When analysts estimate the number of ๐ท๐บ troops required to occupy an area of ๐บ๐ฆ they often use a rule of thumb that expeditionary operations require a minimum troop density of 10 to 15 troops per 1,000 civilians depending on how hostile the local population is. However.. 1/
This assumes there are 1,000 civilians at the start of 'policing' an occupied area. If that figure can be reduced by 25%, 50%, 75% through displacement (shelling and bombing cities, towns and villages to terrorise people into fleeing, as in Syria) a wider area can be occupied. 2/
Approximately one-third of an expeditionary force is needed for 'policing' duties, that is, for combat in a counterinsurgency environment. The remainder are available for more traditional policing and other occupation duties. Combat may continue on the periphery. 3/
That is once the defenders' armed forces are reduced and largely incapacitated. Therefore, if 100,000 ๐ท๐บ combat troops* invade an area in ๐บ๐ฆ, once 'secured', some 33,000 of them will be assigned to combat duties ('mopping up' operations). The remainder to occupation duties. 4/
* It requires between 2 and 3 noncombat troops to support, sustain and administrate 1 combat soldier during an expeditionary operation. This the operational and functional (tactical) "tooth-to-tail" ratio. That is, no more than 25-33% of a total force are combat troops. 5/
Current estimates of ๐ท๐บ troops (ground, airborne, marines, special forces, logistics, army aviation, militia etc) for ๐บ๐ฆ ops are 150,000 to 200,000. Add third wave (yet to deploy), rear (reservists), airborne and National Guard, and the figure for total force is some 300,000. 6/
Therefore, an expeditionary force of some 100,000 combat troops is credible. They will have large-scale support for force sustainment. Once the punch-through, seize-hold and other assault and defeat phases are completed, occupation combat 'policing' operations begin. 7/
The spatial extent of such an occupied area is a variable: it depends on the effectiveness of both reducing hostilities by killing and defeating defenders who resist AND displacement of potentially hostile people (or who could harbour such) out of the occupied area. 8/
Therefore, while a state-wide total occupation is unlikely, it is entirely possible for an expeditionary force of 100,000 or more ๐ท๐บ troops to occupy a large area or areas of ๐บ๐ฆ. They have studdies the lessons of the Syria campaign. It should not be underestimated. End/
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For starters, the US and other militaries do use civilian aircraft charter flights for transatlantic mobility, such as Omni Air International oai.aero/services-chartโฆ
So, @MichealMartinTD@LeoVaradkar@EamonRyan and @SimonCoveney have approximately 9-10 days left to prepare #Ireland๐ฎ๐ช for the economic, financial, social, political and psychological impacts of a ๐ท๐บ-๐บ๐ฆ war that could escalate into a war that threatens all of Europe. ๐งต 1/
Where is the Government of Ireland's strategy for managing public safety and civil defence? Where are the planning and preparedness measures for possible incidents involving, for example, risk to Irish-registered aircraft crossing eastern Europe? 2/
Or Irish citizens caught in the conflict zone or in Russia during wartime? Or extra naval protection for ferries crossing the Irish and Celtic Seas? Is the Government going to protect Ukrainian assets in Ireland from Russian 'hybrid' attacks (and vice versa)? 3/
Russia is not implementing its part of the #MinskAgreements, the security part, by maintaining a ceasefire, withdrawing its Occupation troops from the Donbas, allowing its militias to be disarmed peacefully and returning the border to Ukrainian control, with full OSCE access. 1/
At the same time, Russia insists that Ukraine is failing to implement its part of the agreements, the political part, by granting the Russian-occupied territories elections and political autonomy. Meanwhile, Russia issues passports, creating Donbas citizens of Russia. 2/
Russia has in effect co-opted Macron and Scholz in its efforts to force Ukraine to grant political 'autonomy' to a region occupied by Russian troops and under Moscow's control via puppet administrations. Any elections will inevitably be used to justify annexation by Russia. 3/
So, the current Western analytical wind is blowing in a "Russia is going to keep a lower level of build up in place but without attacking" direction. "Putin will off-ramp in slow motion thus avoiding a humiliating climbdown. He will maintain threat of war to extract concessions."
However, apart from obvious financial costs and difficulties of sustaining a large force far from garrisons, there's a risk of stalemate. The West sees Russia's plan and has no incentive to grant concessions. Result: the status quo (frozen conflict in Ukraine in return for gas).
Furthermore, once bitten, twice shy. NATO allies have been found wanting: first in 2014, then this winter. NATO is moving to strengthen its eastern flank and will - incrementally - continue to do so in coming years in order not to be caught out by a Russian mobilisation again.
'Putin and Macron could not conclude a deal to de-escalate the situation around Ukraine' tass.ru/politika/13646โฆ
'Peskov denied the publication of the Financial Times newspaper about a deal to reduce tensions around Ukraine, which was allegedly concluded by the leaders of Russia and France, Vladimir Putin and Emmanuel Macron.'
'"Financial Times, of course, wrote wrong, basically wrong," a Kremlin spokesman told reporters on Tuesday. "In the current situation, Moscow and Paris could not conclude any deals, it is simply impossible," Peskov said.'
When people talk about the economic, social and human costs to Russia arising from an expansion of its war against Ukraine, they forget: Moscow will have factored in the gains from 'acquiring' an occupied labour force and industry. A crucial oversight in some expert calculi.
E.g., if Russia loses RUB 1,800 billion (โฌ21 billion) per annum from sanctions impact (based on loss of gas revenue to Europe), how much does it gain from subsuming, say, one-third of Ukraine's economy? โฌ45 bn pa is too high, due to sanctions. Maybe โฌ15-25 bn pa? Breakeven.
What would be the social cost to Russia? This would be linked to the economic 'hiccup' as Russia adapted its economy (toward the East) and the human cost in terms of lives and permanent disability. Angry mothers of dead soldiers: did that tip Putin off his chair after Chechnya?