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Michael Kofman Profile picture
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Feb 4 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
I'm going to differ a bit, this is looking for the wrong item in the text. Russia never framed this confrontation as being about Ukraine, it framed it as being about security guarantees and 'indivisibility of security' in Europe, using that as a vehicle to discuss its demands. 1/
The text very clearly indicates Chinese support for Russia's demands on security guarantees in Europe. We know what those are, and which countries they concern. So its a puzzle why folks are expecting to find Ukraine listed in all caps somewhere.
And it shows support for the Russian formulation regarding indivisibility of security.
Here is the English version en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770
If you look at it from the standpoint of Russian strategy, how they are trying to frame this issue, which we know centers on Ukraine, but is also about European security, the joint statement does suggest Chinese support for the Russian position using Russia's preferred framing.

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Michael Kofman Profile picture
Feb 4
The large number of forces Russia shifted from its Eastern Military District (12 BTGs+) to Belarus is illustrative of the degree of vulnerability Moscow is comfortable with China. The Russian Far East has probably not been stripped of combat power like this in decades. /1
This large deployment from EMD, unprecedented in contemporary history, offers one additional piece of evidence that the alignment liberates both states to pursue their respective contests, without having to invest as much in hedging against each other. 2/
If Moscow does go through with a large-scale military operation, this deployment will not be short lived. It suggests Eastern MD will be understrength for quite some time and it shows a degree of Russian confidence in the relationship. 3/
Read 5 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
Jan 23
Folks are right to be skeptical about regime change, but if you consider the logic, a compellance operation or a punitive raid doesn't make good sense in this case. Moscow has no way to enforce implementation of any agreement it imposes without regime change and/or occupation. 1/
The problem with the various lower-end scenarios is they don't offer much in the way of gains. Prior offensives yielded Minsk I, and again Minsk II. This strategy is seen as having failed. Why would Moscow repeat the same failed strategy of compelling with a limited operation? 2/
Moscow loses bargaining power as soon as an offensive ends, which means it has no way to secure preferences in UKR no matter what deal is signed at gunpoint. UKR only gains in Western support, Russian influence declines in the country, sanctions increase. 3/
Read 7 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
Jan 15
Dmitry Gorenburg (@russmil) and I wrote an article for WaPo outlining what we think we know about the Russian military buildup. I'm going to summarize the content here. Long thread. /1
Forces near Ukraine (250-300km) can be estimated at 60 battalion tactical groups (BTGs). These are task organized combined arms formations, averaging 800 personnel in size, but structure varies. Can be 600-1000. However, BTGs are a rough way to measure. 2/
Permanently based ground forces around Ukraine constitute 55-60k. Roughly half of these 60 BTGs are therefore being counted from units garrisoned in the area, the other half represents the buildup. We are using BTGs that could be generated as an imperfect unit of measurement. 3/
Read 12 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
Dec 8, 2021
Feel its important to dispel a few myths about the military aspects of the situation. First, that a real military buildup would have the element of surprise and this is so visible that it can't possibly reflect worst intentions. That's just not correct. 1/
Russia can deploy a large force, with prepositioned equipment, for months. Then add logistics and conduct an operation on short notice. The posture retains the element of surprise. Ukraine cannot know the timing of the operation and can't afford to mobilize too early either. 2/
Current unit positions do not necessarily reflect final unit positions. They are being moved about. Russia can move these units back and forth for months. And yes this does appear to be a much more covert deployment, contrary to what some political analysts think. 3/
Read 6 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
Nov 9, 2021
Brief thoughts on Russian military activity and deployments. The deployment does constitute a buildup, and not just north, or east of Ukraine. Elements of 41st CAA, 1st GTA, & 58th CAA reinforcing permanently based units of the 20th and 8th CAA & 22nd Army Corps in Crimea. 1/
The military activity is out of cycle. These are not routine drills, certification checks, and one would struggle to come up with innocuous explanations for what is being observed. It is not just about 41st CAA units moving up to Yelnya, or 1st GTA movements. 2/
This activity is not particularly public, or paired with coercive statements, compared to what took place in February-April earlier this year. It does appear that the Russian military has been ordered to position itself for a possible operation in the coming months. 3/
Read 7 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
Oct 31, 2021
Commercial sat imagery suggests that units parked at Pogonovo began leaving over a week ago. A new concentration has appeared near Yelnya in recent days. The 144th is an unfilled, understrength division. It appears that elements of the 41st have shifted position to Yelnya. 1/
Elements of the 41st CAA were parked in Pogonovo after March-April, supposedly to participate in Zapad-2021 exercises. They never left after the exercise which concluded mid-September. Then began loading and moving out over the past week. janes.com/defence-news/n…
Here The Lookout's post is quite helpful, discussing the appearance of a new concentration of forces in Yelnya that emerged in recent days, and unlikely to belong to the 144th MRD.
Read 4 tweets

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