Thread by @nicholadrummond

Given a deteriorating relationship with Russia and Putin’s desire to enlarge his empire, we are inevitably returning to a Cold War posture where NATO forces in Europe will need to pre-positioned to prevent future land grabs.
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ft.com/content/f3aaf2…

Hard power is necessary to establish a clear red line, which if crossed, marks the difference between peace and conflict. This is an antiquated concept, but it kept the peace in Europe for 50+ years or until Putin came to power.
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This means that the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review, Defence Command Paper and Future Soldier Guide are already out-of-date. This gives us an opportunity to correct the compromised structure imposed upon the Army by further cost savings.
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Under current plans, the Army will have two armoured brigades, an air assault brigade, and a light mech infantry brigade. (The Deep Reconnaissance Strike brigade will remain an aspiration until Ajax delivers.) That’s just FOUR brigades in total. This simply isn’t credible.
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Obviously, we are not going to bring back the the British Army of the Rhine as it existed in the mid-1980s, with four armoured divisions and an artillery division. But we need something more substantial than we have today.
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Nor is this about returning to outdated Cold War doctrine. We simply do not have the mass to defeat Russia in a head-on clash. But we do possess a technological edge that allows us to fight smarter. This is why we have rightly prioritised the Deep Battle over the Close Battle.
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Twitter is not an ideal environment to describe the UK’s approach to multi-domain operations, but in essence the Army needs to be reconfigured so that it can engage and defeat enemies at stand-off distances using long-range tube, rocket and missile artillery.
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We will need robust reconnaissance units to find and fix the enemy. Forward elements will act as a screening force to protect our deep fires assets. So the Armoured Cavalry concept that Ajax embodies remains relevant to the way the Army intends to fight.
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The question that must be answered is what happens if Ajax is undeliverable or doesn’t arrive until the late 2020s? The Army is resolutely committed to Ajax because its cancellation would mean the loss of 600 armoured vehicles. It has already lost 400 Warrior IFVs.
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My firm belief is that the UK must replicate the structure used by the US Army which divides units into all-tracked Armoured Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT), all-wheeled Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) plus predominantly Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT).
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Heavy armour ABCTs take longer to deploy but are more resilient. SBCTs deploy rapidly but are less resilient. Within a US Army Waypoint division, SBCTs provide a screening / deep reconnaissance strike force, while ABCTs provide the “Schwerpunkt” or main effort and mass.
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To achieve this, I would maintain the current high level structure proposed by the Future Soldier Guide with 1 (UK) Division, 3 (UK) Division, and 6 (UK) Division, supported by Field Army troops, Home Command and the Joint Forces Command.
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I would reconfigure 1 (UK) Division as a medium formation with two all-wheeled MIV brigades and 3 (UK) Division as a heavy formation with two all-tracked armored brigades. I would add a Light mechanised infantry brigade to each division to give it additional mass.
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Note above the major expansion of the Royal Artillery, doubling G/MLRS regiments while increasing total air defence regiments. I estimate 14 regular artillery regiments would be needed.
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This plan would require 200 Challenger 3s to be upgraded plus the acquisition of 600 new medium weight platforms to replace both Warrior and FV432, plus additional Boxers. It also requires MRVP to be accelerated.
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The plan also requires the Regular Army headcount cap reduction to be cancelled to generate the extra combat support assets needed to sustain deployed formations. The Army Reserve would also need to be enlarged so that it can fulfil its proper function: reinforcement.
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The revised structure would allow us to forward deploy medium or heavy brigades. It would enable us to be a more effective coalition partner. It would still allow us to perform out-of-area operations. It would restore the Army's credibility and thus its career offer.
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The estimated cost of this refinement would be:
- £1 billion extra per annum over 10 years to deliver the additional capabilities.
- £500 per annum to support the retained headcount of 80,000 total regular personnel.
A total of £1.5 to £2.0 billion extra per annum.
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Is all this unaffordable? Affordability is defined by the priorities the Government sets. So, if we can allocate an immediate £37 billion to a track and trace system that never worked, adding an extra £2 billion per annum to regenerate our Army shouldn’t be a problem.
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Ultimately, this discussion boils down to one question: what price do you put on being able to defend UK interests? If we'd started to regenerate the Army as we should have done in 2010, instead of cutting it, we wouldn't need to spend the extra money we need to fix it today.
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