In this month’s cover of @CTCWP I look at the who/what/where/when/why/how of Iranian external assassination, surveillance, & abduction plots, based on a personal dataset. ctc.usma.edu/february-2022/
A thread 🧵👇
2. This study is based on a dataset that includes 98 cases of assassination, abduction, attack, & surveillance plots by the #Iran regime from Dec 1979–Dec 2021
3. WHO is targeted by #Iran? Of the 98 cases, 42 target dissidents, 31 target Jews/Israelis, 24 target diplomats, 24 target Western interests, & 7 target Gulf interests (note: some cases target multiple)
4. In the last decade (55 cases), 22 target dissidents, 25 target Jews/Israelis, 19 target diplomats, 12 target Western interests, & 6 target Gulf interests
6. WHO are #Iran ‘s perpetrators? Iranian operatives are preferred, but of 98 cases, 38 cases use non-Iranians/locals, 21 cases use dual nationals, and 7 cases outsource to criminal orgs
7. #Iran and #Hezbollah have actively recruited and deployed dual-nationals for several years now. They are expected to travel & operate using their non-Iranian docs. I noted this trend in @CTCWP in 2020 ctc.usma.edu/fighters-witho…
8. In 2018, registered Iranian diplomat to Austria Assadollah Assadi plotted to bomb the annual @iran_policy conference in Paris, but this was just 1 example of #Iran using gov officials for terror france24.com/en/live-news/2…
9. Iranian diplomats/operatives w/ diplomatic cover were involved in 22 plots in the dataset, including 13 in the past decade. I wrote about this phenomenon w/ @CTCWP in 2018 ctc.usma.edu/irans-deadly-d…
10. WHAT Iranian external ops are we talking about? Of the 98 cases in our dataset, 42 are assassination plots, 10 are abduction plots, 21 are indiscriminate attack plots, & 54 cases involve surveillance
11. According to the dataset, pre-2011 most assassination plots used Iranian operatives (21/24), but in the past decade Iran has been just as likely to dispatch locals/non-Iranians & dual nationals as Iranians
12. The 2011 #Iran plot targeting the Saudi ambassador to the US used Iranian-American dual national Mansour Arbabsiar. Following the arrest, @ODNIgov James Clapper testified that Iranian officials had “changed their calculus” washingtonpost.com/world/national…@gregpmiller
13. HOW does Iran attack + assassinate? Most cases use small arms or explosives, but bombs have become somewhat more common vs individuals & a couple of abduction cases have used sedatives
14. The biggest recent development is use of cyber tools 4 surveillance & targeting. In 2012, #Iran recruited @usairforce intel specialist Monica Witt, who later researched USIC personnel & put together “target packages” on her former colleagues fbi.gov/wanted/counter…@FBI
15. Iranian operatives have used skillful tradecraft in some cases, but poor judgment in others. When police discovered a 2012 #Thailand plot, one operative threw an explosive at police & blew off his own legs bbc.com/news/world-asi…
16. WHERE does #Iran operate? Of the 98 cases, 53 occurred in North America (14) or Europe (39), while 43 occurred in places like South America (4), Africa (10), Asia (21), & the Middle East (8)
17. Of the 20 cases targeting US interests, 12 occurred outside the US in countries with more lax security systems—frequently in Central Asia, the Gulf, & Africa
18. The WHEN & WHY of Iran attack planning are a lot harder to pin down. Iranian sticky bomb plots in 2012 were clear—they were part of its shadow war w/ the West after attacks on #Iran ’s nuclear program washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
19. Others like the Arbabsiar case are less clear. There is suspicion it was revenge after the crackdown on “Arab Spring” protesters in Bahrain. Can't know for sure using only open source data cnn.com/2013/05/30/jus…
20. Iran’s antipathy toward Israel is real, but most typically pursued via proxies. By acting through proxies like Lebanese #Hezbollah, #Iran manages risk & projects influence well beyond its borders. Note recent plot in Colombia timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-plan…
21. Maybe the biggest takeaway: Iran pursues plots in a very aggressive fashion, even at times and in places that are particularly sensitive (including JCPOA & current renewal talks)
