Guessing this is the victim according to that DI_Ukraine tweet
A very surface comment on the functioning malware– abusing a legitimate driver for wiping is a classic from Lazarus Destover and Shamoon, but this is a different driver. Don't draw attribution conclusions from that, more of a shared TTP to get past permission issues.
Redundant loading drivers based on OS version info and bitness (GetLastError != ERROR_OLD_WIN_VERSION, I think)
Btw, regarding that victim tweet above (Titan)– it's speculation. Running with scissors here. Sounds like @ESETresearch might know some victim orgs though :)
Looks like it's opening the beginning of those drives and doing some crypto there. Tbh, it's beyond my quick analysis abilities – anyone looking at 0x401EEA ?
Wow.. they're being thorough..
I have to admit that there's a surprising amount of thorough cleanup after this. Any chance this is a cleanup op more than just a wiper?
Ok.. this isn't a bullshit wiper like the last time.
Ok, folks, we're clearly missing the *MOST* important part of all of this. Seeing as neither @threatintel nor @ESETresearch have named this monster, let's call this #HermeticWiper
Day2, hopefully briefer and less hectic. Our friends at Symantec have published a great blog with way more detail about the attack chain and additional IOCs, including a decoy ransomware–
The 'ransomware' (4dc13bb83a16d4ff9865a51b3e4d24112327c526c1392e14d56f20d6f4eaf382) is written in Go and C and has some interesting quirks and taunting–
Despite a ton of standard Go functions (as is usually the case), all we really want to focus on are the main and Cgo functions.
@1njection I agree with your general sentiment but in the interest of pedantry—
-Regin is your main 4 Eyes APT
-Equation group is (sort of) your missing eye
-Lamberts/‘Longhorn’ == CIA
And then there’s a few presumably western outliers that haven’t been attributed (ex: ProjectSauron)
@1njection To your larger point, you’ll notice that there’s very little follow up on any of these. There’s a complex calculus in the EDR/AV industry on whether to report on ‘friendly’ ops. I understand if they choose not to publish reports but imo intentionally not *detecting* is fraud.
Ok friends, you know it's a wonderful day when you get woken up by @Bing_Chris on madness in Iran. If you haven't seen what's going on, another trollish attack played out today with gas stations in Iran not being able to dispense gas #64411
Screens on the gas pump PoS systems say 'cyberattack, 64411' in Farsi. For avid readers, this should be a throwback to the Iranian railway systems attack in July where the attackers also directed calls to 64411, the Office of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei' #MeteorExpress
We were able to reconstruct the attack chain used in the Iranian railway system, a combination of well-written crafty batch scripts + an externally configurable wiper called 'Meteor'. That led us to calling this group MeteorExpress. s1.ai/meteor
Tbh, when I tweeted out the story about VPNs getting consolidated under a shady company with a reputation for malware/adware distribution, I didn't expect that it would get that big of a response. Since folks are interested, I wanted to discuss my biggest issue w this... #Thread
Sure, shady monetization schemes w ads are the bulk of the business model but it doesn't take into account the targeted espionage concern. Ad networks are fantastically positioned to profile internet users to an impressive level of granularity but they're limited–
For a determined adversary with control or influence over an ad network, you might have access to selectively injecting iframes or malicious ads in the hopes of hitting that one precious target. But a VPN introduces a much smoother avenue of attack.
It's awesome to see analysis of Lamberts and Equation Group tools. They're some of the most noteworthy findings in the short history of Cyber Threat Intelligence and we're doing a disservice by collectively ignoring their existence. Great work @runasand and @patrickwardle!
If you missed it, I'm sure the video will be up in the near future. In the meantime, here's Runa's blog on Green Lambert OS X objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x68…
For additional (non-MacOS) background, here's an overview of the color-coded constellation of the Lambert's toolkit up to a point– securelist.com/unraveling-the…
There are three things you don't want to see made– laws, sausages, and threat intelligence.
Frankly, I'm bummed out at the framing of this issue. It adds fuel to the air-quote 'privacy' debate that keeps eating away at our ability to do security research, as in the case of GDPR.
I've played with Augury before. Netflow can be useful. But for the most part it's spotty, incomplete, and inconclusive. You don't turn into a SIGINT agency because you have visibility into a few hops along a path for a sliver of time. Internet routing doesn't work that way.
You're seeing points connecting to other points at a given time. If the connection is routed a different way, if it takes a hop you don't have access to, if any number of factors changes the connective tissue of the internet, you don't see anything.