You might have noticed Lavrov is fixated on the “indivisibility of security” principle these days. As Tim Colton and I note in our book, the debate over principles of “freedom to choose” and “indivisibility of security” dates to the 1990s. A thread. amazon.com/dp/1138633089/…
BLUF: since the 1990s, both sides cherry-picked their respective preferred principle to justify their respective preferred policies. [quotes below are from the book]
“Yeltsin grounded his early receptivity to talking about Russia-in-NATO in indivisibility ... Russia was comfortable inside a revised security framework only so long as its prerogatives and stature were taken into account, with all that connoted for the US having to share ...
control. Change without its participation and consent was doomed to be interpreted as ‘a sign that we were not welcome’.”
“Justification [for NATO enlargement] was found in the principle of freedom to choose, one of the two keystones of the Charter of Paris. Individual countries, and they alone, should decide on what security alignments were to their liking...
If any or all of the post-communist nations threw in their lot with the US-shepherded Euro-Atlantic alliance, no other state – the United States included, ironically – could question that choice.”
But as we conclude, this debate about abstract principles conceals less pleasant truths about the current policies of both sides vis-à-vis Ukraine.
“Russia’s concept of indivisible security often boils down to a yearning for an accord among great powers, Yalta-style, that would reinforce rather than remove divisions in the region. Such a deal would not work even if it were agreed to, which it will not be.”
“It is not tenable for the West to insist on the right of all countries to make their own choices while at the same time being unable or unwilling to grant them those choices (like NATO and EU membership) or to be accountable for the consequences of choosing.”
the debate on these principles isn’t really a productive use of any policymaker’s time right now. The stakes are too high.
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With all due respect for @IvoHDaalder, I find this line particularly unconvincing: "Putin worries that if any of these states becomes a successful and prosperous democracy, let alone fully integrates with the west, the Russian people will demand the same." Thread
I am increasingly concerned about the prospect of a disastrous war. Creative diplomacy, in addition to strong deterrence measures, is going to be necessary to avoid it.
The Biden administration and NATO allies are right to engage on the regional security issues that were tabled this week.
it's important to note two analytical disagreements. 1) They say Putin could be bluffing. No one knows for sure, but given the gravity of the military build-up and the USG concern about Russian plans, I think we should assume he's not bluffing. 3/13
Have to agree with @KofmanMichael here. Moscow is being rather clear that it is interested in something very concrete. And way beyond what Western capitals could deliver even if they wanted to do so.
So since I've garnered a number of new followers this weekend, I thought I'd follow up on the substance of the discussion around my @POLITICOMag article. A thread. politico.com/news/magazine/…
Folks (particularly those hyperventilating) should recognize that this is a question about means, not ends. Everyone wants to avoid a major war in Europe, right?
If so, the question is how. Some believe that if we only whack the Russians upside the head (or threaten to do so) either via sanctions, military assistance to UA, etc., enough, then they'll reverse course, send everyone home and apologize for the trouble.
If that’s true, choices become very stark very quickly. Threatening consequences is important, but I haven’t seen anyone make a convincing case that the West is prepared to do what it takes to force #Russia to back down. So coercion alone is not going to be enough.