Some reflections on #MSC2022 and Russia-Ukraine conflict as the conference wraps up:

One of the things that struck me the most in conversations with officials here is the lack of discussion of the “Day After Invasion” scenarios 🧵
I’ve been convinced since early December that Russian invasion of Ukraine was highly likely. The Biden administration is now assessing that it is ‘imminent’
Indeed, the Russian force mobilization and positioning is now complete and they can launch the invasion at any moment
As has been widely reported in the press and @VP confirmed here at #MSC, the US and its allies plan to have ‘the largest and most severe <sanctions>, targeting <Russian> financial companies’
In addition, there are reports of intention to use the foreign direct product rule to ban global exports of semiconductors to Russia
Make no mistake about this: the combination of sanctions on top Russian banks and ban on chips has high potential to cripple the Russian economy
And while many in the West may initially cheer at the prospect of crippling Russia economically and see it as a just punishment for invasion, it also has a high likelihood to trigger a massive retaliation from Russia
So this conflict will almost certainly not end with an invasion of Ukraine and imposition of severe sanctions on Russia, after which everyone moves on to other issues, such as domestic politics and China
Faced with a ‘we have nothing to lose now’ attitude, Russia will no doubt lash out at the West in a number of ways. It can limit export of grain, fertilizer, titanium, palladium, aluminum, nickel, forest products, to say nothing of oil and gas
It can also ban overflight rights for Western airlines on routes to Asia
defenseone.com/ideas/2022/01/…
All of this will, of course, be enormously expensive for Russia itself, but facing crippling economic sanctions already and still having $630b in foreign reserves that can last them some months, Putin is likely to take the chance and hit back
Russia’s goal would be to rapidly inflict huge economic pain on the US and Europe in the form of spiking inflation (already at 7.5% in US) and enormous stresses on supply chains, already at a breaking point
In the US, in the midst of a midterm campaign season, such significant economic pain—disproportionally affecting the poor and middle class—would not be easily brushed off. Russia may calculate that it just might get enough leverage over the West to get some sanctions relief
The West most likely won’t climb down from sanctions and the pain suffered by Russian economy will be much worse than to us. However, then Russia may escalate further with cyber attacks on US and European financial systems, as well as energy infrastructure
edition.cnn.com/2022/02/18/pol…
Of course, the US, UK and others—having already nearly exhausted the power of economic sanctions weapons—will have ability to retaliate with their own offensive cyber strikes against Russia
And then Russia and the West will be on a path to a highly dangerous cyber tit-for-tat escalation hitting each other’s critical infrastructure and trying to impose maximum economic costs on each side
The probability of that escalation staying in the cyber domain are quite low unless we find ways to climb down from getting into a hot conflict that no one in the world desires
I write all this not to argue that Russia should not experience any costs for invasion of Ukraine but that we have to be extremely careful about triggering uncontrolled escalation with a major nuclear and cyber power, and one that is a major global supplier of critical materials
There is no doubt that Russia has to pay a big price should it invade Ukraine but using our full sanctions toolkit against them right away will almost certainly be dangerously escalatory and have significant blowback on US and European economies
At the time when the Biden administration has rightly made it clear that our #1 goal is to avoid getting into a hot war with Russia, we have to be extremely thoughtful about how our response can be tailored to avoid that unimaginably horrible scenario

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More from @DAlperovitch

Feb 21
Putin is expected to give a televised address shortly #WatchThisSpace

Likely will announce recognition of DNR and LNR per unanimous recommendation of his Security Council. Will Western leaders keep on with diplomatic efforts after such move?
Speech in progress now:
So far, a history lesson on the Soviet Union and what Lenin did or did not do 100 years ago
Read 33 tweets
Feb 21
Putin is holding a meeting of his Security Council today. #WatchThisSpace
The meeting is being held right now. Lavrov is giving a bleak report on state of diplomatic efforts
Lavrov: European unity at #MSC2022 proved to us once again that it only makes sense for us to talk to the Americans
Read 44 tweets
Feb 12
There is a lot of current discussion about the types of severe sanctions that the US would place on Russia in the event of invasion, but not as much about how Russia can hit back at the US and European economies in response 🧵
Western sanctions on Russian oil and gas industry (except for NS2 pipeline), as well as blacklisting them from SWIFT bank payment system, seem to be off the table
reuters.com/world/europe/s…
Sanctions on NS2 seem to be a certainty but they are not going to matter much to Putin in the event that Russia actually brings Ukraine into its sphere of influence with military force
Read 18 tweets
Feb 10
I’ve been convinced since mid December that the RU invasion of UKR is very likely. But I recognize that a lot of people disagree (not least of all, many in UKR government — at least publicly)

It is always good to reevaluate your assumptions so let’s red team the alternatives 🧵
I have heard 2 predominant theories of why Putin might not invade:

1. He will recognize the significant risks and costs of an operation and pull back at the last minute

2. This was a bluff from day one and he was never planning to invade

Let’s evaluate both systematically
First, the pullback theory

Essentially, some people seem to believe that Putin—who, whatever else you want to say about him, is no dummy—launched a massive troops buildup (and not recently, but back last spring) and only just now realized that it is not going to work
Read 30 tweets
Jan 30
Many of the skeptics of possible Russian invasion of Ukraine seem to largely base their confidence in the idea that a large-scale military operation against Ukraine would be devastating to Russia in economic and human costs and, thus, would be foolish for Putin to undertake 🧵
However, this analysis discounts 2 possibilities:

1. Skeptics may be right about the tremendous costs of invasion for Russia but discounting that Putin may be underestimating them. He may believe the military op would be cheap and quick, while economic sanctions not very severe
And second possibility:

2. That skeptics are wrong and Russian General Staff may have planned a devastating blitzkrieg that can quickly decimate Ukrainian forces and, with utmost brutality and good intelligence, quickly destroy all major resistance to the east of the Dnieper
Read 5 tweets
Jan 23
A month ago on this site I predicted that Putin is likely to invade Ukraine this winter. Since then the White House, among others, have come out with a similar assessment.

Let’s talk now about how such invasion may unfold and what its primary goals might be 🧵
First, Russia is going to need a casus belli for attack. The most likely scenario is that Putin will create a pretext for war by manufacturing a Ukrainian attack on Russia.
His other option is to try to provoke the Ukrainians into reckless action but that is less likely given how cautious and watchful they are for this scenario and how restricted their rules of engagement are in Donbas
Read 56 tweets

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