Main takeaway from that barnburner of a speech is that Russia now has given itself a pretext to respond to "attacks" on DNR and LNR with no need to conceal its direct military involvement. thread 1/x
Putin not only recognized the DNR/LNR, he also signed "friendship and cooperation" treaties with them, essentially security guarantees. 2/x
whereas before this, Russia didn't have a justification for overt military intervention even under its own laws, now it will. This is an important element of the narrative that was missing. 3/x
clearly the legal niceties wouldn't have stopped Russia, but they always need some way of portraying their actions as something other than aggression. As Peskov put it yesterday, Russia has never attacked anyone ever, or something like that. 4/x
Buckle up, in other words. bad things ahead. END
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One thought about what Russia's exit from the Minsk agreements — aka recognition of DNR/LNR — tells us about what is to come. Thread 1/x
Minsk was a mechanism for Russia to cement its influence over Ukraine by returning the Donbas on its terms -- a constitution renegotiated with its proxies and an asymmetric confederal structure with hyper-empowered pro-Russian regions. 2/x
By recognizing the republics' "independence," Moscow has given up on ever getting that mechanism. But the Kremlin has certainly not given up on its objective of cementing its influence over Ukraine. 3/x
Some thoughts on the ongoing show/RF security council meeting: Shoigu now going off on the potential for Ukraine developing a nuclear weapons capability.
Now claiming Ukraine plans to retake the ORDLO by force.
Medvedev now being rolled out to denounce Kyiv's willingness to implement Minsk.
This is an important point. It also underscores the absence of a “playbook” that we’ve heard so much about in recent weeks. In 2014, Moscow only had to twist reality in constructing narratives. This time, they’re just making things up. Thread 1/8
In 2014, there was a revolution led by an armed far-right nationalist vanguard that ousted a democratically elected (though repressive and autocratic) govt dominated by pols from the south and east. 2/8
They actually had a banner of Bandera’s portrait on the Maidan. Really. Clearly there was a *lot* more to the Maidan Rev than that, but those images provided ample material for Russian TV. 3/8
Since everyone is looking for military and informational signs of Russia’s seriousness (or not) about launching an invasion, it might make sense to also think about signs that the diplomatic track might actually be more than Kabuki theater/time-buying tactic/ point-scoring/ 1/9
/alliance management opportunity/letter-writing campaign/pretext creation/etc. — something that might actually preclude the invasion. Here are some things to look for 2/9
1) Presidential-level engagement. There’s only one person in Russia who can call off the mil op. And it isn’t Lavrov. 3/9
You might have noticed Lavrov is fixated on the “indivisibility of security” principle these days. As Tim Colton and I note in our book, the debate over principles of “freedom to choose” and “indivisibility of security” dates to the 1990s. A thread. amazon.com/dp/1138633089/…
BLUF: since the 1990s, both sides cherry-picked their respective preferred principle to justify their respective preferred policies. [quotes below are from the book]
“Yeltsin grounded his early receptivity to talking about Russia-in-NATO in indivisibility ... Russia was comfortable inside a revised security framework only so long as its prerogatives and stature were taken into account, with all that connoted for the US having to share ...