25. I love publishing with @CTCWP Sentinel, not only for its wide reach & smart readers, but for the tremendous editing of @CruickshankPaul@KristinaKHummel & their team. It's an honor to have this paper on the cover of this month's volume. Thank U! ctc.usma.edu/february-2022/ //END
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It's been a long, painful year since the #Hamas massacre of Oct 7. Here's a look back at my writing this year, starting with a @ForeignAffairs article on Oct 11 on "The War Hamas Always Wanted"
2. Next was a look at "The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and US Policy," together with @robsatloff @EhudYaariJLM #NeomiNeumann & @GhAlOmari @WashInstitutewashingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
3. Soon came the anniversary of the 1983 #Hezbollah bombing of the US Marine & French military peacekeepers, which prompted me to write on the "Echoes of 1983 Beirut Bombings in Current Iranian Proxy Escalation" @WashInstitute washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
2. No comment on China in Mideast, but notes "CCP is increasing its criticism of perceived U.S. failures and hypocrisy, including the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and racial tensions in the United States"
3. Russia: In the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow is using its involvement in Syria, Libya, and Sudan to increase its clout, undercut U.S. leadership, present itself as an indispensable mediator, and gain military access rights and economic opportunities.
Breaking: @STLebanon appeal chamber reverses acquittals & convicts Merhi & Oneissi, including on charge of conspiracy aimed at committing a terrorist act, ie #Hezbollah murder of #RafiqHariri
2. The @STLebanon Appeals Chamber does, however, find that the Trial Chamber committed an error of fact by failing to find that Mr Badreddine was a #Hezbollah military commander in 2004 and 2005
3. The @STLebanon Appeals Chamber also finds that the Trial Chamber erred in both law and fact by holding that written statements from unavailable witnesses showing that the Green Network was a #Hezbollah network were not corroborated
2. On Feb 12, 2008, Imad #Mughniyeh was killed in a joint @CIA -Mossad op near Damascus. A bomb was placed in his car’s spare tire. Fearing he would be next, #Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan #Nasrallah warned Israel to expect an “open war”
3. #Hezbollah was desperate to avenge Mughniyeh’s death. The problem was, they weren’t very successful. Operations in Azerbaijan, Egypt, Greece, Turkey, and West Africa were all foiled washingtoninstitute.org/hezbollahinter…
Thread 🧵re SOF raid that took out ISIS leader Qurayshi: 1. Like previous administrations, Biden seeks to get out of 'endless wars' and pivot from Mideast to Asia. Adversaries get a vote, however, so CT efforts must continue. Biden: we will come after you.
2. CT efforts should be seen not in terms of victory or defeat, but rather as an ongoing effort— short of both war and peace—in which both lethal and nonlethal tools are employed to compete with adversaries and disrupt acts of terrorism washingtoninstitute.org/media/4359
3. CT officials very focused on making sure any shift in CT policy seeks a maximum return on US 20-year investment in CT while preserving the many advances made during this period. With fewer troops on ground, looking to leverage opportunities to keep adversaries off balance
1. ~20 yrs after 9/11, it's time 2 think thru what a rationalized & sustainable U.S. CT global posture should look like. We've built great CT tools over 20 yrs, but tools should not dictate strategy. Next week @WashInstitute publishes my CT policy review paper, lots 2 discuss
2. Biden admin interim guidance echoes broadly bipartisan desire 2 rationalize U.S. investment in CT that goes back at least two administrations including pledge not to engage in “forever wars” & to “right-size” U.S. military presence in Mideast whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
3. When it comes to fighting terrorism overseas, mood has shifted to focus on groups presenting threats to homeland, while addressing regional terrorist threats thru intel & action by local partners. But such a shift comes with risks