I'm seeing a good deal of ire and snark about UK sanctions, and while I'm usually up for a good deal of ire and snark, I'm not sure it's entirely deserved in this case.
If you missed it, here it is, targeting the assets and operations of key banks and billionaires.
Yes, it feels like small beans, compared to what the EU and the US are doing. But then the UK _is_ small beans compared to the EU and the US, which can, if they want, entirely upend the Russian economy. London can't.
And yes, the structure of the sanctions give the targets the opportunity to divest, rather than losing their assets altogether. But absent proof that the assets were ill-gained sufficient to convince a court, effective confiscation was never really on the cards.
But don't underestimate the impact of kicking these people -- and others like them -- out of of London.
For one thing, the assets these people hold are significant, and divesting from them -- if they are even able to do so at short notice -- will turn into a fire sale. The sums they stand to lose are enormous.
Second, those assets are worth more than what it says on paper. They are fungible and can be leveraged in ways that assets held in Russia cannot. They thus unlock wealth in many ways far greater than what they actually contain.
Moreover, oligarchs flock to London not because they like the weather or the food, but because there are very few other cities that offer assets that are both reliable stores of massive value, and which are also reasonably liquid. There aren't many other places they can go.
So, _if_ implemented consistently and broadly, and _if_ the gov't pays serious attention to beneficial ownership, this can hit much harder than it looks at first glance. (Admittedly, those are big 'ifs'.)
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Throughout this crisis, one key analytical divide (of several) has been between those analysts who focus on Russian domestic politics on the one hand, and military analysts on the other. I'm obviously in the former camp.
By and large, with notable exceptions, analysts of Russian domestic politics thought war was possible, but unlikely. We generally came to that conclusion based on the risks that a war entails for Putin domestically, and a general assumption about the primacy of domestic politics.
We can debate those conclusions and assumptions later, but we were obviously wrong.
Military analysts generally looked at the scale of forces arrayed against Ukraine and said this was too big to signal anything but war. It certainly looks like they were right.
A bit of analysis, with the caveat that I am struggling to hold it together right now. People in my line of work aren't supposed to be affected by this stuff, but we are. Sorry.
The strategic ambiguity, as always, remains, but it is looking increasingly like cover for a war.
I am trying very hard to find a way to read "de-militarization and de-nazification of Ukraine" as anything but full-scale invasion. I'm failing, but hoping someone better than me succeeds.
Putin declared a war by another name -- a "special military operation". He also said there would be no occupation, but if you can have a war you don't call a war, I suppose you can also have an occupation that you don't call an occupation.
As best I can tell, Putin is declaring war on live TV at 05:45am Moscow time.
Drawing a series of parallels -- Chechnya, Crimea, Syria, Donbas. "We simply haven't been given another option to defend our people other than the one we are forced to use today."
"The People's Republics of Donbas have asked for our help. ... I have decided to launch a special military operation. ... We will seek to demilitarize and de-nazify Ukraine."
If you believe he’s after Ukraine in whole or in part, then expect Putin to wait and see how Kyiv reacts viz military posture, and how US and EU react viz sanctions, and then re-calibrate his risk-reward model before deciding how far and how hard to press on.
If you believe he’s just after DNR/LNR and has written off the rest of Ukraine, then expect gradual creep to secure key infrastructure (see Georgia’s ever-shrinking borders), but probably avoiding major war (and major sanctions).
So, a couple of thoughts on this: (1) Don't worry to much; (2) Worry a little. axios.com/putin-ukraine-…
Here's why not to worry:
The sanctions against DPR/LPR are mostly meaningless, but they're just a placeholder for the moment. There will more to come, which I would expect to be significantly expanded sanctions against against key Russian individuals and corporations.
Here's why to worry a bit, from Psaki: "To be clear: these measures are separate from and would be in addition to the swift and severe economic measures we have been preparing in coordination with Allies and partners should Russia further invade Ukraine."
Note the word "further".
Putin's Donbas address is unbelievably dark and aggressive.
I've watched a lot of Putin speeches, and I don't think I've ever seen one quite like this.
"Contemporary Ukraine should be called The Vladimir I. Lenin Republic of Ukraine. And then they tore down his statues and called it de-communization. You want decommunization? We're prepared to show you what that really means for Ukraine."
This speech has none of the euphoria -- none of the high moral notes -- of Putin's 2014 Crimea address. It doesn't even have the rallying cries of his Feb. 23 2012 campaign speech.