This is an important point. It also underscores the absence of a “playbook” that we’ve heard so much about in recent weeks. In 2014, Moscow only had to twist reality in constructing narratives. This time, they’re just making things up. Thread 1/8
In 2014, there was a revolution led by an armed far-right nationalist vanguard that ousted a democratically elected (though repressive and autocratic) govt dominated by pols from the south and east. 2/8
They actually had a banner of Bandera’s portrait on the Maidan. Really. Clearly there was a *lot* more to the Maidan Rev than that, but those images provided ample material for Russian TV. 3/8
Today, the president of Ukraine is a native Russian speaker of Jewish descent from the east. Most Russians know him from TV sit coms. Hard to make him out to be fascist. 4/8
The Ukrainian military has been observing the ceasefire for weeks. Ze has presided over the calmest period on the LoC. 5/8
Etc. So the narratives being constructed today are whole-cloth manufactured baloney made up from thin air, to mix my metaphors. 6/8
I don’t think this really matters in terms of Russian operational decision-making, but it could well limit the extent of intl support for its actions. 7/8
Domestic opinion will also be harder to sway with this stuff. But given the repression of organized opposition in Russia that probably matters less. 8/8
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Main takeaway from that barnburner of a speech is that Russia now has given itself a pretext to respond to "attacks" on DNR and LNR with no need to conceal its direct military involvement. thread 1/x
Putin not only recognized the DNR/LNR, he also signed "friendship and cooperation" treaties with them, essentially security guarantees. 2/x
whereas before this, Russia didn't have a justification for overt military intervention even under its own laws, now it will. This is an important element of the narrative that was missing. 3/x
Some thoughts on the ongoing show/RF security council meeting: Shoigu now going off on the potential for Ukraine developing a nuclear weapons capability.
Now claiming Ukraine plans to retake the ORDLO by force.
Medvedev now being rolled out to denounce Kyiv's willingness to implement Minsk.
Since everyone is looking for military and informational signs of Russia’s seriousness (or not) about launching an invasion, it might make sense to also think about signs that the diplomatic track might actually be more than Kabuki theater/time-buying tactic/ point-scoring/ 1/9
/alliance management opportunity/letter-writing campaign/pretext creation/etc. — something that might actually preclude the invasion. Here are some things to look for 2/9
1) Presidential-level engagement. There’s only one person in Russia who can call off the mil op. And it isn’t Lavrov. 3/9
You might have noticed Lavrov is fixated on the “indivisibility of security” principle these days. As Tim Colton and I note in our book, the debate over principles of “freedom to choose” and “indivisibility of security” dates to the 1990s. A thread. amazon.com/dp/1138633089/…
BLUF: since the 1990s, both sides cherry-picked their respective preferred principle to justify their respective preferred policies. [quotes below are from the book]
“Yeltsin grounded his early receptivity to talking about Russia-in-NATO in indivisibility ... Russia was comfortable inside a revised security framework only so long as its prerogatives and stature were taken into account, with all that connoted for the US having to share ...
With all due respect for @IvoHDaalder, I find this line particularly unconvincing: "Putin worries that if any of these states becomes a successful and prosperous democracy, let alone fully integrates with the west, the Russian people will demand the same." Thread