100% right. This is an understandable emotion but not a considered policy position. Publicly taking that stance = zero incentive for compromise from Putin or anyone close to him, creating the most dangerous possible situation
Remember what McNamara learned from Castro about the Cuban missile crisis in 1992: In the event of a US invasion, Castro was prepared to endorse the use of nuclear weapons even though he knew the Cuban people would "disappear" armscontrol.org/act/2002-11/fe…
Embracing regime change would also shift the narrative in wholly self-destructive ways. Potential to fragment global consensus vs Russia. W/in Russia, it would endorse Putin's lie that this is all a necessary response to Western aggression + potentially boost his support
There is a middle ground. Demand RU withdrawal and indicate that US/EU = ready for diplomacy w/current regime to end crisis. But signal to Russian officials, people that full recovery of Russia's int'l position will demand real change. Undertake private contacts in that direction
All of this may collapse down to the same result; there is no world in which Europe goes back to "normal" discussions with Putin. But Russia isn't Iraq, or even North Korea. Publicly ruling out any outcome short of end of regime would be a fantastically risky move
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I so respect and agree w/most of what @KoriSchake writes, but am surprised by the implicit message of this new piece--specifically that a major part of "the Biden problem" is that the president isn't willing to threaten military force to defend Ukraine nytimes.com/2022/02/11/opi…
2/ *No one* wants Russia to invade or considers the threat to Ukraine a minor issue. It would be a human catastrophe and a major assault on shared norms. But the security of Ukraine is simply not a vital US interest; there's no way to escape that brutal fact
3/ Kori writes, "Biden is sending the message that the US is afraid of confronting Russia militarily," and even if we don't plan to attack, "it’s a big bargaining advantage for Russia if ... we’re ultimately reassuring it that it doesn’t need to worry about us"
This may be true. But increasingly US policy toward Russia and Iran, *at least publicly* seems to be, "we refuse to take your interests seriously and claim the right to pursue our favored norms as we wish. But we demand that you play by the rules of the road we have laid down"
An unqualified, normative interpretation of the rules-based order worked from 1990 to maybe 2007-8. Now we need engaged, order-seeking statecraft: Not retrenchment, not abandoning the idea of a rule-based order, but being willing to qualify + condition norms on the edges
The idea that allowing any exceptions will produce a cascade of violations + collapse of the norm doesn't match historical experience. Plus, the US has claimed for itself many exceptions we seek to deny others, ranging from controlling foreign forces in Cuba to invading Iraq
Theoretical / conceptual arguments about the role of US global engagement don't capture the real texture of this issue. Interviewed loads of US officials, FSOs, + military officers who confirm that these ties *do* convey significant influence ... defensepriorities.org/explainers/pha…
... in ways that aren't always apparent outside the negotiating room, or may take years to develop, but can be critical. Looking for unqualified influence judges US global role by the wrong criterion; this essay misses many aspects of these rich + complex relationships
For example: "Yet on issue after issue, the South Korean government has butted heads with Washington" is a far too simple + misleading summary of the US-ROK relationship, especially through ROK admins of striking different political stripes. Allies + partners have ...
Just another reminder that this is basically the same strategic norm the US claimed re: Cuba and enforced in the missile crisis + later. SecState Vance in 1979 about just the infamous Soviet brigade in Cuba: "the presence of this unit runs counter to long‐held American policies"
Remember, too, that in the resolution of the crisis, in agreeing to (private) assurances to w/draw missiles from Turkey, the US explicitly affirmed the validity of this notion of equivalence: It is destabilizing for a great power to deploy certain weapons too close to its rival
I know that the debate over what Russia was + was not promised re: NATO enlargement still rages. Persuasive arguments on both sides, tho my best reading of the evidence = that Russia has a decent case to feel at least slightly misled. But ... rferl.org/a/nato-expansi…
A fascinating and visually stimulating summary of several Taiwan scenarios. But it reinforces a lesson of every unclas/strategic-level game or TTX I have ever participated in: I don't see how the PRC makes unqualified aggression work reuters.com/investigates/s… via @SpecialReports
Every time I've seen this played out (politically + strategically, not tactically), there comes a point where those who'd prefer to hedge (Japan, EU, etc) become enraged by Beijing's aggression and decide they have no choice but to respond more decisively--whatever that means
They do that in large measure not because of any generic commitment to norms or alliances (though those are real considerations). They do it because *their* interests become directly threatened, and their red lines get crossed
Very happy to (finally) highlight the release of this study. The idea, given intensifying US-RU/US-CH rivalry, was to ask what factors tend to stabilize such competitions and keep them from running out of control. A few major findings [THREAD]: rand.org/pubs/research_…
2/ We reviewed literature on stability, escalation, and rivalry, and developed principles of stability in great power rivalries. We tested these in a number of historical cases + applied the resulting framework to current US-China and US-Russia contests
3/ Those current-day applications are a little dated--it took a while to get this report out. But we believe the basic conclusions remain valid, and that the trajectory we laid out has roughly continued (though has been mitigated in some cases, eg US Russia diplomacy)