Since everyone is looking for military and informational signs of Russia’s seriousness (or not) about launching an invasion, it might make sense to also think about signs that the diplomatic track might actually be more than Kabuki theater/time-buying tactic/ point-scoring/ 1/9
/alliance management opportunity/letter-writing campaign/pretext creation/etc. — something that might actually preclude the invasion. Here are some things to look for 2/9
1) Presidential-level engagement. There’s only one person in Russia who can call off the mil op. And it isn’t Lavrov. 3/9
2) US/Allies focus exclusively on Russian withdrawal as their only ask. We can talk about all the other bad stuff Russia has done AFTER the forces on Ukraine’s border have returned to garrison. 4/9
3) Some attempt at addressing the Ukraine/NATO question. Clearly Russia won’t get all of what it’s asking for, but there are nuanced approaches that do not cross Western red lines. See on.ft.com/3HVmz24 for one idea 5/9
4) Actual negotiations. As in: negotiators in a room, negotiating. Not sending letters, holding press conferences, repeating talking points, etc. 6/9
5) Alternatively, both sides’ willingness to make some costly signals without negotiation. 7/9
6) some sign that the diplomacy is having an impact on the military dynamics on the ground (unlike now, when they seem to exist on different planes) 8/9
That’s all I got. Open to others’ ideas. END 9/9
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You might have noticed Lavrov is fixated on the “indivisibility of security” principle these days. As Tim Colton and I note in our book, the debate over principles of “freedom to choose” and “indivisibility of security” dates to the 1990s. A thread. amazon.com/dp/1138633089/…
BLUF: since the 1990s, both sides cherry-picked their respective preferred principle to justify their respective preferred policies. [quotes below are from the book]
“Yeltsin grounded his early receptivity to talking about Russia-in-NATO in indivisibility ... Russia was comfortable inside a revised security framework only so long as its prerogatives and stature were taken into account, with all that connoted for the US having to share ...
With all due respect for @IvoHDaalder, I find this line particularly unconvincing: "Putin worries that if any of these states becomes a successful and prosperous democracy, let alone fully integrates with the west, the Russian people will demand the same." Thread
I am increasingly concerned about the prospect of a disastrous war. Creative diplomacy, in addition to strong deterrence measures, is going to be necessary to avoid it.
The Biden administration and NATO allies are right to engage on the regional security issues that were tabled this week.
it's important to note two analytical disagreements. 1) They say Putin could be bluffing. No one knows for sure, but given the gravity of the military build-up and the USG concern about Russian plans, I think we should assume he's not bluffing. 3/13
Have to agree with @KofmanMichael here. Moscow is being rather clear that it is interested in something very concrete. And way beyond what Western capitals could deliver even if they wanted to do so.
So since I've garnered a number of new followers this weekend, I thought I'd follow up on the substance of the discussion around my @POLITICOMag article. A thread. politico.com/news/magazine/…
Folks (particularly those hyperventilating) should recognize that this is a question about means, not ends. Everyone wants to avoid a major war in Europe, right?
If so, the question is how. Some believe that if we only whack the Russians upside the head (or threaten to do so) either via sanctions, military assistance to UA, etc., enough, then they'll reverse course, send everyone home and apologize for the trouble.