NB. I don't believe we're anywhere near nuclear warfare in Europe. But the possibility exists. Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov have executive authority to go nuclear. Senior Armed Forces commanders already have devolved authority to use tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. 1/
The probability of nuclear warfare happening remains extremely low. But the possibility exists and the probabilities can change very quickly depending on events and changes in Russia's win vs lose perceptions. Ultimately, it's a power decision, not a military one. 2/
The primary executive control of nuclear weapons use exists with Putin. It is hoped that both Shoigu and Gerasimov have to concur before activation; if not, they too have indpendent executive authority in case of leadership decapitation. 3/
But the pertinent point now, regarding war in Ukraine and talk of 'no fly zones' and such like, is that if Putin feels Russia is losing, the psychological barrier against initiating nuclear warfare is lowered. Doesn't have to be madness; just personality. 4/
This - the psychology of nuclear authority and command in Russia - is what concerns NATO, the Pentagon, and every allied military command in the West. There is a threshold somewhere beyond which Putin (or the other two) will feel they have nothing to lose from going nuclear. 5/
There is absolutely no way of second-guessing Putin's real state of mind (or Shoigu's or Gerasimov's) or where the threshold exists. The one strong assumption is that 'losing' a war will cross that threshold - hence 'escalate to de-escalate'. 6/
The other strong assumption is that direct engagement in combat between Russia and NATO forces - something as simple as jet on jet - could cross that threshold. Simple machismo, laddish behaviour, pissing contest psychology: You shot my jet, I'm gonna shoot two of yours, etc. 7/
Once the threshold is crossed, especally by a 'failed' and 'beaten' leader who already has issues, the decision to go nuclear becomes more appealing in the sense of 'payback', 'we all go down together', 'serves you right' reasoning under stress and irrational decision making. 8/
Putin is clearly not acting like a normal rational leader of a stamp collector's club let alone the world's second most powerful nuclear armed state. Mix that with potential failure of his war, total isolation, bankruptcy of the state, loss of power, potential ouster = danger. 9/
Putin has a personal threshold at which he feels he has nothing to lose anymore. He lacks the moral strength to raise that threshold (as a nuclear leader). Therefore, that threshold is likely to crossed earlier than some people expect. But we're not there yet. 10/
The point about a 'No Fly Zone' is that it means NATO forces will be in combat situations with Russian forces. That challenge or not being able to win, or even losing in Ukraine, plus combat with NATO will likely lower Putin's threshold further. 11/
Desperate people do desperate things. If Putin feels he's going to lose control and power, he is likely to feel he has nothing left to lose. The fact that he has gone to war in such a way against Ukraine indicates that he has no qualms about large-scale casualties. 12/
Going nuclear would be an irrational but logical step for somebody in Putin's state of mind: a last throw of the dice, a last statement for the world (what's left of it) to remember him by. The threshold crossed. Normal people don't go to war on Ukraine. Putin is not normal. 13/
And that's why there can be no 'No Fly Zone' or bases in Poland for the Ukrainian Air Force. Putin may cross his personal threshold because Russia is losing against Ukraine - but there's nothing to gain, and everything to lose, from pushing that threshold lower for him. End/
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When analysts estimate the number of 🇷🇺 troops required to occupy an area of 🇺🇦 they often use a rule of thumb that expeditionary operations require a minimum troop density of 10 to 15 troops per 1,000 civilians depending on how hostile the local population is. However.. 1/
This assumes there are 1,000 civilians at the start of 'policing' an occupied area. If that figure can be reduced by 25%, 50%, 75% through displacement (shelling and bombing cities, towns and villages to terrorise people into fleeing, as in Syria) a wider area can be occupied. 2/
Approximately one-third of an expeditionary force is needed for 'policing' duties, that is, for combat in a counterinsurgency environment. The remainder are available for more traditional policing and other occupation duties. Combat may continue on the periphery. 3/
For starters, the US and other militaries do use civilian aircraft charter flights for transatlantic mobility, such as Omni Air International oai.aero/services-chart…
So, @MichealMartinTD@LeoVaradkar@EamonRyan and @SimonCoveney have approximately 9-10 days left to prepare #Ireland🇮🇪 for the economic, financial, social, political and psychological impacts of a 🇷🇺-🇺🇦 war that could escalate into a war that threatens all of Europe. 🧵 1/
Where is the Government of Ireland's strategy for managing public safety and civil defence? Where are the planning and preparedness measures for possible incidents involving, for example, risk to Irish-registered aircraft crossing eastern Europe? 2/
Or Irish citizens caught in the conflict zone or in Russia during wartime? Or extra naval protection for ferries crossing the Irish and Celtic Seas? Is the Government going to protect Ukrainian assets in Ireland from Russian 'hybrid' attacks (and vice versa)? 3/
Russia is not implementing its part of the #MinskAgreements, the security part, by maintaining a ceasefire, withdrawing its Occupation troops from the Donbas, allowing its militias to be disarmed peacefully and returning the border to Ukrainian control, with full OSCE access. 1/
At the same time, Russia insists that Ukraine is failing to implement its part of the agreements, the political part, by granting the Russian-occupied territories elections and political autonomy. Meanwhile, Russia issues passports, creating Donbas citizens of Russia. 2/
Russia has in effect co-opted Macron and Scholz in its efforts to force Ukraine to grant political 'autonomy' to a region occupied by Russian troops and under Moscow's control via puppet administrations. Any elections will inevitably be used to justify annexation by Russia. 3/
So, the current Western analytical wind is blowing in a "Russia is going to keep a lower level of build up in place but without attacking" direction. "Putin will off-ramp in slow motion thus avoiding a humiliating climbdown. He will maintain threat of war to extract concessions."
However, apart from obvious financial costs and difficulties of sustaining a large force far from garrisons, there's a risk of stalemate. The West sees Russia's plan and has no incentive to grant concessions. Result: the status quo (frozen conflict in Ukraine in return for gas).
Furthermore, once bitten, twice shy. NATO allies have been found wanting: first in 2014, then this winter. NATO is moving to strengthen its eastern flank and will - incrementally - continue to do so in coming years in order not to be caught out by a Russian mobilisation again.
'Putin and Macron could not conclude a deal to de-escalate the situation around Ukraine' tass.ru/politika/13646…
'Peskov denied the publication of the Financial Times newspaper about a deal to reduce tensions around Ukraine, which was allegedly concluded by the leaders of Russia and France, Vladimir Putin and Emmanuel Macron.'
'"Financial Times, of course, wrote wrong, basically wrong," a Kremlin spokesman told reporters on Tuesday. "In the current situation, Moscow and Paris could not conclude any deals, it is simply impossible," Peskov said.'