Day2, hopefully briefer and less hectic. Our friends at Symantec have published a great blog with way more detail about the attack chain and additional IOCs, including a decoy ransomware–
The 'ransomware' (4dc13bb83a16d4ff9865a51b3e4d24112327c526c1392e14d56f20d6f4eaf382) is written in Go and C and has some interesting quirks and taunting–
Despite a ton of standard Go functions (as is usually the case), all we really want to focus on are the main and Cgo functions.
Among those, you can already see some of the bizarre taunting–
More importantly, in execution, the malware seems to lose control of concurrent threads creating hundreds of events in our consoles– super loud and ineffective as ransomware (Credit to Jim Walter for the dynamic analysis)
Btw, for folks looking to analyze the Go malware, we released AlphaGolang (a set of IDA plugins for v7.6 and under). The folder organizing feature was adopted by IDA v7.7 natively :) github.com/SentineLabs/Al…
Filenames to keep in mind from the Symantec blog. I have to admit that I find the idea of *independent* ransomware sample being used as a decoy or distraction from a wiper is counterintuitive but who knows.
Ok... so I've been looking to understand the concurrency here. I think there might be big mistake in the code (and one that happens to amateur Go programmers all the time). Concurrent threads are handled by sync WaitGroup that functions as a sort of mutex/counter for threads.
Usually, you wrangle those concurrent threads with an upperbound – max 8 threads or whatever.
In this case, 'partyTicket_len' which is determined by the wHiteHouse.GoodOffice1() function
It looks like they upper bound is dynamically determined and huge (an enumerated file count maybe?) and... they *never* call sync.WaitGroup.Done()! Because that lives in main.subscribeNewPartyMember()... and that's never called!
So that's my explanation for why this thing runs a bajillion threads. It's more effective as a local DoS of the system than a piece of ransomware...
Aaaaand seeing as our friends at @threatintel didn't name this one either... I'm gonna go with @TomHegel's suggestion that we call this PartyTicket!
@1njection I agree with your general sentiment but in the interest of pedantry—
-Regin is your main 4 Eyes APT
-Equation group is (sort of) your missing eye
-Lamberts/‘Longhorn’ == CIA
And then there’s a few presumably western outliers that haven’t been attributed (ex: ProjectSauron)
@1njection To your larger point, you’ll notice that there’s very little follow up on any of these. There’s a complex calculus in the EDR/AV industry on whether to report on ‘friendly’ ops. I understand if they choose not to publish reports but imo intentionally not *detecting* is fraud.
Ok friends, you know it's a wonderful day when you get woken up by @Bing_Chris on madness in Iran. If you haven't seen what's going on, another trollish attack played out today with gas stations in Iran not being able to dispense gas #64411
Screens on the gas pump PoS systems say 'cyberattack, 64411' in Farsi. For avid readers, this should be a throwback to the Iranian railway systems attack in July where the attackers also directed calls to 64411, the Office of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei' #MeteorExpress
We were able to reconstruct the attack chain used in the Iranian railway system, a combination of well-written crafty batch scripts + an externally configurable wiper called 'Meteor'. That led us to calling this group MeteorExpress. s1.ai/meteor
Tbh, when I tweeted out the story about VPNs getting consolidated under a shady company with a reputation for malware/adware distribution, I didn't expect that it would get that big of a response. Since folks are interested, I wanted to discuss my biggest issue w this... #Thread
Sure, shady monetization schemes w ads are the bulk of the business model but it doesn't take into account the targeted espionage concern. Ad networks are fantastically positioned to profile internet users to an impressive level of granularity but they're limited–
For a determined adversary with control or influence over an ad network, you might have access to selectively injecting iframes or malicious ads in the hopes of hitting that one precious target. But a VPN introduces a much smoother avenue of attack.
It's awesome to see analysis of Lamberts and Equation Group tools. They're some of the most noteworthy findings in the short history of Cyber Threat Intelligence and we're doing a disservice by collectively ignoring their existence. Great work @runasand and @patrickwardle!
If you missed it, I'm sure the video will be up in the near future. In the meantime, here's Runa's blog on Green Lambert OS X objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x68…
For additional (non-MacOS) background, here's an overview of the color-coded constellation of the Lambert's toolkit up to a point– securelist.com/unraveling-the…
There are three things you don't want to see made– laws, sausages, and threat intelligence.
Frankly, I'm bummed out at the framing of this issue. It adds fuel to the air-quote 'privacy' debate that keeps eating away at our ability to do security research, as in the case of GDPR.
I've played with Augury before. Netflow can be useful. But for the most part it's spotty, incomplete, and inconclusive. You don't turn into a SIGINT agency because you have visibility into a few hops along a path for a sliver of time. Internet routing doesn't work that way.
You're seeing points connecting to other points at a given time. If the connection is routed a different way, if it takes a hop you don't have access to, if any number of factors changes the connective tissue of the internet, you don't see anything.