tense situation. 6/7
6. Most importantly, it has nothing to do with the mission of the unit to get there on time, and settled.
Bottom line, thanks for all the folks on twitter suggesting another options, but I would guess the NATO Commander & CDR @USArmyEURAF would give it👎 7/7
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I had the pleasure of engaging a group of Professional MBA students this weekend in a"Strategic Leadership" class
As an adjunct, these classes are fun, especially since we discuss application of knowledge in the real world 1/12
Last semester, these students received an introduction to "leadership theories."
For info, there are literally *dozens* of theories on leadership, but we wanted groups of students to do a deeper dive on 4 different theories, their meaning & potential application. 2/
The theories the 4 groups analyzed were: 1. Leader-Member Exchange (or LMX) theory 2. Servant Leadership Theory (which most wanted to analyze, because they felt they were "servant leaders") 3. Transactional Leadership Theory, and 4. Transformational Leadership Theory 3/
Some facts to put this article in perspective:
1.Pentagon always does “planning” for civilian evacuations in a war-torn country. Plus, there are contingency plans already on the shelf that are adapted. 1/
2. There are always “courses of action” & a “number of different scenarios” based on the situation & thoughts on how to conduct the NEO (non-combatant evacuation operations) Having planned and conducted these, the course of action usually changes, sometimes more than once. 2/
3. While the Pentagon plans, the State Dept is always the lead for these actions. They make the call on when to execute and how many citizens to remove. State never has an accurate count of US citizens in any particular country. 3/
A tip, America: you’ll soon become familiar with the terms “Suwalki Gap” & “Kaliningrad enclave.” These are two areas every NATO veteran understands as critical flash points.
Russia/Putin are pushing refugees into this area from Belarus, and any misstep by Polish borders forces create the opportunity for Russia to “defend Russians” in K-grad while marching forces into the Baltic countries of Latvia/Lithuania/Estonia (all NATO members).
This has been a strategic goal of Putin, Poland & the Baltics will likely respond, and it will create a requirements for a NATO Article V action.
A suicide attack - SVIED or VBIED - is a commander’s biggest threat in these environments. They’re hard to stop, even at checkpoints…because they are already there and can be initiated when found. 1/
The only way to address them is 1) find the cell that is making them 2) constantly change methods at checkpoints 3) have greater standoff 4) limit crowds. All of these were difficult at HKIA. 2/
We had a network of female suicide vest wearers in Iraq that were particularly confounding. Widows of terrorists, group leaders drugged them, convinced them they had nothing to live for, and sent them on their mission. 3/
This - along with the politicians lied, the intel community lied, etc - has been a mantra repeated the last few days on cable news and in print media. 1/
There were certainly LOTS of mistakes over the 20 years of the Afghan war, as outlined in several official governmental reports and well-researched news articles.
There were likely some - many? - mistakes, and maybe even some coverups, corruption, or misleading testimony. 2/
But I'll go on a limb & say the vast majority of leaders - senior, junior, officer & NCOs; governmental officials & reps of State & USAID; reps from the intel community - who served in AFG did the very best they could to serve that nation and its people & represented the US. 3/
The great @barbarastarrcnn just said what I’ve been saying for awhile. In any NEO - especially those that are contested - not all people who want to get out will get out. It will be heartbreaking, but this is a fact associated with these operations. 1/
Given the uptick in movements, I’d estimate there will eventually be close to 100k+ evacuees. The focus in the next few days will be US citizens, SIV holders, and “special evacuee cases.” 2/
Always primary on the commander’s mind in a NEO: how do I get @StateDept consular officials & military forces out before things go to hell. 3/