Quick reminder of how @UniversitiesUK have tried to scupper our proposals:
- 26 Jan: "The union's proposal does not appear to be a serious attempt to reach agreement"
- 28 Jan: "We are awaiting confirmation from #USS that @UCU’s proposal is viable, implementable, & fully costed"
28 Jan (cont): "If we receive confirmation, we will formally consult employers on [UCU's proposals]"
2 Feb: "UUK is consulting employers for views on potentially modifying the proposal for concluding the 2020 #USS valuation" (but not UCU's proposals)
10 Feb: "Now we have received a costed proposal from UCU, we have formally asked employers whether they would wish to support it"
10 Feb: @MikeOtsuka writes to UUK about "serious misrepresentations of UCU’s proposals" in the launch of the consultation. mikeotsuka.medium.com/uuks-serious-m…
11 Feb (morning): JNC meeting, and a chance for @UniversitiesUK to clear up any misunderstandings
11 Feb (late afternoon): @UniversitiesUK post "full consultation materials" on the @USSemployers website.
15 Feb: @UniversitiesUK circulate an extra @UCU document to employers and post it on their consultation webpage, but without the text of their accompanying email to VCs.
We're hearing more reports of universities keen to engage with their @UCU branches on the substance of our proposals, and some responding positively despite @UniversitiesUK's best attempts to undermine our attempts at a resolution. 1/
Branches who need assistance in their discussion with management should feel free to contact the negotiation team. 2/
Unfortunately, @SheffieldUni management, who have previously boasted about our highly constructive #USS Working Group, are not engaging, symptomatic of the increasingly insular approach to decision-making by UEB most evident in the efforts to close @UniShefArch. 3/
A long overdue thread on the @USSpensions consultation, and what you might consider saying.
Firstly, here's consultation link. You will need your USS member number, which you can find on the top of emails from them, plus identifying information. 1/ ussconsultation2021.co.uk/members
Once you're logged in, you can play with the modeller and confirm that @UniversitiesUK are shameless about misrepresenting the scale of the cuts. (I am projected to lose ~36% of my future guaranteed pension, which falls to ~28% including DC converted to an annuity.) 2/
Once you've figured out the impacts, then you can go to the questions. I will not tell you what to say, as the questions are fairly clear and I would expect the responses fairly obvious. But here are some things you might like to consider saying at various points. 3/
❓ Have @USSpensions correctly followed the scheme rules in dealing with the 2020 valuation?
I'm not convinced they have, and see what they've done as having significantly biased the JNC process against @UCU and in favour of @UniversitiesUK.
Read on... 1/
I'm focussing on the 'Rule 76' process, which sets out how the JNC (made up of UCU & UUK reps, plus an independent chair) deals with the outcome of a valuation in which costs have increased. The process starts with the #USS laying out the increase. Or it should. 2/
Let's look at the 'Cost Sharing' rule, 64.10, referenced as part of the Rule 76 process. It sets out the rights of the JNC to determine a change in benefits or contribution rate splits between members and employers, with a 'cost-sharing' backstop for if the JNC does not agree. 3/
Let's talk about the non-existent 2021 valuation, that could have been invoked by @USSpensions as a solution to the crisis that the scheme and pre-92 HE sector is heading towards. (This is an overdue thread.) 1/
It is widely appreciated by the scheme's members that the 2020 valuation date of 31 March 2020 is right in the middle of a COVID-related dip in the markets (first-wave, locked-down, market chaos), and is one important factor in the huge £14-15bn deficit. 2/
At the valuation date, the scheme's assets had plummeted from around £73bn at the end of December 2019 to £66.5bn. By 31 March 2021 the assets had recovered to £80.6bn, and market conditions were widley seen as more 'normal'. (Most recent figure? £88bn) 3/
@USSpensions ploughed ahead with a valuation using market data from the peak of market turmoil in the first wave of COVID (31 March 2020), wiping billions off the value of the scheme's assets.
2. Extreme prudence and misguided risk-management
Not content with a COVID-affected valuation date, #USS reworked their discredited Test 1 and ramped up prudence much further than in previous valuations. medium.com/ussbriefs/how-…
"Tired of your old Test 1? Always found the linakage too rigidly mechanical? Then welcome to the new, improved Metric A!" Or so the marketing spiel seems to go. But look below the surface and you'll find all the same logical flaws and a near identical ramping up of costs. 1/
I will try and keep this as accessible as possible, because #USS can't be allowed to bluff their way through this stuff. First, a recap. What was wrong with Test 1? 2/
There were a number of criticisms of Test 1, but the main one was that it unnecessarily drove up deficits and contribution rates based on a very flimsy premise (a "large and demonstrable mistake" in @MikeOtsuka's words). 2/ medium.com/@mikeotsuka/us…